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This dissertation puts forward a series of arguments and theoretical proposals about 
the architecture and development of the human capacity to reason about the internal, 
psychological causes of behavior, known as “theory of mind” or “mindreading.”  
Chapter 1, “Foundations and motivations,” begins by articulating the 
philosophical underpinnings of contemporary theory-of-mind debates, especially the 
dispute between empiricists and nativists. I then argue for a nativist approach to 
theory-of-mind development, and then go on to outline how the subsequent chapters 
each address specific challenges for this nativist perspective. 
Chapter 2, “Pragmatic development and the false-belief task,” addresses the 
central puzzle of the theory-of-mind development literature: why is it that children 
below the age of five fail standard false-belief tasks, and yet are able to pass implicit 
versions of the false-belief task at a far younger age? According to my novel, nativist 
  
account, while they possess the concept of BELIEF very early in development, 
children’s early experiences with the pragmatics of belief discourse initially distort 
the way they interpret standard false-belief tasks; as children gain the relevant 
experience from their social and linguistic environment, this distortion eventually 
dissipates. In the Appendix (co-authored with Peter Carruthers), I expand upon this 
proposal to show how it can also account for another set of phenomena typically cited 
as evidence against nativism: the Theory-of-Mind Scale. 
Chapter 3, “Spontaneous mindreading: A problem for the two-systems 
account,” challenges the “two-systems” account of mindreading, which provides a 
different explanation for the implicit/explicit false-belief task gap, and has 
implications for the architecture of mature, adult mindreading. Using evidence from 
adults’ perspective-taking abilities I argue that this account is theoretically and 
empirically unsound.  
Chapter 4, “Character and theory of mind: An integrative approach,” begins 
by noting that contemporary accounts of mindreading neglect to account for the role 
of character or personality-trait representations in action-prediction and interpretation. 
Employing a hierarchical, predictive coding approach, I propose that character-trait 
representations are rapidly inferred in order to inform and constrain our mental-state 
attributions. 
Because this is a “covering concept” dissertation, each of these chapters 
(including the Appendix) is written so that it is independent of all of the others; they 
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Chapter 1: Foundations and motivations 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation is comprised of three core papers about theory of mind, or 
“mindreading,” which is the capacity to represent the mental states of other agents for 
the purposes of predicting and interpreting behavior. Each paper is concerned with a 
distinct aspect of theory of mind: Chapter 2 focuses on a longstanding debate about 
when we acquire the concept of BELIEF; Chapter 3 uses data on our reasoning about 
perceptual states to make a point about the architecture of theory of mind; Chapter 4 
proposes a model of how we reason about character traits. Additionally, I include in 
the Appendix a follow-up to the account laid out in Chapter 2, written collaboratively 
with Peter Carruthers, which concerns children’s ability to reason about desires and 
states of knowledge. The three core chapters are independent of one another, and can 
be read in any order. However, these three papers share a common approach, and can 
be read as part of a broader project. This project begins with a nativist perspective on 
the acquisition of theory of mind, and then works through a succession of key 
challenges from the mindreading literature that such an account must overcome. As 
these challenges are addressed one by one, a broader picture of the architecture and 
development of theory of mind starts to emerge. 
To establish this way of reading this dissertation, I begin by discussing the 
dispute between nativists and empiricists in the abstract, and laying out the general 




mindreading literature that hovers in the background of all three chapters in my 
dissertation: whether or not infants have the capacity to represent beliefs. This subject 
has been a source of renewed controversy among philosophers and developmental 
psychologists for over a decade now, epitomizing the contrast between nativist and 
empiricist approaches to mindreading, and to the mind more generally. Having 
established the plausibility of a nativist approach to theory of mind, I go on to present 
a few of the key empirical challenges that this view faces, and summarize how they 
are addressed in the chapters to come.  
2. What’s the philosopher doing here? 
First, however, a few words about why I, as a philosopher, am writing about this topic 
at all. At a glance, the topic of mindreading seems to belong to the domain of 
psychology. As such, one might wonder what a philosopher is doing writing about it. 
Fortunately for me, I am not alone: since it became a topic of sustained empirical 
research, philosophers have managed to insert themselves into debates about 
mindreading. When Premack and Woodruff, in their seminal article in Brain and 
Behavioral Sciences, asked, “Does the Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?”, it was 
three philosophers – Dennett, Harman and Bennett – who, in independent 
commentaries, suggested a principled criterion for discovering the answer: show that 
chimpanzees understand the intentionality of mental states (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 
1978; Harman, 1978; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). A good way to test this, they 
speculated, would be to design a behavioral task that could only be solved correctly 
given an understanding of false beliefs. A few years later, Wimmer and Perner (1983) 




developmental research program that continues to this day. During this time, 
philosophers have continued to play a substantial role in the mindreading literature 
(Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Carruthers, 2013; Christensen & Michael, 2015; Fenici, 
2013; Fodor, 1992; Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1996; Nichols & Stich, 
2003; Spaulding, 2010; Thompson, 2014; Zawidzki, 2011). 
One of the reasons why philosophers have been so involved in the 
mindreading debate has to do with its similarity to an old philosophical problem. 
Arising from the Cartesian thesis that we have privileged access to our own minds, 
and can therefore be certain of our own existence, the problem of other minds points 
to the fact that this certainty does not extend to the existence of other minds. 
Moreover, our understanding of our own mind seems to be intrinsically bound to our 
own first-person experience. Thus, there is a profound conceptual and 
epistemological gap between our grasp of our own minds and the minds of others. 
Given this gap, it is not clear how we could ever conceive of a mind that is not our 
own, let alone have knowledge of such a thing (Avramides, 2000; Hyslop, 2014). 
In answer, the philosophical literature has produced a number of attempted 
solutions. Mill proposed that our knowledge of other minds is grounded in an analogy 
between our own experience of the connection between our first-person mental states 
and behaviors, and our observations of the behaviors of others (Mill, 1865). Another 
solution is that we posit the existence of other minds because this is what best 
explains our observations of regularities in behavior; thus, other minds are treated as 
theoretical posits, much like other unobservables in scientific theories (Pargetter, 




endorsing a form of behaviorism about mental states (Wittgenstein, 1953), or by 
claiming perception-like access to some of other agents' mental states (Cassam, 2007; 
Gallagher, 2008). 
There is both a "hard" and a "soft" problem of other minds. The "hard" 
problem concerns how we reason about or conceptualize the qualitative, 
phenomenally conscious aspects of other minds: how do we know that other people's 
experiences are like ours, or completely different? How do we know that other people 
are not really philosophical zombies, who are functionally and physically like us, but 
lack inner lives and subjective experiences? The "soft" problem of other minds, on 
the other hand, assumes a functionalist account of the mind, and does not explicitly 
concern itself with phenomenal consciousness or qualia. It simply asks us how it is 
that we conceive of and reason about the existence of unobservable, intentional states 
that interact to cause behavior.  
The hard problem, like the hard problem of consciousness, is widely believed 
to be intractable. The soft problem, on the other hand, really amounts to an empirical 
puzzle about the nature of human reasoning about other agents. And while the 
analogical and (especially) theory-based strategies for solving the hard problem seem 
to fall short of what would be needed to overcome the gap between first- and third-
person experiences of other minds, they offer plausible psychological hypotheses for 
solving the soft problem. As a result, it has been the soft problem of other minds, and 
not the hard problem, that has really influenced the contemporary mindreading 
debate. The debate between the analogical and theoretical solutions to the problem of 




contemporary theory-of-mind literature. Today, most mindreading theorists identify 
their views with some form of theory-theory, simulation theory, or a hybrid of the two 
(Carruthers & Smith, 1996). 
This is a telling bit of intellectual history: what began as a single, seemingly 
insoluble philosophical problem came to structure the solution-space for an entire 
sub-field of empirical research. And this influence of philosophy on scientific practice 
was not merely historical: as these philosophical frameworks were put into practice, 
philosophers continued to refine and update them in light of new evidence, leading to 
increasingly sophisticated psychological models of mindreading (incorporating, for 
example, insights from dual-process approaches to cognition (Goldman, 2006)). We 
see something similar in the way philosophers contributed to the creation of the false-
belief task: initially, philosophers established the conceptual criteria for establishing 
an understanding of other minds, and then psychologists went ahead and put it into 
practice. As time has passed, philosophers have elaborated upon these conceptual 
criteria, and psychologists have developed new experimental designs as a result. To 
take a notable example, psychologists have now taken a cue from Frege, and 
developed tasks that test children’s grasp of the fact that two people can represent the 
same object under different modes of presentation (Low, Drummond, Walmsley, & 
Wang, 2014; Rakoczy, 2015). Increasingly often, this combination of philosophical 
ideas and psychological practice has come in the form of direct collaborations 
between members of both disciplines (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the study of mindreading has become the 




discipline of philosophy is a deep well of concepts and arguments that stand to 
illuminate our scientific understanding of the world. As scientists design experiments, 
develop new ontologies, and choose between competing explanations, they often 
draw from this well, and start to engage in philosophy themselves. Simultaneously, 
we philosophers often find ourselves drawn from more abstract questions towards the 
activities of scientists. At first, this happens because we think empirical data might 
inform our more traditional, philosophical debates. But then we notice something: the 
scientists are doing philosophy as well, on questions just as profound as any that we 
concern ourselves with! Thus, philosophers and scientists come to meet each other in 
the middle, discovering that they possess complementary skills and strengths. The 
convergence of philosophers and scientists has the potential to generate profound 
contributions to our understanding of the world. This potential is on full display in the 
mindreading literature. My own research falls within this tradition.  
3. From empiricism to nativism 
While the problem of other minds has significantly shaped the contemporary 
mindreading literature, some of the deepest disagreements in this field stem from the 
dispute between empiricism and nativism. While the historical empiricist-nativist 
debate was often also concerned with epistemological issues, the contemporary one is 
more narrowly focused on the kinds of psychological representations and processes 
that support learning. Generally speaking, empiricists explain learning as the product 
of domain-general inferential processes, perceptually based representations, and a 
very small set of innately specified primitives. Nativists, in contrast, posit additional 




between nativists and empiricists thus comes down to a dispute about the extent of 
children’s innate learning endowment – what Margolis and Laurence call the 
“acquisition base” (Margolis & Laurence, 2012). In this section, I present some very 
general considerations in favor of adopting a nativist approach, even if we take the 
existence of domain-general learning systems as a theoretical point of departure. 
To better understand the nature of the nativist-empiricist dispute, it is useful to 
consider how it manifests itself in discussions of Bayesian models of cognitive 
development, which are currently in vogue in empiricist circles (Gopnik & Wellman, 
2012; Perfors, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Xu, 2011; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Learning, 
according to this view, basically amounts to a form of Bayesian hypothesis testing, 
whereby the posterior probability of a hypothesis given a particular observation is 
derived from prior probabilities assigned to hypothesis and the observation, as well as 
the likelihood of the observation given the hypothesis. Bayesian models of cognitive 
development assume that children learn to use their observations and interactions 
with the world to update empirical hypotheses about the causes of their sensory 
experiences. More sophisticated “hierarchical” Bayesian models of cognitive 
development suggest that children do this at multiple levels of abstraction 
simultaneously, updating “overhypotheses” about the relative probabilities of 
different hypothesis spaces at the subordinate level (Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 
2007). Collectively, this hierarchy of Bayesian updating procedures is said to provide 
a powerful computational framework for learning about the world. Note that qua 




applied to any set of hypotheses and observations, regardless of their content – a 
feature that makes these models attractive to empiricists. 
 
One might wonder how such a model initially assigns prior probabilities to 
different hypotheses, or if it starts out with a flat probability distribution. But even 
before we can ask this question, we must consider where the hypotheses themselves 
come from. Notably, Bayesian models of learning do not actually provide an 
explanation for how hypotheses are generated in the first place, or how the space of 
hypotheses gets expanded over time. The Bayesian formalism only gives the 
procedure for updating the probabilities of pre-existing hypotheses. Thus, the 
acquisition base for Bayesian models of cognitive development must include 
additional, constructive procedures that are capable of generating new hypotheses, as 
well as the representational primitives that are involved in the hypothesis-
construction-process. Following Perfors and colleagues, let us call the entire range of 
hypotheses that these procedures are capable of generating the latent hypothesis 
space, and the hypotheses that are actually subject to testing and updating the explicit 
hypothesis space. The process of hypothesis generation thus describes the process 
whereby hypotheses are moved from the latent space to the explicit one (Perfors et 
al., 2011). 
Importantly, the procedures and representational primitives contained in the 
latent hypothesis space would necessarily determine the range of explicit hypotheses 
that a Bayesian learner could potentially entertain. A latent acquisition base lacking 




about squares, which would then make learning about squares impossible. It would 
also be entirely consistent with the Bayesian approach if the hypothesis-construction 
process contained every possible concept as a representational primitive. Indeed, 
Fodor famously envisioned a hypothesis-testing account of learning that included all 
possible concepts in the acquisition base, including GRANDMOTHER and 
DOORKNOB (Fodor, 1975). No doubt this particular proposal is not what empiricists 
have in mind when they invoke Bayesian models of cognitive development. But this 
only serves to highlight the fact that Bayesian hypothesis-testing accounts of learning 
are not uniquely empiricist: indeed, they are compatible with even the most radical 
forms of nativism.  
Thus, even if we assume that a Bayesian hypothesis-testing account is correct, 
the true mark of an empiricist model of learning will not be a domain-general learning 
procedure as such, but rather a domain-general approach to hypothesis construction. 
For traditional empiricist accounts, this will consist in a limited set of perceptually 
based representational primitives, associative procedures that track statistical relations 
between different combinations of these primitives, and abstraction procedures that 
derive more general representations (e.g. concepts of categories) from particular 
perceptual inputs (Hume, 2000; Locke, 1690; see also Hornstein, 2005). With this 
kind of acquisition base, new explicit hypotheses about present and future inputs can 
be generated based on representations of past inputs alone. However, a crucial 
drawback of such a hypothesis-construction procedure is that the latent hypothesis 
space will be limited by the particular inputs that it has already processed. For a 
machine-learning algorithm that only needs to construct hypotheses about a particular 
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domain, and is fed a large number of inputs related to that domain, this can work fine. 
But for a human infant, who must use her limited experiences in order to learn about 
many different domains, this mode of hypothesis construction is inevitably inflexible.  
More sophisticated empiricist models might enrich this set of tools with the 
capacity to construct totally novel hypotheses that have never been experienced at all. 
One example of this kind of enriched empiricist framework is Gopnik and colleagues' 
proposal that learners generate structured representations of possible causal patterns 
in the environment, or "causal Bayesian networks" (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004; Pearl, 
2000). Causal Bayesian networks go beyond simple associative models in several 
ways. First, they can represent different relations between co-occurring 
representations, which are treated as variables: whereas an associative model can only 
represent that A, B, and C co-occur, causal models can represent A as the cause of B 
and B as the cause of C, or A as the common cause of both B and C, and so on. 
Further, for each of these different causal representations, the network encodes 
corollary information about how changes to one of the causal variables would affect 
the others (e.g. if A causes B and B causes C, a change to B will imply a change in C; 
but if A is the common cause of B and C, then changes to B would leave C 
unaffected). Causal Bayesian networks are also capable of introducing and inferring 
hidden variables, which enables them to form hypotheses about causal structures 
whose component elements are not directly observable. This account of hypothesis 
formation has a much wider range than basic association-based models: on this view, 
every permutation and combination of causal relations between variables can be 
expressed as a testable hypothesis about the world. Notably, this flexibility was only 
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achieved by adding knowledge of causality to the acquisition base – in effect, making 
the account more nativist. 
However, this added flexibility also creates new challenges. If the latent 
hypothesis space now contains every possible causal pattern that could obtain 
between a set of variables, this means that the space of possible hypotheses will now 
be extremely large (if not infinite). This raises the question of which hypotheses the 
learner should generate and test first. If the learner were to begin by assuming a flat 
probability distribution across the entire hypothesis space, then it would have no 
choice but to begin generating and testing hypotheses at random. Given the size of the 
latent hypothesis space, this makes for a highly inefficient strategy: a learner could 
spend all its time generating and testing completely spurious hypotheses, without ever 
actually learning anything about the world. Thus, equipping a Bayesian learner with a 
highly flexible hypothesis-generation procedure creates a learning problem that is the 
inverse of the associationist hypothesis-generation strategy: if the latent hypothesis 
space is too large, then learning becomes extremely difficult. 
The solution to this problem is to impose some structure on the hypothesis-
generation procedure, so that it is no longer randomly generating and testing 
individual hypotheses. One way to do this is to posit overhypotheses about which 
portions of the latent hypothesis space will yield fruitful hypotheses – essentially, a 
hypothesis about a prior probability distribution over the whole hypothesis space. A 
Bayesian learner could then start by testing overhypotheses, and thereby arrive at a 
non-flat probability distribution over space of possible hypotheses, which would then 
guide the generation and testing of hypotheses. However, this strategy risks running 
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into the same problem as before: if the space of overhypotheses is also extremely 
large and has a flat probability distribution, then a learner will have no choice but to 
start generating and testing overhypotheses at random. Thus, it may be just as 
difficult to arrive at informative overhypotheses as it is to arrive at informative first-
order hypotheses.  
Ultimately, the only way to resolve this issue is to posit that the learner starts 
out biased towards certain overhypotheses, and that these enable her to start 
generating and testing first-order hypotheses that will actually be informative. With 
such initial biases in place, a learner could thus avoid getting stuck in a fruitless 
pattern of random hypothesis-generation and testing, and instead actually learn things 
about the world. However, these biases could not themselves be the product of the 
same hypotheses-generation and testing procedure that they are intended to constrain. 
If they were, then we would be faced with the problem of explaining how we arrived 
at those particular biases as opposed to other possible ones. Thus, the biases that 
initially constrain the learning procedure must not themselves be the product of a 
learning procedure – in other words, they must be innate. 
And so, even if we start with an empiricist approach to learning, and allow for 
empiricist hypothesis-generation mechanisms, we still need to posit additional innate 
constraints in order to make the learning process tractable. This means that the 
nativist might be in complete agreement about the idea that learning consists in a 
domain-general Bayesian updating procedure that tracks statistical regularities in the 
environment, and even the idea that we possess domain-general hypothesis-
construction procedures. But this cannot be the whole story. Nativists, on this picture 
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of the empiricist-nativist dispute, are simply interested in describing those additional 
structures, how they relate to particular kinds of hypotheses about the world, and the 
ways in which they facilitate learning. Empiricists, in contrast, are interested in 
describing the basic domain-general structures that apply to all forms of hypothesis 
testing. The disagreement between these two camps ultimately comes down to a 
question about the extent of these innate constraints on learning. Empiricists think 
that we should posit fewer innate constraints on learning, while nativists are open to 
the possibility that these constraints might be quite extensive. 
4. Nativism, modularity, and cognitive architecture 
Until this point, we've been working with the abstract assumption that hypothesis-
generation involves some combination of perceptually based representational 
primitives, abstraction, and domain-general causal modeling. But one way that innate 
constraints on learning might manifest themselves is via innately channeled 
mechanisms that spontaneously generate particular kinds of hypotheses about the 
world in response to environmental input. If, for instance, learners spontaneously 
interpret self-generated movements as caused by intentional agents with goals and 
perceptual states, then the hypotheses they generate in response to perceptions of 
self-generated movement will tend to invoke intentional concepts (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). Likewise, learners might spontaneously interpret sounds coming from agents 
as linguistic utterances, and seek to extract from them syntactic structure and 
semantic content that conforms to the parameters of Universal Grammar. These are 
examples of domain-specific hypothesis-generating systems that could lead learners 
to apply innate concepts to their experiences. Contemporary nativist proposals have 
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mostly been about the existence of such domain-specific conceptual systems and their 
particular attributes.  
To cash out these proposals in architectural terms, many nativists have 
appealed to the concept of modularity. However, the concept of modularity comes in 
varying strengths, a fact that often leads to confusion among critics of nativism. The 
strongest conception of modularity was originally invoked by Fodor to describe the 
innate architecture underlying perceptual and linguistic processing (Fodor, 1983).  
According to this view, modules tend to possess nine features: domain-specificity, 
mandatory operation, limited central accessibility, fast processing, informational 
encapsulation, ‘shallow’ outputs, fixed neural architecture, characteristic and specific 
breakdown patterns, and innateness. However, even Fodor noted that a cognitive 
system could count as modular even if it adhered to these properties only “to some 
interesting extent,” suggesting that he did not see all of these nine features as 
necessary for modularity; indeed, there are virtually no proponents of modularity 
today who endorse all of the items on this list as necessary and sufficient conditions.  
One of the stronger approaches to modularity takes informational 
encapsulation and limited central accessibility as its signature properties (Apperly, 
2011; Coltheart, 1999; Scholl & Gao, 2013; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). According to this 
approach, modules constrain hypothesis-generation by applying a specific set of 
computational procedures to specific kinds of perceptual inputs. In generating its 
output, the module is only able to use information carried by the input signal, and 
information stored internally within the module itself. It cannot draw on any 
information stored outside of the module. Conversely, the module-internal processing 
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is also inaccessible to other computational processes taking place outside the module, 
including person-level goals and intentions. This ensures that given a particular set of 
environmental inputs, modules are guaranteed to produce a particular set of outputs. 
Once an output is produced, it can either serve as input into another module, or figure 
in domain-general inferences.  
As a consequence of these informational restrictions, the module exhibits a 
number of the other features of modularity from Fodor's original list: because it is 
only sensitive to certain inputs, it is domain-specific; because its operations are not 
accessible to goals, it is mandatory; because it only draws on information internal to 
the module, it is fast and efficient; because it cannot draw on information from 
outside the module, its outputs are representationally "shallow." One of the features 
of modularity that is not implied by this account is innateness, however: it is quite 
plausible that encapsulated systems could emerge through a process of 
environmentally-driven specialization, or "downwards modularization" (d’Souza & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2011). Encapsulation-based views of modularity thus make fairly 
specific claims about the how a system processes information, but need not imply that 
that system has an innate basis. 
In contrast to the encapsulation-based approach, which preserves the bulk of 
the features associated with Fodor’s original account of modularity, some conceptions 
of modularity are quite weak, and only posit that modules are domain-specific 
computational systems (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006). On this view, to 
postulate the existence of a module is basically to posit that a particular cognitive 
function is somehow performed by the brain. In the context of nativism, the relevant 
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sense of "function" invoked by this conception of modularity is often tied to natural 
selection: to say that an organism possesses an innate module that performs some 
function F is to say that doing F was selected for in an ancestral population. Thus, 
while weak modularity makes few specific claims about cognitive architecture, it 
does tend to imply an evolutionary argument for why we should expect a particular 
function to be innate in the first place. 
Despite the association between nativism and modularity, there is no obvious 
theoretical reason to think that innate learning constraints should be modular in the 
strong sense. Some innate structures may be rigidly encapsulated, but it is entirely 
possible that many innate structures are modular only in the weaker, functional sense. 
Moreover, some innate systems may include components that are modular in both the 
strong and weak senses. Carey, for instance, argues that the core knowledge system 
for object knowledge includes both a perceptual component that is modular in the 
strong sense, but that the outputs of this module – domain-specific, specialized 
representations for object-tracking called “object files” – can be “bound” with content 
from outside the module, and can enter into domain-general inferences (Carey, 2009). 
Other nativists have posited innately channeled systems operating on a few core 
principles that initially display a kind of encapsulation due to limited processing 
resources and experience; however, as children mature, these systems become 
enriched over time with new principles derived from experience (Baillargeon, 2008). 
The point is that positing innate constraints on learning in a particular domain need 
not imply any particular architectural commitment. Which cognitive structures 
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underlie innate structures in a given domain is an empirical issue, and could very well 
vary on a case-by-case basis. 
5. Empiricism, nativism, and the false-belief controversy 
In the developmental literature on the topic, empiricist-nativist debates about 
mindreading have proceeded in a relatively piecemeal fashion. Instead of taking 
mindreading capacities as a monolithic whole, developmental psychologists have 
instead investigated the sources of particular concepts of mental states, including 
beliefs, goals, intentions, emotions, and perceptual states. This stands to reason: just 
as one need not be a nativist or empiricist about knowledge as a whole, one need not 
be a nativist or empiricist about every aspect of theory of mind. For instance, 
concepts of states like embarrassment or guilt – complex compounds of beliefs and 
emotions that get tokened in response to the violation of social norms – seem unlikely 
to be innate. Concepts of mental states with modal contents, such as supposition and 
wondering, also seem to be quite complex, and few nativists would posit that they are 
innate. On the other hand, many are inclined to accept that very young children 
possess a basic grasp of perceptual and teleological relations that form the rudiments 
of concepts like goal and sees (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Carey, 2009; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003).  
In principle, it is possible that innate mental-state understanding could be 
atomistic: an agent could possess one mental-state concept (e.g. SEEING), but lack 
all of the others. As an empirical hypothesis, however, this seems unlikely. If, as 
many theorists hold, the function of mindreading is the prediction and interpretation 
of behavior, then mindreaders must be able to grasp the relations between mental 
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states and behavior. This requires an understanding of practical reasoning, which 
implies a grasp of the inferential relations between beliefs and desires. And so, if the 
thesis that we possess any mental-state concepts innately is meant to explain how we 
come to predict and interpret behavior, then this thesis must hold that we possess 
multiple mental-state concepts. It must also hold that we understand something about 
the inferential relations between these concepts, and something about the causal 
relations between practical reasoning and action. Thus, while empirical research on 
mindreading might proceed on a concept-by-concept basis, nativist accounts of 
mindreading must posit a cohesive set of mindreading abilities and concepts. 
That said, a great deal of the empiricist-rationalist debate in the mindreading 
literature has focused on whether our innate set of mindreading abilities includes the 
ability to represent hypotheses about beliefs. Beliefs are thought to be special because 
they are paradigmatic bearers of intentionality, a property widely held to be the 
hallmark of the mental (Chisholm, 1967). Beliefs are robustly intentional: they can be 
false, they can be about entities that do not exist, and they are inherently aspectual. In 
contrast, some theorists have claimed that infants might initially possess non-
intentional versions of the concepts SEEING or GOAL that refer to simple spatial 
relations between agents and the environment (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 
1981; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). These relations are not genuinely intentional, because 
they can only hold between agents and real properties of the world, and therefore do 
not permit misrepresentation. Thus, while a grasp of perceptual and teleological states 
need only imply a rudimentary grasp of other minds, understanding beliefs means 
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understanding intentionality, and thus implies the possession of a representational 
theory of mind.  
Since the early 1980s, the gold standard for measuring children's 
understanding of beliefs has been the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In 
the classic Sally-Anne version of this task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), 
children are shown a vignette in which one character (Sally), places a marble in a 
basket, and then leaves the room. While she is gone, another character (Anne) moves 
the marble from the basket to a box. When Sally returns, the experimenter asks the 
child where Sally will look for the marble. The correct answer, of course, is that Sally 
will look for the marble in the basket, because that is where she falsely believes it to 
be. Strikingly, young children are overwhelmingly likely to systematically fail this 
task, and say that Sally will look for the marble in the box, its actual location.  
Until the early 2000s, the broad consensus among developmental researchers 
was that this showed that children acquire the concept of BELIEF around four years 
of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Typically, the developmental explanations 
for this invoke a number of experiential factors, including exposure to mental state 
terms (Dunn & Brophy, 2005), propositional-embedding syntax (de Villiers & Pyers, 
2002), and various forms of social experience (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Some 
of these explanations situate the acquisition of a representational concept of BELIEF 
within a more extended, experience-driven developmental progression through 
different stages of mental-state understanding (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). What all of these theories have in common is that they posit that a 
combination of domain-general learning and some specific set of environmental 
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factors ultimately explain the emergence of false-belief understanding around four 
years of age. In other words, the consensus view was that some kind of empiricist 
model would explain the acquisition of BELIEF. 
However, a small number of philosophers and psychologists have consistently 
questioned this empiricist consensus. The standard, verbal false-belief task, they 
argued, fails to get at children’s underlying competence with the concept of BELIEF, 
since, in addition to an understanding of beliefs, it requires advanced linguistic and 
executive abilities (P. Bloom & German, 2000; Fodor, 1992; Scholl & Leslie, 1999, 
2001). Pockets of evidence seemed to support these worries. The finding that children 
with autism tended to have difficulty with the false-belief task even as they performed 
well on comparable tasks led some researchers to postulate that theory of mind is 
subserved by an innately channeled modular architecture (in the strong, 
encapsulation-based sense) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1997; Leslie, 
Friedman, & German, 2004). This approach led these researchers to discover that 
experimental manipulations aimed at easing the attentional demands of the false 
belief task could enable children to pass it earlier than previously thought (Siegal & 
Beattie, 1991; Surian & Leslie, 1999). Even proponents of the received view 
occasionally ran into anomalous findings: Clements and Perner discovered that 
younger children seem to demonstrate an “implicit” understanding of beliefs through 
their looking behavior even as they failed verbal false belief tasks (Clements & 
Perner, 1994).  
Motivated by these considerations, as well as a growing literature on the 
considerable social-cognitive abilities of very young infants (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; 
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Woodward, 1998), developmental researchers began to apply non-verbal methods 
designed to spontaneously elicit infant knowledge to test younger children’s abilities 
to attribute false beliefs. The results of these first studies turned the received view of 
theory of mind development on its head, apparently vindicating the nativist minority: 
Onishi and Baillargeon’s seminal study (2005) used a looking time measure to show 
that 15-month old infants form expectations about behavior that are sensitive to 
agents’ false beliefs. In the past ten years, this finding has been replicated dozens of 
times using a wide range of methods, and evidence of false belief understanding has 
been demonstrated in infants as young as six months of age (Baillargeon, Scott, & 
He, 2010; Barrett et al., 2013; D. Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; D. 
Buttelmann, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; 
Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014).  
Empiricists about belief understanding have responded by offering 
deflationary, non-mentalistic interpretations of the infant false-belief data. They argue 
that infants might pass these tasks even without the capacity to represent beliefs; 
instead, infants’ expectations in these tasks might simply be driven by low-level 
statistical associations formed either during their everyday experiences (Perner, 2010) 
or during the task itself (Heyes, 2014a; Ruffman, 2014). Defenders of belief-nativism 
have addressed these arguments by explicitly controlling for particular deflationary 
alternative interpretations in their studies, and by arguing that the general strategy 
behind these arguments fails on theoretical grounds, in that it is inevitably post hoc 
and offers few specific predictions (Scott & Baillargeon, 2014; Scott, 2014). 
Although the issue remains controversial, it has been nativists, and not their critics, 
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who have reliably generated new, surprising results in this domain, pushing the 
boundaries of both how early we thought infants would demonstrate false belief 
understanding (Kovács et al., 2010; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014) and the sophisticated 
ways in which they are able to apply this understanding (F. Buttelmann, Suhrke, & 
Buttelmann, 2015; Moll, Kane, & McGowan, 2015). Proponents of infant false-belief 
understanding, it would seem, are driving the empirical agenda. 
Empiricists might respond to this claim by pointing out the broad success of 
domain-general models of infant learning (Ruffman, 2014). There is, for instance a 
growing literature showing that even very young infants are in fact highly sensitive to 
the statistical regularities in their environments, and that they draw on these 
regularities when forming expectations about future events (Dewar & Xu, 2010; 
Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012; Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Paulus et al., 
2011; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015; Xu & Garcia, 2008). For some critics of theory-of-
mind nativism, this growing trend in developmental psychology provides a general 
theoretical justification for skepticism about infant false-belief claims: if infants really 
are “intuitive statisticians” (Xu & Garcia, 2008), and there are good reasons for 
believing that learning in general relies upon tracking observable correlations and 
inferring hidden causal variables in the environment, then we seem to have good 
reason to expect that infants rely upon this form of learning during false-belief tasks 
as well. Thus, while nativists may claim that their interpretations of the new infant 
data are more predictively fruitful in the restricted domain of theory-of-mind, 
deflationists may counter that their own interpretation is more coherent with a much 
broader research program within developmental psychology. Ultimately, this clash of 
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Quinian virtues seems to result in an impasse, with both sides of the debate firmly 
entrenched in their respective positions. 
However, as we have seen, there is no prima facie incompatibility between 
nativism and domain-general learning. Moreover, no nativist account of mindreading 
would propose that the mindreading system is innately endowed with all there is to 
know about the world. It is widely acknowledged across the mindreading literature 
that in order for the mindreading system to function properly, it has to be able to 
access the subject’s general knowledge (Heal, 1996; Nichols & Stich, 2003); 
mindreading nativism is no different. Even a mindreading system with a rich, innately 
specified set of general principles for generating hypotheses about the causes of 
behavior must still be sensitive to regularities about the local environment, or else it 
would never be capable of giving specific predictions that would actually be relevant 
to the subject’s interests. For instance, in order to predict whether a person will 
choose to take public transit or her car to go to the zoo on a Sunday afternoon, we 
need to know something about the woman's preferences and goals; but we also need 
to know about where the zoo is, whether the public transit system is reliable, the cost 
of parking, and so on. If it turned out that this knowledge was acquired via domain-
general statistical learning, this fact would be entirely consistent with mindreading 
nativism.  
Nativists could also agree with empiricists that we use these statistical 
learning tools to track regularities in behavior, and to facilitate behavioral predictions. 
For if domain-general learning mechanisms can track other sorts of environmental 
realities, there is no reason why they should not also track the regularities that 
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underlie common human behaviors as well. But while empiricists propose that we 
parse such regularities as disparate correlations between bundles of low-level 
perceptual features, the nativist would argue that we instead carve up these 
regularities in terms of their underlying mental causes. This would mean that instead 
of acting on hypotheses framed in purely behavioristic predicates (e.g. “agents tend to 
search for objects that they have repeatedly made contact with in the location where 
that last contact took place”), as has been argued by deflationists (e.g. Perner, 2010), 
infants would act on hypotheses framed in mentalistic predicates (e.g. “agents tend to 
search for objects they desire where they believe those objects to be”). Thus, the 
difference between empiricists and nativists need not turn on the fact that infants 
sometimes employ domain-general statistical learning strategies when reasoning 
about behavior. Rather, the real difference concerns the contents of the hypotheses 
that infants use to interpret behavioral inputs. Nativists hypothesize that infants learn 
about behavior by generating and testing mentalistic hypotheses that invoke primitive 
mental-state concepts and core knowledge about the mind. Empiricists argue that 
infants learn about behavior by generating and testing hypotheses that invoke non-
mentalistic concepts or domain-specific psychological knowledge. 
At this point, an empiricist might appeal to considerations of parsimony: her 
proposal only invokes those representational primitives that we use for any other form 
of perceptually based reasoning; the nativist, in contrast, must posit additional, 
mentalistic primitives. Intuitively, the former is more parsimonious. However, 
appealing to parsimony at this point would be premature: first, it must be established 
that the two theories under consideration are both empirically adequate, and actually 
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succeed in explaining the phenomena in question. If one theory cannot account for the 
relevant explananda, while an alternative theory can, then the fact that the former is 
simpler is irrelevant. In the remainder of this section, I will argue that empiricist 
accounts of infant false-belief task performance are in fact empirically inadequate, 
because these accounts do not propose adequate constraints on the learning process. 
Before determining whether the empiricist proposal is empirically adequate, 
let us allow that the empiricist learner can generate new hypotheses about the causes 
of behavior through the use of causal Bayesian networks. This means that the 
learner’s latent hypothesis space will contain hypotheses about every possible causal 
pattern (including those with hidden variables) that can be modeled using such tools. 
This, in principle, should give the child the ability to generate causal hypotheses 
capable of predicting simple behaviors like the ones that they observe in infant false-
belief tasks. Now suppose that such a learner observes a series of behaviors over the 
course of several familiarization trials in such a task. On the basis of these 
observations, which hypotheses will the child generate in order to predict the agent’s 
future behaviors?  
The problem with this proposal is that there is an immense range of possible 
(non-mentalistic) causal hypotheses that would be consistent with the child’s 
observations she could potentially generate. For instance, the child could entertain the 
possibility that the weather is a relevant causal variable for predicting behavior. This 
wouldn’t be an outlandish possibility: the weather is readily observable, and it affects 
how we behave all the time (e.g. the clothes we wear, whether we go outside, what 
we do outside, etc.). The child may thus assume that the weather modulates some 
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hidden causal variables that lead to certain patterns of observable behavior. Thus, the 
child could formulate numerous hypotheses about the causes of a given behavior that 
include the weather as a variable. Upon witnessing a familiarization event, the child 
might therefore entertain the hypothesis that,  “agents tend to search for objects that 
they have repeatedly made contact with in the location where the last contact took 
place when it is sunny outside.” Or they might instead focus on some other observable 
feature of the situation: the color of the experimenter’s shoes, the smell of the testing 
space, whether they have their dolly, and so on. All of these factors might seem like 
potentially relevant variables, and could be used in the construction of hypotheses 
about why certain events have occurred. Sometimes, these hypotheses would happen 
to generate correct predictions. But more often, they would be utterly spurious. 
In effect, the empiricist proposal falls prey to a specific version of a familiar 
problem for empiricist reasoning: Nelson Goodman's new riddle of induction 
(Goodman, 1955). Goodman's famous insight was that experience could support any 
number of accidental hypotheses based on spurious predicates. Most famously, 
Goodman pointed out that the same observations that would support the 
generalization, "All emeralds are green," could also support the generalization, "All 
emeralds are grue," where grue stands for the property of being green until some 
(distant) time t, and blue thereafter. The new riddle of induction asks us how it is that 
we successfully arrive at solid hypotheses such as, "all emeralds are green," and avoid 
spurious ones that employ grue-like predicates.  
The challenge for the empiricist, likewise, is to explain how it is that children 
reliably predict behavior in these scenarios, when there is nothing in their model that 
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would prevent children from generating grue-like hypotheses. How is it that children 
somehow alight upon precisely the right variables that enable them to make 
successful predictions, while ignoring all the spurious ones? To answer this 
challenge, the empiricist needs to posit additional constraints on how children 
generate hypotheses about behavior, beyond the existence of a domain-general 
capacity to represent causal patterns. Otherwise, empiricists cannot claim to have 
provided a complete explanation of how infants are able to reliably predict agents' 
behavior. 
The nativist can offer a clear answer to this challenge: the child ignores 
spurious generalizations because she is able to evaluate the importance of certain 
features of the situation in terms of their relevance to the target agent's beliefs and 
desires. By attending to agents' mental states, a child can avoid considering spurious 
hypotheses based on irrelevant situational factors, and instead focus on those factors 
that feature in the agent's decision-making process. The child's theory of mind thus 
provides her with a basis for determining the salience of different features of the 
environment as she learns about the social world. 
This argument recapitulates the basic argument for nativism that I outlined 
above, as it applies to mindreading specifically. What nativist proposals offer and 
empiricists lack is a basis for generating and testing informative (rather than 
uninformative) hypotheses about the causes of behavior. Without domain-specific 
constraints on the kinds of hypotheses that a child is likely to form about the causes of 
behavior, empiricist models have no way of explaining why children do not make 
wildly inaccurate predictions. Core knowledge systems about minds, on this view, 
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provide children with an overhypothesis about the prior probabilities of different 
kinds of hypotheses that they could generate to learn about behavior. Spurious 
hypotheses that make reference to irrelevant situational factors can be safely ignored, 
because they have extremely low prior probabilities. This resource is unavailable to 
the empiricist ex hypothesi, since the empiricist model treats hypotheses about the 
causes of behavior like the causes of any other observable event. 
To be fair, the nativist proposal is also incomplete. Much more work needs to 
be done to discover the nature of the representations and inferential processes that 
guide infant behavior-prediction. However, both the current state of the evidence and 
the theoretical considerations that I and other nativists have raised give us good 
reason to believe that early-emerging representations of beliefs and other mental 
states will be a part of the explanation of the data.  
6. Further challenges 
6.1. How social experience affects false-belief task performance 
Given these considerations, I adopt nativism about belief reasoning – and about 
mindreading in general – as a plausible theoretical starting point for investigating the 
architecture of theory of mind more generally. But despite the promise of the nativist 
explanation of infants’ behavior-prediction abilities, such an account faces two 
parallel empirical challenges. One points to the inadequacy of current nativist 
explanations of why younger children still fail traditional, explicit false-belief tasks. 
The second comes from an alternative approach that proposes a “two-systems” 
account of children’s theory-of-mind development.  
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The typical nativist explanation for why children below the age of four-and-a-
half fail the standard false-belief task appeals to the processing burdens that these 
tasks place on children's developing executive abilities, which prevent children from 
expressing their underlying competence in belief reasoning (Baillargeon et al., 2010; 
Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). But while there is some indication that executive factors do 
contribute to children's performance on these tasks (Benson & Sabbagh, 2005), a 
recent meta-analysis of this literature has shown that executive functioning only 
explains a small portion of the variance in false-belief explicit-task performance 
(Devine & Hughes, 2014). Even more problematically, there is a wide range of 
evidence suggesting that various socio-linguistic factors, including having older 
siblings (Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998), exposure to mental-
state discourse (Symons, 2004), and training (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; 
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996) all affect when children 
pass the false-belief task. Most strikingly, late-signing deaf children (born to hearing 
parents and not exposed to sign language at an early age) exhibit significant delays on 
the false-belief task (Pyers & Senghas, 2009; Wellman & Peterson, 2013). Appeals to 
processing demands cannot explain why these factors influence performance on the 
false-belief task, as they are largely unrelated to executive functioning. Instead, this 
evidence suggests that experiential factors play an important role in explaining why 
children fail (and then subsequently pass) the false-belief task. 
In Chapter 2, "Pragmatic Development and the False-Belief Task," I propose a 
novel nativist account for the role of socio-linguistic experience in children's 
performance on the false-belief task. The core proposal of this account is that 
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children's failure on this task is not due to a breakdown in processing resources, but 
rather an error of Gricean inference. That is, children fail this task because they 
misinterpret the experimenter's query, not because they are overwhelmed by the 
demands of the task itself. This pragmatic error is related to children's exposure to 
belief discourse. As I argue in the paper, children's early input for belief-discourse is 
pragmatically complex, and initially leads children to hypothesize that beliefs are 
unlikely to be implicated in conversation. As children's experience with belief 
discourse increases, they gain more experience with its unique pragmatic elements, 
and revise their priors about the likelihood of beliefs as a topic of conversation. This 
proposal has the resources to explain the influence of a variety of experiential factors 
on children's false-task performance, and also makes a number of concrete empirical 
predictions.1  
The key thing to note about this account is how it differs from previous 
nativist proposals. Whereas previous models attribute children's failures on theory of 
mind tasks to an a-rational flaw in their underdeveloped cognitive resources, the 
pragmatic development account assumes that the mechanisms supporting younger 
children's reasoning in the false-belief task are rationally coherent, and that their 
responses are justified given their experiences. On this view, children's interpretations 
of the false-belief task scenario reflect statistically driven priors about what people 
tend to talk about, and about the kinds of conversational interactions they tend to 
have. Likewise, their shift in performance during the fifth year of life reflects a 
rational updating procedure in response to a shifting evidential base. The primary 
                                                
1 In the Appendix, I include a paper written with Peter Carruthers in which we show how this account 
can also be extended beyond the false-belief task, to explain children's developing performance on a 
number of different measures in the theory of mind literature. 
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advantage of this approach is that it allows for a nativist explanation that predicts 
environmentally driven variance in performance, whereas previous nativist 
explanations could only appeal to internal, maturational factors. Thus, the pragmatic 
development reflects my earlier point that there need be no contradiction between the 
facts that children are statistical learners, and that they are innate mindreaders. 
6.2. The two-systems account 
One of the major problems for the empiricist account of infant false-belief implicit-
task performance was that it could not provide an account of the hypothesis-
construction systems that underlie infants' accurate behavioral predictions. But there 
is an alternative to the robust mentalistic interpretation that I have defended that does 
not share this problem: the two-systems account (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; 
Apperly, 2011; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). In terms of the nativist-empiricist debate, 
this view is something of a hybrid. Its explanation of how children eventually pass the 
standard false-belief task is traditionally empiricist: children acquire the concept of 
belief after their fourth birthdays as the result of a protracted period of social learning, 
executive development, and experience with language. But rather than explaining 
infants' false-belief task performance as the product of low-level associative 
procedures, two-systems theorists accept that it is a genuine form of mindreading. 
However, they deny that these tasks show that infants actually possess a 
representational theory of mind. Instead, they posit that it is the product of a more 
limited, implicit mindreading system that tracks beliefs in an extensional sense, but 
does not actually represent them as such. This system, they suggest, develops prior to 
and persists into adulthood alongside our mature, representational theory of mind. 
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Instead of the concept of belief, which represents relations between agents and 
representational contents, two-systems theorists propose that infants pass false-belief 
tasks because they have the ability to track registrations, which consist in polyadic 
relations between agents, objects, locations, and times. Similarly, they posit that 
infants also represent goals and perceptual encounters as purely external, spatial 
relations that hold between agents and their environments. Two-systems theorists also 
posit a limited set of predictive rules that characterize how goals, perceptual 
encounters, and registrations combine to produce behavior. Collectively, this set of 
quasi-mentalistic concepts and rules forms a discrete, automatic mindreading system 
that guides infants' passive expectations about behavior. However, the system is not 
integrated with action-planning or language-production systems, and so it is not able 
to influence children's responses on explicit false-belief task measures.   
One key prediction of this account is that while infants and young children 
might succeed in predicting behavior driven by false beliefs about objects' locations, 
these abilities should be subject to signature representational limits. For while the 
registration concept can encode information about where and when an agent 
encountered an object, it cannot encode information about the way agents represent 
objects. In other words, infants should not be able to predict behavior in Frege cases, 
wherein an agent encounters an entity under two different modes of presentation, but 
does not recognize that it is the same entity in both cases (e.g. when Lois Lane 
encounters Superman and Clark Kent, but does not know that Superman is Clark 
Kent). A number of developmental studies appear to confirm this prediction (Low et 
al., 2014; Low & Watts, 2013; Rakoczy, 2015; Surtees, Butterfill, & Apperly, 2012), 
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although their interpretation is a matter of some controversy (Carruthers, 2015c; 
Christensen & Michael, 2015; Michael & Christensen, 2016; Thompson, 2014). 
Another key prediction of this account is that the dissociation between infant 
and older children's theory-of-mind abilities should be paralleled in adults. Because 
the implicit mindreading system exists alongside the explicit one in adulthood, we 
should expect to see cases where the two dissociate. Specifically, when behavior-
prediction only requires the use of the implicit mindreading system, we should expect 
adults to engage in automatic behavior prediction, which ought to manifest itself in 
anticipatory looking behavior and in reaction time measures. But when behavior-
prediction requires the representation of complex, representational states, we should 
expect prediction to be slower and more effortful. Once again, two-systems theorists 
have designed a number of experiments that seem to bear out these predictions 
(Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & 
Bodley Scott, 2010; Surtees et al., 2012; Surtees, Samson, & Apperly, 2016); and 
again, the interpretation of these findings is disputed (Carruthers, 2015a; Christensen 
& Michael, 2015; Elekes, Varga, & Király, 2016). 
Unlike standard empiricist explanations, this account makes real predictions, 
and it offers a specific account of the representational basis of the construction of 
hypotheses about behavior. It has also generated a broad array of empirical results to 
support it. Empirically speaking, it is on a much firmer foundation than the standard 
empiricist line. But this foundation is only as stable as the theory of cognitive 
architecture that motivates its core predictions. One of the things that I do in Chapter 
3, "Spontaneous mindreading: A problem for the two-systems account," is analyze 
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the underlying architectural claims of the two-systems account, and expose the 
assumptions that drive their empirical predictions.  
A key thing to note about the two-systems proposal is that the implicit system 
is modular in the strong sense – i.e. it is informationally encapsulated (Apperly, 
2011). The signature representational limits on the implicit system – specifically, its 
inability to represent beliefs as such – are a direct consequence of its encapsulation. 
To represent beliefs, the two-systems theorists argue, requires access to long-term 
memory and working memory, since BELIEF is a flexible representation that should 
be able to embed any content whatsoever, and should be able to figure in 
“promiscuous” inferential relations. In other words, reasoning with BELIEF is 
something that only a central, “isotropic” system could do (cf. Fodor, 1983). In 
contrast, reasoning with REGISTRATION only requires the information and 
specialized inputs that can be processed by the implicit mindreading module. This 
makes the implicit system fast and efficient, but it also makes it inflexible, which is 
what explains its signature representational limits. Conversely, the explicit 
mindreading system, which is able to represent BELIEF, can only do so at the cost of 
significant processing resources, since these are required to apply such a sophisticated 
concept. 
The central assumption of this argument is that there is a sharp trade-off 
between a system’s capacity for speed and efficiency, and its capacity for 
representational flexibility. As I point out in Chapter 3, however, this claim is not true 
of many cognitive systems, including pre-attentional visual processes (once a 
paradigm case of informational encapsulation). It is thus not obvious that a fast and 
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efficient system should be unable to represent concepts like BELIEF, even if this does 
in fact require access to long-term memory. I then go on to discuss evidence showing 
that the implicit mindreading system is unencapsulated from goals and long-term 
memory, while the explicit system can be fast and efficient. I conclude that the 
architectural assumptions driving the two-systems account are false, and that we 
should abandon it as a framework for interpreting both developmental and adult 
mindreading data. 
6.3. The bigger picture 
Explaining the development of the concept of belief is all well and good. However, 
we also need to be able to translate what we learn from these arguments into a 
broader understanding of how mindreading works. We need to be able to say how 
experience and innately channeled mindreading systems combine to support mature 
mindreading abilities. We should also be able to say something about other forms of 
mental-state attribution, besides belief-desire reasoning. The two-systems view 
attempted to do this by offering a comprehensive account of both the development 
and architecture of human mindreading; but as we have seen, this account comes up 
short. What can we offer in its place?  
Two ideas from Chapters 2 and 3 inform my thinking on this question. The 
first is reflected in the way the pragmatic development account envisions mental-state 
attribution as a kind of statistically informed Bayesian hypothesis-testing. The 
account assumes that we use data from the environment to generate prior probabilities 
for different mentalistic hypotheses, which we then use to predict and interpret 
behavior. This also reflects the more general point that nativism is perfectly 
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compatible with domain-general forms of learning. But most importantly, this kind of 
model has ample resources to explain experience-dependent variance in mindreading 
performance, which a broader account should be able to do. 
The second idea comes from the observation in Chapter 3 that the extent to 
which we track and update representations of other agents' mental states depends in 
part upon our motivations. This is a deep point: generating new hypotheses about the 
mental states can involve varying amounts of attention and other cognitive resources. 
Depending on the context and the identity of the target, mindreaders may sometimes 
be better served by diverting those cognitive resources elsewhere. Mature 
mindreading performance seems to reflect this fact by selectively updating agents' 
mental states when doing so is relevant to the mindreader's goals. 
This kind of goal-sensitive, statistically informed, probabilistic approach to 
mental-state inference is on full display in the mindreading architecture that I put 
forward in Chapter 4, "Character and theory of mind: An integrative framework." The 
stated goal of this paper is to better understand a form of mindreading that is often 
ignored in the theory-of-mind literature, namely, character-trait attribution. But I also 
use the opportunity to develop a broader account of how different forms of mental-
state representations contribute to the prediction and interpretation of action. I do this 
by invoking a hierarchical predictive processing architecture, a model of neural 
information processing that has become highly influential in a number of areas of 
cognitive science, including theory of mind (Clark, 2015; de Bruin & Strijbos, 2015; 
Hohwy & Palmer, 2014; Hohwy, 2013; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 
1999; Spratling, 2016). Importantly, this kind of architecture is built around precisely 
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the kind of Bayesian hypothesis testing that I have argued governs mental-state 
inference. It also has the resources to explain how motivational factors can modulate 
the extent to which cognitive resources are devoted to particular representational 
tasks. In other words, hierarchical predictive coding provides an ideal framework for 
modeling the architecture and development of mindreading. 
Of course, the model I describe in Chapter 4 is of mature mentalizing; it 
makes no explicit claims about how any of these abilities develop, nor does it offer 
any particular support for nativism. But it does cohere with the overarching Bayesian 
approach that I advocate throughout my dissertation. It does not propose that low-
level, perceptual associations or a fixed set of quasi-mentalistic behavior rules predict 
behavior. The picture of mindreading it offers instead is abstract, highly structured, 
and able to flexibly respond to evidence. Moreover, the particular structure for 
mental-state inference that it proposes - a predictive hierarchy that moves from 
temporally stable states to transient ones - reflects the hierarchical structure of 
intentional action itself. Thus, what it offers for nativists is a picture of what our 
innate mindreading capacities become, a model for what a mature, rationalistic theory 
of mind might look like. With such a picture in mind, nativists can start to think 
further about how the core hierarchical structure of action prediction and 





The philosophical roots of the theory of mind debate can be traced to the problem of 
other minds, but my specific approach to it has been most deeply influenced by the 
debate between nativists and empiricists. I’ve suggested that if we think of learning 
on the model of Bayesian hypothesis testing, then we can think of the nativist’s 
proposed innate learning structures as providing constraints on hypothesis-generation 
that make learning possible. Without such innate constraints in the domain of 
mindreading, I’ve argued, we simply cannot make sense of young children’s 
precocious mental-state attribution abilities, especially on “implicit” false-belief 
tasks. In other words, innate, domain-specific constraints on mental-state attribution 
are what make children’s learning about other minds possible. 
Given this starting point, the nativist about theory of mind must address a key 
challenge: the gap between infants’ “implicit” false-belief understanding and older 
children’s explicit false-belief competence. Chapter 1 offers a novel pragmatic 
explanation for why this gap arises (which I expand upon in the Appendix), while 
Chapter 2 challenges the underlying architectural commitments of an alternative 
view, the two-systems account. Chapter 3 takes a broader view, and puts forward a 
proposal about the structure of mature mental-state inference (while at the same time 






Chapter 2: Pragmatic development and the false-belief task2 
 
1. Introduction 
Since it became a topic of empirical research, the study of children’s theory of mind – 
their understanding of the underlying psychological basis of behavior – has been 
dominated by the discovery that younger children systematically fail false-belief 
tasks, and start to succeed sometime after their fourth birthdays (Wellman et al., 
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The debate regarding the interpretation of this 
discovery has divided philosophers and psychologists along nativist and empiricist 
lines. Empiricists have claimed that the shift in performance on false-belief tasks 
around children’s fourth year signals their acquisition of a genuinely meta-
representational concept of belief (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991). Nativists 
argued that younger children’s failures reflected a performance error related to 
children’s underdeveloped executive and attentional resources and the processing 
demands inherent to the task, rather than a fundamental lack of competence with the 
concept of belief (Fodor, 1992; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004).  
In the two decades after the false belief task was first introduced as a measure 
of theory of mind development, both empiricist and nativist camps remained firmly 
entrenched (see, for example, Scholl & Leslie's (2001) response to Wellman et al. 
(2001)). More recently, new methods for studying false belief understanding in 
preverbal infants appear to have vindicated the nativist position (Barrett et al., 2013; 
                                                
2 This chapter was originally published as Westra (2016). It has been reprinted here with permission 
from Springer, copyright license # 4067640601646. 
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D. Buttelmann et al., 2009, 2014; Kovács et al., 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Senju et al., 2011; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014). These studies seem to show that 
while younger children do systematically fail false-belief tasks that attempt to elicit 
explicit, communicative responses, infants as young as 6 months of age understand 
false beliefs in tasks where success is measured by their spontaneous reactions to 
behavior, either with anticipatory looking, violation of expectation, active helping, or 
EEG paradigms.  
Interpreting these findings has created a great deal of controversy. Many 
authors have argued that such implicit measures do not actually demonstrate genuine 
meta-representational abilities, and offered a variety of alternative interpretations that 
preserve the empiricist narrative (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Gallagher & Povinelli, 
2012; Heyes, 2014a; Perner, 2010). In response, nativists have produced a steady 
stream of new empirical results aimed at refuting these deflationary hypotheses (D. 
Buttelmann et al., 2014; Moll et al., 2015; Scott, Richman, & Baillargeon, 2015; 
Senju et al., 2011). Others have defended a rich, mentalistic interpretation of the new 
infancy data on theoretical grounds, pointing out that the post hoc nature of many of 
these deflationary proposals counts against their credibility, while other proposals 
seem to be ill-equipped to explain the sheer range and flexibility of infants’ socio-
cognitive abilities (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Carruthers, 2013; Christensen & Michael, 
2015; Scott & Baillargeon, 2014; Scott, 2014; Thompson, 2014). Thus, in spite of this 
controversy, theory-of-mind nativism continues to enjoy substantial evidential 
support, and is currently driving a highly productive research program. There is, in 
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short, good reason to think that children possess the concept of belief well before they 
pass the false belief task. 
However, even if we accept this conclusion (as I will in this paper), nativism 
about theory of mind development still faces a significant challenge when it comes to 
explaining why younger children systematically fail the standard false belief task 
(hereafter, FBT). The standard nativist line is that these tasks impose severe demands 
on young children’s still-developing executive resources, which causes them to fail. 
But this account is ill-equipped to explain why certain forms of social experience and 
training affect when children succeed on the FBT, as it is not clear that the findings in 
question could be explained solely in terms of a child’s developing executive 
abilities. 
The goal of the current paper is to show how these findings fit into a revised 
nativist framework. Typically, data showing a role for social experience in theory-of-
mind development are cited in support of empiricist accounts. However, there is no 
inconsistency between nativism and a role for social learning. All contemporary 
nativist approaches to the mind are meant as explanations for how individual learning 
takes place; they do not deny that individuals ever learn at all, or that innate 
knowledge is ever enriched by experience (pace Fodor (1975)). But it is incumbent 
upon the nativist to explain how various types of experience lead to individual 
differences in theory of mind development.  
This is the challenge that I take up in this paper. Given the strong evidence in 
its favor, and its growing acceptance in the field, I will be taking the claim that young 
children can represent beliefs as a point of departure. Those who are agnostic or 
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skeptical of this claim are invited to view the account I’ll be laying out as a way of 
filling in the following conditional: if infants could represent beliefs, how would we 
go about explaining the influence of social experience on FBT performance? 
Providing the best answer to this conditional question should be important even for 
those who ultimately reject its antecedent. 
My proposal, which I’ll call the pragmatic development account, is that while 
young children are capable of representing beliefs early on in development, they are 
not yet very good at understanding when facts about belief are relevant to 
conversation. In spite of the fact that they constantly attribute beliefs, desires, goals 
and intentions to other agents, understanding when these pre-linguistic concepts are 
implicated in conversation is not just a matter of acquiring the right vocabulary. 
Young children do not initially expect people’s beliefs to be a topic for conversation. 
They have to learn this through experience with the pragmatics of belief discourse – 
that is, during social interactions in which facts about beliefs are implicated in 
conversation. With this experience, children learn to adjust their prior expectations 
about the relevance of doxastic facts when interpreting particular speech acts.  
As a result, different levels of exposure to belief discourse can affect how 
children interpret questions like the ones they must answer in FBTs. When they lack 
the requisite experience, children are prone to misinterpret the crucial false belief 
query as a kind of indirect speech act that is not about the beliefs at all. But as they 
gain more experience with belief discourse, children start to recognize the true 
purpose of the experimenter’s question, and respond accordingly. In other words, 
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younger children fail the FBT not because they lack the concept of belief or because 
the tasks are too executively demanding, but due to a mistaken Gricean inference. 
The pragmatic development account is not wholly new. Siegal and Beattie 
(1991) proposed a Gricean account of younger children’s systematic failure on FBTs. 
They argued that three-year-olds are typically too inexperienced to pick up on 
experimenters’ conversational implicatures during the FBT; as a result, they fail to 
grasp the relevance of mentalistic factors to the experimenters’ questions, opting 
instead for a more familiar, world-oriented interpretation. Thus, when children hear 
“Where will Sally look for her marble?” they interpret it as, “Where will Sally have to 
look for the marble in order to find it?” rather than “Where will Sally look for her 
marble first?” Siegal and Beattie supported this interpretation by showing that three-
year-olds tended to pass a modified version of the FBT in which they were asked the 
latter question, even though they would still fail when asked the former. Later, Surian 
and Leslie (1999) both replicated Siegal and Beattie’s findings and expanded upon 
them by showing that a similar manipulation failed to improve the performance of a 
control group of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (a population widely 
believed to suffer from a chronic theory of mind deficit). In support of a similar 
hypothesis, Hansen (2010) argued that children in the FBT might interpret the 
experimenter’s query as a question about the state of the world, rather than a question 
about the agent’s mental states. To this end, he showed that young children perform 
much better on FBTs in which the experimenter makes it clear the he is not asking 
about the state of the world: “You and I both know where Sally’s marble is, but where 
does Sally think it is?” Pursuing a different version of the pragmatic development 
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strategy, Helming and colleagues have proposed that it is children’s propensity to be 
helpful which leads them to misinterpret the experimenter query during the FBT 
(Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2014). The current proposal builds upon these earlier 
pragmatic accounts in that it specifically engages with the social learning that goes 
into passing the FBT, rather than simply focusing on the on-line pragmatic demands 
of the task itself. It also makes a number of novel recommendations about how to 
tease apart the respective contributions of children’s executive abilities and their 
pragmatic understanding of the task. 
In the next section, I describe current nativist explanations of children’s 
failure on the FBT, and then present findings that seem prima facie inconsistent with 
these explanations. In the third section, I lay the groundwork for the pragmatic 
development account, and present several arguments for why belief discourse poses 
pragmatic challenges for the novice speaker. In section 4, I present the core elements 
of the pragmatic development account, and show how it is able to explain children’s 
performance on a wide range of FBTs. In section 5, I show how the account is able to 
accommodate a particularly challenging set of findings from Call and Tomasello 
(1999). In section 6, I end by making several predictions that would distinguish my 
own view from other nativist accounts. 
2. A challenge for existing nativist accounts 
Many of the prominent nativist accounts of theory of mind development have focused 
on the processing load that the FBT places on younger children’s developing 
executive functioning. Baillargeon and her colleagues’ response account, for 
instance, posits that younger children are unable to cope with the demands of 
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simultaneously attributing a false belief, selecting a response to the experimenter’s 
question, and inhibiting a prepotent tendency to answer the experimenter’s question 
with her own knowledge, perhaps due to still immature connections between 
mindreading and executive regions of the brain (Baillargeon et al., 2010). Along 
similar lines, Leslie and colleagues have argued that success on FBTs is modulated by 
the development of a domain general selection processor responsible for inhibiting 
the mindreading system’s tendency to attribute the subject’s own beliefs to others by 
default (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Carruthers (2013) 
also holds a “processing load” view, but emphasizes that all three components of 
FBTs – attributing a false belief, interpreting the experimenter’s question, and 
generating a response that will communicate the appropriate information to the 
experimenter – involve mindreading (see also Sperber & Wilson, 2002). According to 
this triple mindreading account, executing each of these tasks simultaneously places 
heavy demands on both processing resources internal to the mindreading system and 
general executive resources, both of which may be insufficiently developed in 
younger children, which explains why younger children fail the FBT while still 
possessing the concept of belief.  
In line with these “processing load” accounts, a number of studies have found 
that performance on various executive tasks predicts earlier success on the FBT 
(Benson & Sabbagh, 2005; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). However, the overall 
correlation between these two constructs is in fact quite weak. According to a recent 
meta-analysis by Devine and Hughes, the correlation between executive functioning 
tasks and performance on FBTs is only .22 after controlling for age and verbal ability, 
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with differences in executive functioning accounting for only 8% of the variance in 
performance on FBTs (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Moreover, this correlation was 
consistent across diverse measures of executive functioning. This suggests that no 
single component of executive functioning accounts for its relation to FBT 
performance. Thus, although it does make a small contribution to children’s 
performance on the FBT, it seems unlikely that executive functioning holds the key to 
explaining why most children fail the task until after their fourth birthday. 
Moreover, any account that appeals solely to the maturation of children’s 
executive abilities as an explanation of how they come to pass the FBT is ultimately 
underequipped when it comes to explaining the various experience-related factors that 
influence FBT performance. For instance, it’s been shown that the extent to which a 
child’s mother talks about mental states predicts how early that child will succeed on 
FBTs (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006; Symons, 
2004). Beyond maternal interactions, children with older siblings also appear to have 
an advantage on the FBT (Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994; Ruffman et al., 1998). 
Further, interventions that train children on various aspects of mental state discourse 
have tended to improve children’s performance on FBTs (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 
2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996; Wellman, 2012).  
Exposure to language in general also has dramatic effects on when children 
are able to pass the FBT. Deaf children born to hearing parents who are exposed to 
sign-language late in life are significantly delayed on explicit false-belief tasks when 
compared to both hearing children and deaf children born to deaf parents (whose FBT 
performance is comparable to that of hearing children) (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 
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2005; Wellman, Fuxi, & Peterson, 2011). Notably, this delay is not the result of any 
sort of congenital neurological abnormality (as is the case with children on the autism 
spectrum) but is instead due to purely environmental factors. Nevertheless, late-
signing deaf children still reliably display the same developmental progression 
through various types of theory-of-mind problems as typically developing children 
(e.g. succeeding on problems involving diverse desires before problems involving 
false beliefs; see Section 4.1). However, late-signing deaf children are able to succeed 
earlier on FBTs after they are exposed to theory-of-mind-based interventions using 
“thought bubbles” that draw attention to individuals’ beliefs (Wellman & Peterson, 
2013).  
Some of the most striking evidence for the importance of experiential factors 
in theory-of-mind development comes from a natural experiment that took place in 
Nicaragua during the last few decades of the 20th century. In 1977, an expanded 
elementary school for special-needs children was opened in the city of Managua. 
Here, for the first time, deaf children in Nicaragua came into extended contact with 
one another. Although their education was conducted in Spanish, amongst themselves 
the students began to develop their own novel system of gestural communication, an 
amalgam of the children’s various idiosyncratic home-sign gestures. This system of 
gestural communication was expanded as older students passed it on to new ones, and 
rapidly developed into a full-fledged sign language known today as Nicaraguan Sign 
Language, or NSL (Senghas, Kita, & Ozyürek, 2004).  
Importantly, the version of NSL acquired by its earliest speakers was less 
complex than the one acquired by later speakers, and completely lacking in mental 
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state vocabulary (Pyers & Senghas, 2009). In a study with adult speakers of NSL that 
compared the performance of earlier “first cohort” and later “second cohort” speakers 
of NSL, Pyers and Senghas found that first cohort speakers systematically failed a 
non-verbal elicited-response version of the FBT, while second cohort speakers were 
generally successful. In a follow-up several years later, the performance of the first 
cohort speakers on the FBT had significantly improved. Pyers and Senghas attributed 
this improvement to an intermingling between first and second cohort speakers of 
NSL, leading the first cohort speakers to acquire a greater facility with mental state 
discourse. Note that one could not plausibly attribute the change in the first cohort 
speakers’ performance on the FBT to a development in executive abilities (as the 
nativist might for the parallel change in performance of 3-4 year olds), as these 
subjects were adults at the time of the first test, and likely possessed fully mature 
executive resources. Indeed, both the difference between first and second cohort NSL 
speakers and the change in first cohort speakers’ performance appear to be the result 
of social experiences specifically related to their acquisition of mental-state 
vocabulary. 
Explanations of FBT performance that appeal solely to the on-line demands 
that the task places on executive resources do not tell us much about why these kinds 
of experiences affect when an individual ultimately overcomes those demands. Even 
if important maturational changes to children’s executive resources do occur between 
the ages of four and five, and individual differences in executive functioning do 
correlate somewhat with individual differences on the FBT, it’s not obvious how 
these internal cognitive developments could explain why an individual’s social 
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experiences also seem to matter for her performance on the FBT, particularly when 
that individual does not pass the FBT until long after her fifth birthday (as is the case 
with language-deprived children). This suggests that a child’s social environment 
makes an independent contribution to her performance on the FBT. 
At this point, one might suggest that language might be the crucial factor in 
passing the FBT. Indeed, various authors have proposed a crucial role for various 
aspects of language in theory-of-mind development, including complementation 
syntax (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002), mental-state vocabulary (Montgomery, 2005), and 
the social experience that comes with linguistic interactions (Dunn & Brophy, 2005; 
P. L. Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2005; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003); however, in a 
recent meta-analysis of the theory-of-mind and language literature, Milligan, 
Astington, and Dack (2007) were unable to identify a special role for any single 
aspect of language independent of general language ability. Moreover, after 
controlling for age, they determined that linguistic factors accounted for roughly 10% 
of the variance in theory of mind abilities. Thus, language, like executive functioning, 
makes only a small (albeit statistically significant) contribution to performance on the 
FBT. 
However, one limitation of this meta-analysis was that it did not assess how 
pragmatic learning affects children’s performance on the FBT. In the next section, I 




3. The pragmatic challenges of belief discourse 
To begin to make sense of all the above-mentioned findings within a nativist 
framework, we must first be clear about the basic problem that contemporary versions 
of theory of mind nativism are meant to solve, namely, explaining how even very 
young children’s spontaneous expectations about behavior seem to be sensitive to the 
mental states of others. Nativists posit that they are able to do this because they 
possess innately channeled inference mechanisms that take observable behaviors as 
input and generate mental state attributions as output. But this account only explains 
how young children come to possess mental state concepts. Learning to apply these 
concepts in an adult-like manner in linguistic interactions is another story. A novice 
speaker of a language, even one who is able to represent the mental states of others, 
may nevertheless demonstrate non-adult-like performance on tasks that require her to 
interpret other speakers’ utterances as being about mental states. After all, the 
nativist’s hypothesis is about where our conceptual understanding of mental states 
comes from, not how we learn to talk about them. The nativist about mindreading is 
silent when it comes to explaining how we learn to participate in mental-state 
discourse – which, it turns out, is surprisingly tricky for the novice speaker. In 
particular, it appears that younger children do not expect beliefs to be a likely topic of 
conversation. 
3.1. References to beliefs in the explanation and description of behavior 
To see why doxastic facts pose a particular difficulty for the novice speaker, consider 
first the asymmetrical roles that beliefs and desires play in ordinary folk-
psychological explanation (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2007; Steglich-
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Petersen & Michael, 2015). Suppose, for instance, that we observe Sally walk over to 
the cookie jar and open the lid. When asked why Sally opened the lid to the cookie 
jar, a natural and perfectly informative response would be, “Because she wanted a 
cookie.” Note that this response makes no mention of Sally’s beliefs – just her 
desires. Now, consider an alternative response: “Because she wanted a cookie, and 
she believed that there would be cookies inside the jar when she opened it.” This 
explanation, while accurate, is a bit odd. To mention Sally’s belief in this context 
seems to provide too much information, a violation of Grice’s Maxim of Quantity 
(Grice, 1991). Sally’s belief about the cookie jar is so obvious that it is simply not 
worth mentioning. This is because when we give explanations of this type, we tend to 
presuppose that facts about Sally’s beliefs are a part of the conversational common 
ground. Even when this is not in fact the case, and the listener actually does not take 
facts about Sally’s beliefs to be in the common ground, the speaker’s act of only 
referring to Sally’s desires is itself evidence that some fact about Sally’s beliefs has 
been presupposed. It is then incumbent on the listener to supply that fact herself in 
order to render the explanation coherent.3 Thus, overt reference to beliefs is notably 
absent from even this very simple instance of a folk psychological explanation; in its 
place, we find a subtle practice that relies upon presupposition and pragmatic 
inference.  
                                                
3 This is a weak form of presupposition accommodation, which takes place whenever speakers 
dynamically update the set of propositions that are taken to be a part of the common ground in 
response to changes in the conversational context. Thus, for example, a felicitous utterance of “It was 
Jon who broke the doorknob” presupposes that the doorknob has been broken, and this leads the 




Our descriptions of behavior also seem to frequently omit reference to beliefs. 
In an elegant series of experiments, Papafragou et al. (2007) presented both adults 
and children with short scenes, which the subjects were then asked to describe. In 
their control conditions, they found that both adults and children tended to make very 
few references to the actors’ beliefs when describing the scenes, opting instead to 
refer to agents’ goals, or simply to their overt physical behaviors. However, the 
experimenters hypothesized that both children and adults would be more likely to 
describe a scene in terms of actors’ beliefs when they are provided with additional 
cues that make doxastic factors more salient. Specifically, they predicted that the 
presence of syntactic cues from sentences with clausal complement structure (e.g. 
“Sally believes THAT the marble is in the box,”) or situational cues in which a 
character acts on a false belief would prompt subjects to use more belief words.  
To test these predictions, the authors presented both adults and children 
between the ages of three and five with silent scenarios showing actors engaged in 
various activities. Some of these scenarios showed actors performing simple actions, 
while others showed the actors acting on false beliefs (e.g. absent-mindedly drinking 
from a flower vase that had been placed where their water glass was while they were 
not looking). In some cases, these scenes were accompanied with nonsense sentences 
containing either a clausal complement structure introduced by ‘that’ (e.g. “Vanissa 
LODS that she ziptorks the siltap”), a transitive structure with a direct object 
(“Vanissa VAMS the torp”), or an intransitive structure (“Vanissa TROMS”). Across 
their experiments, they found that both the false-belief scenario and the clausal 
complement cue substantially increased both adults’ and children’s references to 
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beliefs when describing what they saw. This effect was strongest when both cues 
were co-occurring; when such cues were absent, they tended to describe the scene 
using non-doxastic vocabulary.  
These results show two things: first, that we do not spontaneously refer to 
beliefs in our behavioral descriptions; second, talk of beliefs seems more likely when 
some feature of the situation has raised the saliency of belief facts. Thus, in 
description, as with explanation, doxastic facts are not often mentioned under 
ordinary circumstances. Yet representations of belief facts still appear to be available, 
as overt references to them can be prompted by the presence of a syntactic cue. The 
fact that false-belief scenarios do prompt references to beliefs is also telling, because 
it suggests that it is only in somewhat unusual circumstances that it becomes 
important for speakers to draw attention to beliefs. This suggests that while we do 
represent the beliefs of others, it is only in special circumstances that these 
representations get overtly mentioned in conversation.  
If this asymmetry in the role of beliefs in the explanation and description of 
behavior were in fact pervasive in the novice speaker’s linguistic input, then we 
would expect a corresponding asymmetry in the frequency of overt references made 
to beliefs and desires in child-directed speech. There is some indication that this is in 
fact the case: according to the Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES) 
database, by age 4, children have heard the verb ‘think’ an average of 611, 220 times, 
and ‘want’ 1.3 million times (MacWhinney, 2014).4 We see something similar in a 
study conducted by Tamoepeau and Ruffman, in which mothers were made to tell a 
                                                
4 Corpus analyses are due to Kaitlyn Harrigan and Aaron White (Department of Linguistics, University 
of Maryland, College Park). 
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story to their children from a book containing only images: references to desires were 
roughly twice as frequent as references to beliefs (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). 
These findings provide support for the claim that we frequently omit references to 
beliefs in our explanations and descriptions of behavior. They also highlight a more 
basic fact, namely that belief discourse input is relatively sparse for a novice speaker, 
at least when compared to desire input.5  
In both our explanations and our descriptions of behavior, then, facts about 
belief are often left implicit. For adults, this pragmatic dimension of belief discourse 
is barely noticeable, and engaging in these discursive practices is positively effortless. 
But for a child – even one who possesses the concept of belief – this might make 
belief discourse rather difficult. Not only must the child be able to grasp the role of 
beliefs in generating behavior, but she must also know that common knowledge of 
these facts is often being presupposed during conversation. But until she has learned 
this, she will only notice that talk of beliefs is comparatively rare. For the child, it will 
seem as though beliefs are not the sort of thing that people are often interested in 
talking about. 
3.2. The pragmatics of ‘thinks’ 
Another factor adding to difficulties associated with belief discourse is that the verb 
that we most often use to express the belief concept, ‘think,’ is generally not used to 
attribute beliefs. Often, ‘think’ is used in indirect speech acts as a way of proffering a 
                                                
5 There may be other reasons for the prevalence of desire-talk in child-directed speech when compared 
to belief-talk. For instance, it may be that caregivers query children about their desires much more 
often than their beliefs because caregivers are more interested in satisfying children’s needs than in 
hearing about what they think.  
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complement clause that the speaker takes to be true (Simons, 2007). To illustrate, 
consider the following exchange: 
Agnes: When does the game start? 
Roberta: I think that it starts around 7pm. 
Interpreted literally, Roberta has responded to Agnes’ question by self-attributing a 
belief about the game. But this interpretation would be bizarre: facts about Roberta’s 
mental states are orthogonal to the question under discussion, and Roberta’s referring 
to them would seem to violate the Maxim of Quantity by bringing up irrelevant 
information. Of course, we do not interpret Roberta’s utterance in this manner 
because it is clear that the primary illocutionary act being performed is not, in fact, 
about Roberta’s mental states, but rather about the game itself.6 In the exchange 
above, Roberta is using ‘think’ as a way of indirectly endorsing the truth of the 
complement clause, namely, that the game starts at 7pm. Used in this “parenthetical” 
manner (J. Hooper, 1975; Simons, 2007), sentences of the form “S thinks that P” 
become pragmatically enriched so that they imply that the speaker takes P to be true; 
in contrast, literal, attributive uses of “S thinks that P” are neutral with respect to the 
truth of P.7  
                                                
6 Similarly, consider how the primary illocutionary act behind the familiar “Could you pass the salt?” 
is a request for salt, not question about someone’s salt-passing abilities (Searle, 1975). 
7 Third-personal instances of “S thinks that P” are also often indirect. For instance, suppose that 
Roberta were to answer Agnes’ query from the dialogue above with “Carlos thinks it starts at 7pm.” 
Once again, the primary illocutionary act in this case is not to draw attention to Carlos’ beliefs per se, 
but rather to reply to the speaker’s question. Roberta’s use of ‘think,’ in this utterance, serves an 
evidential function: it provides information about the source of Roberta’s reply, and it adds a 
qualification about the reliability of that source. Thus, we might accurately paraphrase Roberta’s 
utterance here as, “To the best of my knowledge, the game starts at 7pm. I learned this from Carlos” 
(Simons 2007).  
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Thus, utterances containing ‘think’ often require an additional inference about 
speaker meaning to determine whether it is being used indirectly or attributively, 
which in turn impacts whether or not the complement clause is being asserted as true. 
Even worse (from the perspective of the novice speaker), indirect uses of ‘think’ 
appear to be far more common than attributive uses: corpus analyses of child-directed 
speech reveal that the overwhelming majority of adults’ uses of ‘think’ are of the 
indirect variety; correspondingly, most of younger children’s early uses of ‘think’ 
tend to be indirect and first-personal in nature, rather than genuine belief ascriptions 
(L. Bloom, Rispoli, Gartner, & Hafitz, 1989; Diessel & Tomasello, 2001; Shatz, 
Wellman, & Silber, 1983).The combination of the infrequency with which we overtly 
refer to beliefs in explanation and description and the pragmatic noisiness of ‘think’ 
makes interpreting utterances containing ‘think’ quite challenging for the novice 
speaker. It is therefore unsurprising that children below the age of four also 
sometimes show non-adult-like comprehension of ‘think,’ and often seem to treat it as 
equivalent to ‘know’ (Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Moore, Bryant, & Furrow, 1989).  
Multiple authors have interpreted younger children’s difficulties with 
epistemic verbs as evidence of an underlying conceptual deficit: younger children fail 
to distinguish the meanings of ‘think’ and ‘know’ because they lack the concepts 
those words express (Perner, Sprung, Zauner, & Haider, 2003; Tardif & Wellman, 
2000). However, recent experimental evidence suggests that, contrary to the above 
interpretation, children do in fact demonstrate an adult-like semantic understanding of 
‘think’, provided that extraneous task demands have been sufficiently reduced. 
                                                                                                                                      
Second-personal instances of ‘think’ are often indirect as well. If I ask, “Do you think it’s going to 
rain?” I am effectively asking whether it will rain. Here too, the question under discussion does not 
concern your mental states, but rather facts about the world.  
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Specifically, while children do poorly on tasks requiring them to say what an 
individual thinks, they do much better when they are asked to make truth-value 
judgments about sentences in which ‘think’ is used attributively (Dudley, Orita, 
Hacquard, & Lidz, 2015; Hacquard, 2014; S. Lewis, Hacquard, & Lidz, 2012; S. 
Lewis, 2013).  
Pursuing this idea, Lewis, Hacquard, and Lidz (2012) proposed that children’s 
non-adult-like performance on other tasks involving ‘think’ is the product of 
pragmatic factors, not a conceptual or semantic deficit. According to this ‘pragmatic 
development hypothesis,’ three-year-olds do in fact have the appropriate semantics 
for ‘think’ and the corresponding concept of belief, but they tend to make incorrect 
inferences about the intentions behind utterances in which ‘think’ occurs, treating 
literal uses of ‘think’ verbs as indirect by default. This hypothesis predicts that 
experimental manipulations that make attributive interpretations of utterances 
containing ‘think’ more salient should lead to more adult-like performance on 
comprehension tasks.  
To test this prediction, Lewis et al. (2012) presented a sample of four-year-
olds with vignettes in which cartoon characters played a game of hide-and-seek. After 
watching one or more characters hide, participants first interacted with a puppet that 
would ascribe beliefs to the seeker (e.g. “Dora thinks Swiper is behind the toy box,”) 
and then were asked by the experimenter whether or not what the puppet said was 
correct. In their first experiment, participants tended to give incorrect truth-value 
judgments when the puppet accurately ascribed false beliefs to the seeker. However, 
in their next experiment, a second seeker with conflicting beliefs about the location of 
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the hider was added to the vignette. In this experiment, participants’ truth-value 
judgments about the puppet’s belief ascriptions improved across all conditions, 
revealing an adult-like semantic understanding of the verb ‘to think’.  
To explain this improvement, the authors suggest that children in the 1-seeker 
condition failed because they defaulted to an indirect interpretation of the puppet’s 
use of ‘think’, which led them to infer that the puppet was in fact proffering a false 
statement. By introducing another conflicting perspective to the scenario, the authors 
were able to highlight the relevance of the first seeker’s beliefs in the child’s 
conversation with the puppet, which led the children to interpret the puppet as using 
‘think’ attributively and give the correct answer. This suggests that the subjects’ 
initial responses were not based on a failure to represent the character’s beliefs or an 
immature understanding of the meaning of ‘think’, but rather a failure to correctly 
interpret the speaker meaning behind the original belief ascription made by the 
puppet.  
Notably, standard nativist accounts of children’s theory of mind development 
that stress the development of executive functioning would not have predicted this 
result. Such an account would have predicted that the addition of the second seeker 
would have made the task harder, since adding another perspective to the situation 
would have given the subjects yet another concurrent mindreading task and increased 
the executive burden of the task. The fact that adding the second seeker did not have 
this effect is further evidence that demands on executive functioning do not fully 
explain children’s systematic failures on the FBT. 
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Introducing a telling contrast in order to highlight the attributive interpretation 
of ‘think’ has also been demonstrated in three-year-olds. Arguing along similar lines 
as Lewis et al. (2012), Hansen (2010) showed that younger children’s success rates 
on FBTs surpass chance levels when experimenters ask, “You and I both know where 
Sally’s marble is, but where does Sally think it is?” This manipulation is particularly 
effective, since it actually introduces two pieces of contrastive information that serve 
to highlight the relevance of the subject’s doxastic state. First, by drawing attention to 
the knowledge she shares with the child, the experimenter’s query serves to highlight 
the fact that Sally does not share in this knowledge. Second, the query involves the 
use of both ‘know’, which has a factive semantics, and ‘think’, which does not. 
Contrasting ‘think’ and ‘know’ in this context is an effective way of eliminating the 
possibility that ‘think’ is being used indirectly, since such an interpretation (which 
tends to imply that the complement clause is true) would render the contrast with 
‘know’ uninformative. Thus, both pieces of contrastive information contained in the 
experimenter’s query lead the child to interpret the topic of conversation to be Sally’s 
beliefs rather than reality. Both Hansen (2010) and Lewis et al. (2012) thus provide 
compelling evidence that children are able to grasp that ‘think’ expresses a belief 
attribution, provided that other, non-doxastic interpretations of ‘think’ are excluded 
by contextually relevant information.  
4. The pragmatic development account 
One thing that the studies by Hansen and Lewis et al. tell us is that we should expect 
younger children to have difficulties on FBTs that ask them what a particular agent 
thinks (e.g. Jacques & Zelazo, 2005; Low & Simpson, 2012): in those tasks, children 
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are likely defaulting to an indirect interpretation of the verb, rather than an attributive 
one. Notably, the subset of FBTs that employ the ‘thinks’-question includes the 
majority of unexpected-contents and deceptive-object versions of the FBT (e.g. 
Perner et al. 1987; Gopnik and Astington 1988).8 This is because these tasks all try to 
draw children’s attention to their own or another agent’s prior expectations about the 
world, which requires an overt reference to beliefs. Since younger children do not 
expect beliefs to be a topic of conversation, and are used to ‘think’ being used in 
indirect speech acts, they naturally interpret this to be the experimenter’s true 
communicative purpose. They thus interpret the question “what will S think is in the 
box?” as an indirect question about the contents of the box, and respond accordingly. 
4.1. “Where will Sally look for the apple?” 
However, many standard FBTs do not ask children what a particular character will 
think, but rather where she will look (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983). It might be 
objected that the above results tell us nothing at all about why younger children fail 
this kind of task, since the word ‘think’ is never actually used. But this objection 
misses the point of the proposal. The frequency of indirect uses of ‘think’ and the 
absence of overt references to belief in explanations and descriptions of behavior 
would, according to this account, lower the probability that belief facts are relevant to 
interpreting the speech acts of others. This would hold true regardless of whether the 
word ‘think’ is used in a given utterance. Thus, when an experimenter asks a child, 
                                                
8 In an unexpected-contents FBT, children are shown a container that looks like it should contain one 
thing (e.g. candy), but really contains another (e.g. pencils). They are then asked to say what another 
ignorant agent will think is in the box, or what they themselves originally thought was in the box 
before seeing its contents. In a deceptive-object FBT, they are shown an object that looks like one 
thing (e.g. a rock), but is really another (e.g. a sponge), and then get asked a similar set of questions as 
in the unexpected-contents task.  
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“Where will Sally look for her marble?” he wants the child to show that she knows 
that Sally believes that the marble is in its old location. But, if the child has had little 
experience with belief discourse, then she is unlikely to judge that this is the 
speaker’s true communicative intention. Because such an interpretation would 
implicate beliefs as a topic of conversation, its low prior probability would place it at 
a disadvantage relative to any other, competing interpretations that might be 
available. Thus, the child would be unlikely to attribute the doxastic interpretation to 
the experimenter’s speech act. 
Importantly, I do not claim that the pragmatics of the false-belief task cause 
children to lose track of the agent’s beliefs, or that pragmatic factors make this 
information cognitively inaccessible; this would render my view virtually 
indistinguishable from a processing-load account. Children, on my account, 
spontaneously infer and maintain mental representations of the agent’s beliefs and 
goals throughout the false-belief scenario. But although they represent the agent as 
having certain beliefs, they fail to infer that the experimenter is interested in those 
beliefs, and that this interest is motivating her communicative intention. Thus, while 
children are perfectly capable of representing false beliefs in this scenario, their 
inexperience with belief discourse leads them to err in their Gricean reasoning about 
what the experimenter wants from them. 
But while younger children do, from our adult perspective, get the answer to 
the FBT wrong, it is important to note that from their perspective, their answer is 
perfectly justified. For given their experience with belief discourse, the actual 
communicative intention of the experimenter – which is to get children to show that 
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they know that Sally thinks the marble is in the incorrect location – would seem quite 
unusual. It is only natural that children should instead attribute to the experimenter a 
more plausible communicative intention. 
But, one might wonder, how else would the child interpret the experimenter’s 
query in when she asks where Sally will look for the marble? As proponents of other 
pragmatic development accounts have pointed out, the standard change-of-location 
scenario creates a set of conditions in which other interpretations of the 
experimenter’s query would be highly salient to the child. For instance, Siegal and 
Beattie (1991) suggest that children may interpret the experimenter’s query as 
“Where will Sally find the marble?” given that obtaining the ball is Sally’s ultimate 
goal in the FBT scenario, and children treat the impending resolution of this goal as 
highly salient. Helming and colleauges (2014) offer a related explanation, drawing 
upon the well-established finding that children are highly motivated to engage in 
spontaneous helping behavior (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007, 2009). They suggest 
that children in the change-of-location FBT would treat the fact that Sally has an 
unfulfilled goal as highly salient, and would be very motivated to help her fulfill that 
goal. Consequently, children infer that the experimenter must be indirectly asking 
them to help Sally; they thus interpret “Where will Sally look for her marble?” as 
“Where should Sally look for her marble? Let’s help her find it!” They respond by 
giving the most helpful answer possible – namely, by indicating the actual location of 
the ball. In other words, children fail to judge that the doxastic interpretation of the 
experimenter’s question is correct because they judge it far more likely that the 
experimenter is concerned with (what they see as) the most salient feature of the 
 63 
 
situation: that Sally needs help. Thus, when children hear the experimenter ask, 
“Where will Sally look for her marble?” according to the pragmatic development 
account, they think, the experimenter wants me to help Sally find her marble. 
This explanation also enables us to make sense of the fact that children tend to 
do slightly better on FBT tasks in which the change of location is the result of a 
deliberate deception (Chandler et al., 1989; Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Wellman 
et al., 2001). In such a context the child may find it less likely that the experimenter 
(who is also the deceiver) would be inviting the child to undo his deception, which in 
turn raises the probability that the experimenter is doing something other than inviting 
the child to help. It also helps to explain why younger children succeed on false-belief 
tasks that use helping as a dependent measure: when children’s inclination to help is 
exploited by the false-belief task design, and does not interfere with it, children’s 
early false-belief competence is on full display (D. Buttelmann et al., 2009, 2014; 
Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010). 
If children’s failures on the FBT are due in part to the fact that they do not see 
doxastic facts as conversationally relevant, this would suggest that manipulations that 
raise the salience of these facts should improve performance. A number of findings in 
the literature support this prediction. As we saw, the Lewis et al. (2012) and Hansen 
(2010) studies showed that the presence of contrastive information can heighten the 
salience of belief facts and thus trigger a doxastic interpretation. Asking a child where 
an agent will look first also leads to improved performance (Siegal & Beattie, 1991; 
Surian & Leslie, 1999); perhaps this added specificity simply restricts the range of 
plausible interpretations, forcing the child to consider the doxastic one more 
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carefully. Asking a child to play out a character’s actions using a toy rather than 
directly querying them about the character’s actions (i.e. the “Duplo Task”) also 
helps, perhaps because the play-acting activity naturally leads the child to treat the 
character’s beliefs as contextually relevant (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013); unlike 
traditional FBTs, the Duplo Task presents children with a situation in which showing 
their understanding of beliefs actually makes sense from their point of view. All of 
these manipulations, whether they involve the verb ‘think’ or not, seem to change the 
features of the situation in a way that makes children regard doxastic facts as more 
salient, enabling them to demonstrate their knowledge of the character’s beliefs. 
4.2. Social experience and the FBT 
Here, the importance of social experience for understanding the relevance of belief 
facts becomes clear: children who have had more opportunities to observe and 
participate in conversations about beliefs seem to be better attuned to the 
conversational relevance of psychological facts. They may, for instance, gradually 
encounter more situations in which non-doxastic interpretations of speech acts fail to 
explain speakers’ behavior, forcing them to entertain alternative, doxastic 
interpretations. In this manner, children may come to learn that the concept of belief 
that they deploy to interpret the behavior of others is also regularly implicated (either 
explicitly or implicitly) in everyday speech, especially in contexts involving diverse 
beliefs (Lewis et al. 2012) and false beliefs (Papafragou et al., 2007). This newly 
acquired knowledge prompts children to adjust their prior expectations about the 
potential relevance of belief-facts when drawing inferences about speaker meaning. 
They are then better able to disambiguate indirect and attributive uses of ‘think,’ and, 
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most importantly for our current discussion, accurately interpret experimenter queries 
in the FBT. 
This experience could be achieved via exposure to maternal “mind-minded” 
conversation (Ruffman et al., 2002), interactions with older siblings (Perner et al., 
1994; Ruffman et al., 1998), or various forms of explicit training (Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Notably, the absence of these 
experiences would lead to corresponding delays on FBTs. Late-signing deaf children, 
for instance, are not exposed to belief discourse until primary school, and 
consequently they show delays in explicit false belief performance (Wellman et al., 
2011); yet, when they are exposed to theory of mind-based training interventions, 
they rapidly improve (Wellman & Peterson, 2013). The first cohort of Nicaraguan 
signers did not even possess mental state vocabulary when Pyers and Senghas (2009) 
first tested their explicit false belief competence, which they systematically failed. 
Several years later, after being exposed to the mental state vocabulary of the second 
cohort, their performance markedly improved. According to the pragmatic account, 
what developed in the interim was not a new set of concepts; rather, it was their 
sensitivity to the contextual factors that rendered beliefs conversationally salient. For 
the late-signing deaf-children, their general deficit in linguistic experience meant that 
they lacked crucial experience with belief discourse; Wellman and Peterson’s 
intervention succeeded in compensating for this deficit. For the first-cohort 
Nicaraguan signers, the language itself was impoverished with respect to mental state 
terms, which resulted in impoverished experience with belief discourse. 
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These findings, which resist explanation under accounts that appeal solely to 
the executive demands of the FBT to explain systematic failures, are convincingly 
explained under the pragmatic development account. But more importantly, they 
point to the specific importance of experience with mental state discourse in 
improving children’s performance on the FBT. Such experiences provide a 
developmental scaffold for the ability to understand when psychological facts are 
conversationally relevant. 
At this point, one might object that while the pragmatic development account 
is well-equipped to explain experience-dependent individual differences in FBT-
performance, it may seem less obvious that it can explain why most children suddenly 
pass this task around 4-and-a-half years of age. This sharp developmental shift was 
convincingly explained by the processing-load account, as it seemed indicative of a 
biologically-based, maturational change to a child’s executive abilities. But now that 
the processing-load account has been shown to be inadequate (for the reasons given 
in Section 2), it is not clear that the space left in its wake can be filled by appealing 
solely to a child’s experiences with belief discourse. 
The strength of this objection depends upon the claim that there is a sharp 
shift in performance on the FBT around 4.5 years of age. But as we’ve already seen, 
the precise timing of this shift is in fact quite variable: children with more experience 
with belief discourse pass the FBT slightly earlier, while children with less 
experience pass it slightly later; children with significantly less experience (e.g. late-
signing deaf children and first-cohort speakers of NSL) pass it significantly later. 
When we include populations from a broader range of cultures, the age of success on 
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the FBT varies still further: for instance, children from Hong Kong do not pass the 
task until they are 6 (Wellman et al., 2011), and Samoan children do not pass the FBT 
until around 8 years of age (Mayer & Trauble, 2012). Moreover, even in culturally 
homogeneous, Western populations, the shift in children’s performance is not 
particularly abrupt: at 30 months of age, the rate of success on the task is 20%; by 40 
months, it rises to 50%; by 56 months, it rises to 74.6% (Wellman et al., 2001). There 
is, in other words, a gradual, linear change in the rate of FBT success, the timing of 
which varies substantially in different populations. This broad pattern is consistent 
with the hypothesis that FBT performance is related to gradually increasing exposure 
to belief-discourse, which itself may vary on individual and cultural bases.9 Thus, the 
pragmatic development account is fully able to explain why children pass the FBT 
when they do, whether or not this happens to occur at 4.5 years of age. 
4.3. Desire discourse 
The pragmatic development account also helps us understand another major 
developmental finding in the theory of mind literature, namely that children 
consistently succeed on verbal tasks that implicate the concept of desire well before 
those that involve false beliefs (Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Rakoczy et al., 2007; 
Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Explaining these findings has proven challenging for 
nativists, who hold that basic conceptual understanding of both belief and desire 
                                                
9 While some authors have appealed to deep cultural differences between Western and Eastern 
societies (e.g. individualist versus collectivist value systems) in order to explain cultural variation on 
theory of mind tasks, (Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008; Shahaeian et al., 2011), others have 
proposed that much of this variation may be due to factors that cross-cut such cultural divides: for 
instance, Hughes et al. (2014) suggest that the age at which children begin primary schooling, and the 
experiences that they gain in formal pedagogical contexts, may explain differences in FBT 




emerge in the first year of life. Leslie and colleagues (Leslie et al., 2004) have argued 
that desire-based tasks are less demanding on a child’s executive resources than 
FBTs; however, Rakoczy et al. (2007) have shown that the gap between desire and 
false belief persists even when both types of task are matched for logical complexity.  
An initial prediction of the pragmatic development account is that this phenomenon is 
likely to have its roots in children’s conversational experiences, and indeed, there is 
reason to believe that this is the case. As I argued in section 3, both our explanations 
and descriptions of behavior tend to omit any overt reference to beliefs and refer only 
to desires, which leads references to desires to be roughly twice as frequent as talk of 
uses of ‘think’;10 thus, children have a much greater input for desire discourse than 
for belief discourse (see also Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006). Moreover the frequency of indirect uses of ‘think’ makes the input for belief 
discourse fairly noisy, whereas ‘want’ does not seem to pose the same kinds of 
pragmatic difficulties.11 One would expect, then, that proficiency with desire-
discourse would precede proficiency with belief-discourse, as the input for the former 
would be both greater and more easily interpretable than the input for the latter. Thus, 
according to the current account, children succeed on tasks involving desire before 
they succeed on tasks involving belief because desire discourse lacks the pragmatic 
difficulties posed by belief discourse. 
                                                
10 The asymmetric roles of beliefs and desires in folk psychological explanation is itself a fact in need 
of some explanation. Steglich-Petersen and Michael (2015) have recently argued that this is due to the 
fact that one may substitute one’s own beliefs into most folk psychological explanations and still have 
them make sense, but that the same is not true of our desires; thus, we must make overt reference to 
desires in our folk psychological explanations because this is information that cannot be presupposed 
in a coherent explanation of behavior.  
11 ‘Want’ can be used imperatively (e.g. “Do you want to cut that out?” really means “Cut that out!”) 
But given that desire discourse is also more frequent than belief discourse, genuine attributive uses of 
‘want’ are likely to be common enough that it would not pose a comparable learning challenge. 
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5. A problem case: Call & Tomasello (1999) 
One set of findings that seems to raise doubts about the pragmatic development 
account is reported by Call and Tomasello (1999), who developed an entirely non-
verbal change-of-location FBT. In this task, two groups of children (with mean ages 
of 4 and 5 years) were asked to sit in front of a large rectangular barrier. Behind the 
barrier were two identical boxes. One experimenter, the Hider, would place a sticker 
inside a box while it was behind the barrier, where the child could not see it. Seated 
behind the Hider was the Communicator, whose job was to point to the box 
containing the sticker after the barrier was raised. The child was told that her job was 
to point to the box containing the sticker, which she would then be able to keep.  
On the crucial false-belief trials, the Communicator would watch the Hider 
place the sticker in one of the boxes, and then briefly left the room. During the 
Communicator’s absence, the Hider would switch the locations of the two boxes. The 
Communicator would then return and point to the location in which the sticker was 
originally hidden prior to the switch. In order to pass this task, children had to 
recognize that the Communicator had a false belief about the location of the sticker, 
and then ignore the Communicator’s pointing gesture. Children’s performance on this 
task was then compared to their performance on a standard FBT. 
Call and Tomasello found that children’s performance on this non-verbal task 
was highly similar to their performance on verbal versions of the FBT, with 
performance on both types of task improving with age. In other words, the younger 
children tended to fail both tasks, while the older children tended to pass them. These 
results are problematic for the pragmatic development account for two reasons. First, 
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the task is non-verbal, and made use of simple pointing gestures, which children 
understand well by this age (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Liszkowski, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). This seems to eliminate the possibility that children 
were responding to an indirect speech act. Second, children of both age groups clearly 
seemed to understand that their goal in this task was to collect the stickers for 
themselves. This makes it unlikely that children in the crucial false-belief trial 
thought that they were being invited to help the ignorant communicator. Thus, both 
the pragmatic development explanation of children’s misunderstanding in the 
standard FBT, and the explanation for their systematic errors in that task are off the 
table. 
However, there is reason to believe that the correlation between children’s 
performance on this non-verbal task and the standard FBT is illusory. While Call and 
Tomasello’s design did reduce the pragmatic demands of the FBT, it also increased 
its inferential complexity and executive demands. In an ordinary change-of-location 
FBT, children must simply recall where the agent thinks the object is in order to give 
a correct response. In this task, in contrast, the child must 1) track the visible 
displacement of the sticker in the original hiding phase; 2) track the invisible 
displacement of the sticker during the switching of the boxes, 3) remember which 
parts of the task the Communicator was present for, and 4) ignore the 
Communicator’s advice when she returned on the basis what the she remembers of 
1)-3). Already, this exceeds the processing demands of an ordinary FBT. 
In addition to this added executive burden, the child must be capable of reasoning 
with non-specific, quantified belief-attributions. Because the child does not know 
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where the sticker is, she must not represent, “The Communicator knows the sticker is 
in Box A,” but rather, “The Communicator knows which box the sticker is in.” Then, 
when she sees the boxes switched, she must infer, “Whichever location the 
Communicator thought the sticker was in, it is now in the other one.” Then, when the 
Communicator points to one box, the child must select the other. This kind of 
reasoning is vastly more complex than what is required in the FBT. Thus, it appears 
that the above task design has simply traded pragmatic challenges for greater 
inferential complexity executive demands. 
Call and Tomasello do attempt to head off this line of criticism by 
administering a series of control tasks, testing children’s ability to track the visible 
and invisible displacements of the sticker, as well as the child’s ability to ignore the 
Communicator. The authors thus argue that the children were capable of surmounting 
all of the executive and inferential demands of the task. Crucially, however, the study 
only controlled for each of these factors independently of one another, whereas the 
real challenge of the task would have been coping with all of these demands 
simultaneously. The study thus failed to adequately control for the executive demands 
and inferential complexity of the task. 
6. Predictions 
One could empirically distinguish between the pragmatic development account and 
the standard nativist “processing load” account in several ways. The processing load 
account points to the information-processing demands of the FBT itself to explain 
younger children’s failures, and predicts that if we reduce these demands, children’s 
performance should improve. In the past, this approach has been successful, and 
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several authors have developed simplified, less executively demanding versions of 
the FBT that children are able to pass before their fourth birthdays (Rubio-Fernández 
& Geurts, 2013, 2015). The pragmatic development account, in contrast, points to the 
conversational context of the FBT as a crucial determiner of performance. It predicts 
that if children are better able to grasp the fact that in this context they are supposed 
to attend to belief facts, then their performance on a standard FBT should improve – 
even if no change is made to the task’s immediate information-processing demands. 
Thus, where the processing load account would predict that contextual manipulations 
that leave the basic executive demands of the FBT unchanged should have no effect 
on performance, the pragmatic development account predicts that these manipulations 
should lead to improvements in performance. 
This contextual manipulation could be achieved using a between-subjects 
design with children aged 3.5 to 4 years (i.e. on the cusp of passing the FBT). Both 
the experimental group and the control group would complete a standard, change-of-
location FBT as the dependent measure. But prior to completing the task, the 
experimental group would engage in a pre-test familiarization activity that would 
serve to heighten the saliency of beliefs. One might achieve this effect by having 
children answer a number of questions that draw a contrast between knowledge and 
belief. One way to do this would be to base the activity on Wellman and Peterson’s 
“thought bubble” intervention, originally used with deaf children (Wellman and 
Peterson, 2013). Unlike prior research that used multiple training sessions to improve 
children’s performance on the FBT, the pragmatic account predicts that these 
manipulations should have an immediate effect. 
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Alternatively, one could use a contextual manipulation to diminish the 
saliency of alternative interpretations of the FBT query – for instance, by making the 
prospect of helping the agent seem undesirable (Helming et al., 2014). This could be 
achieved by borrowing from the design of Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2010). 
These authors found that three year-old children would selectively avoid helping an 
agent if they previously saw that agent intentionally harm someone else. If children’s 
incorrect response in change-of-location FBTs is in fact a helping response, then 
seeing an agent commit an intentionally harmful act prior to completing the FBT 
should also diminish their inclination to give this response.  
One could also use the same type of contextual manipulation to cause children 
who we would expect to pass the FBT (e.g. children aged 4.5 to 5) to fail the task. 
This could be achieved by making the needs of the agent especially salient and/or by 
emphasizing the prosocial nature of the agent, causing the motivation to help to 
override the still-fragile doxastic response. This manipulation could be implemented 
by showing children an agent with a false belief who has just been the victim of an 
unfair resource allocation. Since we know that children at this age are highly 
motivated to rectify such inequalities (Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014), we might expect 
them to use the context of the FBT as a chance to rectify the inequality, and thus give 
the helpful but incorrect response. 
Crucially, all of these designs would include a standard FBT task, free of 
simplifying manipulations. However, one might also build on the last suggestion by 
taking a simplified FBT that younger children normally pass (e.g. Rubio-Fernandez 
and Geurts, 2013, 2015), and using a contextual manipulation to make it harder. The 
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pragmatic development account predicts that even if the processing demands of the 
task have been sufficiently reduced, a contextual manipulation emphasizing the 
helping motivation should cause these children to fail. Something like this might 
explain one of the results of Rubio-Fernandez and Geurts (2015). In their Experiment 
2, they administered a simplified version of the FBT – the “Duplo task” – that three-
year-olds have been known to pass with little difficulty, but with one modification: 
they made sure to mention the desired object.12 This caused three-year-olds 
overwhelmingly to fail the task. The authors attribute children’s failure in this 
manipulation to the fact that mentioning the object made it more salient to the child, 
disrupting the child’s perspective-taking in the process. But the pragmatic 
development account offers a different interpretation: drawing the child’s attention to 
the banana qua object of desire triggered their motivation to help, causing them to 
lead the character to the bananas’ correct location instead of acting out the 
appropriate behavior. 
An alternative to the contextual manipulation strategy would be to modify the 
immediate FBT context in a way that would increase the salience of belief facts. This 
kind of approach would probably make it more difficult to tease apart pragmatic 
factors from executive demands, since it could be claimed that any resulting 
improvement in performance might be due to a reduction in processing demands, 
rather than anything to do with the salience of belief facts. But this sort of obstacle 
                                                
12 In the Control Question condition, the experimenter first asks, “Where is the banana now?” and then 
proceed with the test question. In the Goal condition, the experimenter says, “Now Lola is very hungry 
and wants the bananas” (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2015, p. 10). Of the two conditions, the Goal 
condition is most clearly explained by the helping interpretation; however, the Control Question 




could be overcome by following the example of Lewis et al. (2012). Recall that Lewis 
and colleagues were able to improve children’s performance on a truth-value 
judgment task for belief reports by adding an additional seeker with contrasting 
beliefs (see Section 3.2). This manipulation would have also increased the processing 
demands of the task – reading two minds is harder than reading one – but this did not 
seem to hurt children’s performance. One could implement a similar manipulation in 
a more traditional FBT design. In such a task, children would be presented with a 
hide-and-seek scenario; in the 1-seeker condition, children would see just one seeker 
with a false belief about the location of the hider; in the 2-seeker condition, children 
would see two seekers, one with a false belief about the hider’s location, and the other 
with a true belief. In both conditions, the test question would be, “Where will [the 
seeker with the false belief] look for [the hider]?” The pragmatic development 
account would predict that having two seekers as opposed to one should improve 
performance, whereas the processing load account would predict that it would lead to 
a decrease in performance. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I’ve illustrated how belief discourse poses substantial challenges for 
young children that have nothing to do with whether or not they possess the concept 
of belief. This highlights a new way of interpreting the relationship between 
children’s early social experiences and their performance on FBTs: even children 
who are able to represent false beliefs must still learn from their social environment 
how and when belief facts are implicated in conversation before they are able to pass 
the FBT. Thus, if a child’s social environment is enriched or impoverished with 
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respect to belief discourse, this will affect when she passes the FBT. The pragmatic 
development account thus provides the theory of mind nativist with a framework for 
accommodating a wide range of variation in FBT performance brought on by 
differences in individuals’ social experiences, as well as set of empirical predictions 
for testing and extending that framework and enriching our understanding of theory 
of mind development.  
 77 
 
Chapter 3: Spontaneous mindreading: A problem for the two-
systems account13  
 
1. Introduction 
For decades, social cognition research has been dominated by the idea that we 
navigate the social world by attributing mental states to other individuals in order to 
predict and explain their behavior – the ability known as “theory of mind” or 
“mindreading” (Carruthers, 2013; Fodor, 1992; Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 
2003). This approach to social cognition has been quite fruitful, and has yielded an 
immense body of empirical knowledge about the development of our social cognitive 
abilities and their neural underpinnings (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003; Wellman, 2014). But philosophers and psychologists are nevertheless divided 
over how great a role these folk-psychological concepts actually play in our everyday 
lives. While many continue to assume that the mindreading paradigm is basically 
sound, others have suggested that it is deeply flawed as an account of our ordinary 
socio-cognitive abilities, and must be radically re-thought. 
One of the most compelling skeptical arguments about mindreading draws our 
attention to the unbounded scope of paradigmatic folk-psychological inferences 
(Bermudez, 2003; Morton, 1996; Zawidzki, 2013). This argument begins with the 
idea that belief-formation itself is a holistic, unbounded, “isotropic” process (cf. 
Fodor (1983)). Our actions can be informed by an indefinitely wide range of beliefs 
and desires. For instance, when I decide to take the metro rather than drive, I may do 
                                                
13 This chapter was originally published as Westra (2016b). It has been reprinted here with permission 
from Springer, copyright license # 4067640831758. 
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so because I believe that taking the metro is better for the environment, and I desire to 
make environmentally-friendly choices; it may also be because I think that parking is 
expensive, and I wish to save money; or I may believe that I am being followed, and I 
wish to lose my pursuers on the crowded metro platform.  There are, in other words, 
indefinitely many different folk-psychological ways to rationalize a particular action. 
When interpreting other people’s actions, the argument goes, we are faced with the 
daunting task of sifting through this immense space of possible mental causes, and 
abductively inferring which belief-desire set best explains the action in question. Such 
a process would no doubt be incredibly demanding and effortful, and would place 
heavy demands on executive systems like working memory – that is, if the task were 
not completely intractable. It thus seems highly unlikely that we engage in this kind 
of inference during our everyday social interactions, which occur at a very rapid pace. 
Motivated by these and other skeptical concerns, a number of theorists have 
proposed alternatives to mindreading in order to explain our everyday social-
cognitive abilities. Some have suggested that we gain knowledge of mental states via 
automatic, perception-like processes (Gallagher, 2008). Others have argued that we 
draw on folk-psychological narratives and social norms to predict behavior, rather 
than belief-desire inferences (Hutto, 2012). Still others have suggested that many of 
our socio-cognitive abilities may be subserved by a combination of low-level 
associations between perceptions of behavior and domain-general attentional 
processes (Heyes, 2014b). It has even been suggested that these abilities are parts of 
dynamical systems that emerge during social interactions with multiple agents, and 
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thus cannot be explained in individualistic terms and all (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 
2007). 
It is worth emphasizing the broad-reaching, often radical consequences of 
these anti-mentalistic proposals. Mindreading is widely believed to be central to many 
uniquely human social practices: linguistic communication (Grice, 1991; Wilson & 
Sperber, 2012), moral judgment (Mikhail, 2007; Thomson, 1976; Young, Cushman, 
Hauser, & Saxe, 2007), joint action (Bratman, 1992; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne, & Moll, 2005) and establishing new social conventions (D. Lewis, 1969). Our 
grasp of the psychological underpinnings of these activities hinges on the view that 
mindreading is a cornerstone of social cognition. If we abandon the mindreading 
paradigm, then our theories about these important human activities must also be re-
thought. 
In the context of this dispute over the scope of theory of mind in our everyday 
social lives, the two-systems account of mindreading (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; 
Apperly 2011; Butterfill and Apperly 2013) seems to offer something of a middle 
ground: on the one hand, it adheres to the basic idea that some form of mindreading is 
pervasive in our everyday lives. But on the other hand, two-systems theorists agree 
with mindreading skeptics that the attribution of “full-blown” propositional attitudes 
such as beliefs is generally quite slow and effortful, places heavy demands on 
attention and working memory, and likely requires fairly advanced linguistic abilities. 
Because it is so demanding, proponents of the two-systems account agree that this 
form of reasoning is unlikely to contribute to many of the ordinary social practices 
that are often associated with it. When it does, it is likely scaffolded by some of the 
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very processes proposed by anti-mindreading theories, such as social norms and 
narratives (Apperly 2011).  
And yet, two-systems theorists also maintain that we are nevertheless 
equipped with an innately-channeled, automatic mindreading system that is 
constantly active in the presence of other agents. However, the representational 
capacities of this system, according to the two-systems account, fall well short of the 
kind of unconstrained belief-desire reasoning typically associated with mindreading. 
Instead, this “implicit” mindreading system is said to employ a limited set of quasi-
mentalistic, mainly extensional concepts and inference rules that allow us to roughly 
predict behavior. Because of its limited representational capacities, this system 
exhibits a number of signature limits that distinguish it from genuine, “explicit” 
mindreading. Specifically, the implicit mindreading system is said to be insensitive to 
the fact that agents represent the world under a particular mode of presentation. For 
example, this system could never predict that Lois Lane would be surprised to see 
Clark Kent fly, even if she knew that Superman can fly, and that Superman is Clark 
Kent, because the implicit system would be insensitive to the fact that a single 
individual can be represented in a number of different ways. 
Thus, according to this view, humans possess two “systems” for mindreading: 
the early-developing, automatic “implicit” system, and the later-developing, slow and 
effortful “explicit” system. Initially, human infants start out with just the implicit 
mindreading system, and as a result, their mindreading abilities are subject to its 
signature limits. As they get older, acquire language, and gain social experience, 
children develop explicit mindreading abilities, which start to emerge after their 
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fourth birthday. Ultimately, these two systems exist side by side in adulthood, 
producing distinct types of mental state judgments in parallel to one another, creating 
a dissociation between implicit and explicit forms of mindreading (Low & Perner, 
2012). 
The main goal of this paper is to offer a critique of the two-systems account of 
mindreading. Specifically, I will be arguing that the two-systems account is unable to 
accommodate the extant empirical evidence on one, very central type of mental-state 
attribution: the attribution of perceptual states or “perspective-taking.” I’ll further 
argue that these problems generalize to other aspects of theory of mind, and thus 
seriously undermine the two-systems account. What emerges in its place is a picture 
of mental-state attribution that lies somewhere in between the automatic, rigid 
information processing of the implicit mindreading system, and the slow, effortful 
reasoning of the explicit system. The evidence that I will discuss suggests that even 
“full blown” forms of mental-state attribution can be both fast and flexible, and that 
“implicit” forms of mindreading can be highly flexible and context-sensitive. This 
combination of speed and flexibility is achieved via the coordinated integration of 
domain-specific mindreading strategies with goals, attention and knowledge stored in 
long-term memory.  
But while the main target of this paper is the two-systems account, this 
critique has broader implications for mindreading skeptics as well. This is because a 
key flaw in the two-systems account is that it accepts the skeptic’s claim that genuine 
mindreading must be slow and cognitively effortful. A proper understanding of the 
underlying processes that enable mindreading shows that this is a mistake. Thus, the 
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picture of mindreading that emerges from my critique of the two-systems account can 
also serve as a reply to the skeptic: we should not abandon the mindreading paradigm 
so quickly. 
In the second section of this paper, I will discuss the general theoretical 
motivations for the two-systems account. Then, in section 3, I will introduce the 
notion of perspective-taking as it occurs in the social cognition literature, and explain 
how the two-systems account purports to explain perspective-taking phenomena. In 
sections 4 and 5, I will argue that the evidence from perspective-taking undermines 
key claims about the implicit and explicit mindreading systems, respectively. In 
section 6, I will show how the problems from perspective-taking generalize, and 
ultimately undermine the two-systems account as a whole. In section 7, I’ll discuss 
the fast, flexible conception of mindreading that emerges from my critique, and how 
it can serve as a bulwark against theory-of-mind skepticism. 
2. Why two systems? 
The motivation for proposing two systems for mindreading, its proponents argue, 
becomes especially clear when we consider the kinds of properties that human 
mindreading must possess in order to successfully navigate ordinary social 
interactions. First, our mindreading abilities must be very fast and efficient, in order 
to keep up with the pace of ordinary behavior. Second, they must also be 
representationally flexible, since we need to be able to attribute an indefinite range of 
attitude contents to others in order to make sense of the complexity of human 
behavior. The problem, according to two-systems theorists, is that,  
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[T]here is a tension between the requirement that mindreading be extremely 
flexible on the one hand, and fast and highly efficient on the other. Such 
characteristics tend not to co-occur in cognitive systems, because the very 
characteristics that make a cognitive process flexible – such as unrestricted 
access to the knowledge of the system – are the same characteristics that make 
cognitive processes slow and effortful. Instead, flexibility and efficiency tend 
to be traded against one another. This trade-off is reflected in Fodor’s 
distinction between “modular” versus “central” cognitive processes. (Apperly, 
2013, pp. 73–74) 
Thus, human beings need at least two mindreading systems because no single system 
could be both efficient and representationally flexible. According to this view, we 
rely on the fast and inflexible system when we need to rapidly anticipate what others 
will do, while we turn to the slow, flexible system when we need to carefully reflect 
on their specific beliefs. Thus, the reason the implicit system is unable to represent 
“full-blown” propositional attitudes is because these are thought to place heavy 
demands on working memory, which is slow but representationally flexible (Butterfill 
& Apperly, 2013).14 The implicit system gains its speed and efficiency from the fact 
that it can circumvent these forms of reasoning, and rely instead on a strictly limited 
set of quasi-psychological concepts and inference rules to automatically generate 
                                                
14 Why is representing “full-blown” propositional attitudes so demanding? Butterfill and Apperly 
write: 
On any standard view, propositional attitudes form complex causal structures, have arbitrarily 
nestable contents, interact with each other in uncodifiably complex ways and are individuated 
by their causal and normative roles in explaining thoughts and actions…. If anything should 
consume working memory and other scarce cognitive resources, it is surely representing states 
with this combination of properties. (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, pp. 609–610) 
 See Carruthers (2015c) for a critique of this argument. 
 84 
 
rough-and-ready predictions about behavior. But when accurate behavioral prediction 
means factoring in the way that an agent represents a particular state of the world, this 
system ought to make systematic errors. The explicit system, meanwhile, should be 
able to accommodate these cases; but this processing will inevitably be slow and 
effortful, and always goal-dependent. 
The purported properties of the implicit mindreading system appear to derive 
from its modularity. In particular, Apperly (2010) emphasizes the essential role that 
informational encapsulation would play in the two-systems architecture. An 
informationally encapsulated, modular system could permit us to circumvent the need 
for effortful uses of working memory in many social interactions, thus rendering 
mental-state attribution fast and efficient, and even possible for young infants and 
non-human animals. However, such a system would also be representationally 
limited, due to its lack of access to working memory and stored knowledge. In other 
words, the tension between the need for flexible and efficient mindreading that 
motivates the two-systems proposal is explained by the trade-offs inherent in a 
modular, informationally encapsulated architecture.15 
Moreover, Apperly (2010) suggests that informational encapsulation may 
provide part of the solution to the challenge raised by mindreading skeptics 
mentioned in the introduction. He argues that a modular, informationally 
encapsulated system could impose “hard constraints” on the scope of our folk-
                                                
15 There are a number of other well-known modularist approaches to theory of mind (Fodor, 1992; 
Leslie et al., 2004; Scholl & Leslie, 1999); however, these accounts tend not to sharply distinguish 
between implicit and explicit mindreading systems, as the two-systems theorists do. Although a 
discussion of these views is beyond the scope of this paper, it is likely that many of the arguments to 
come that are directed at the two-systems account will also pose challenges for them as well. 
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psychological inferences, thus limiting the need for complex, abductive reasoning. By 
restricting the range of possible inputs that it could process, and by sharply delimiting 
the kinds of inferences that could be made on the basis of those inputs, an 
encapsulated, implicit mindreading system offers us a way to render mental-state 
attribution computationally tractable. Thus, the notion of informational encapsulation 
seems to provide the two-systems account with both a basic architectural framework 
and a potent theoretical justification. 
Problematically for the two-systems view, there is growing consensus among 
cognitive scientists that perceptual systems – the paradigms of modularity (Fodor, 
1983; Pylyshyn, 1999) – are not, in fact, informationally encapsulated.16 Instead, we 
find that abstract, conceptual knowledge “penetrates” even the earliest, most rapid 
stages of visual processing. For instance, there is evidence that feedback signals from 
inferotemporal conceptual areas impact processing in the visual cortex just 100ms 
following stimulus onset, well before the onset of endogenous attention (Wyatte, Jilk, 
& O’Reilly, 2014). Similarly, Moshe Bar and colleagues have shown that conceptual 
information in the orbitofrontal cortex gets applied to rapidly transmitted, low spatial-
frequency visual information, which is then projected back to mid-level and high-
level visual processing areas 50ms before object-recognition takes place (M. Bar et 
al., 2006; Chaumon, Kveraga, Barrett, & Bar, 2014). There is also EEG evidence that 
linguistically encoded categorical distinctions (e.g. the lexical distinction between 
light and dark blue in modern Greek) can penetrate pre-attentional, pre-conscious 
processing in the visual cortex as early as 200ms after stimulus onset (Thierry, 
                                                
16 For a recent review of this topic, see Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016). 
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Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009). In short, there appear to be a 
number of pathways by which conceptual information stored in long-term memory 
can penetrate even paradigmatically modular systems, such as early visual processing.  
The fact that vision is unencapsulated tells us something important: the trade-
off between speed and representational flexibility is not mandated by our cognitive 
architecture.17 But just because certain aspects of perceptual processing may be 
unencapsulated, it does not follow that there are no genuinely encapsulated systems. 
For instance, the analogue magnitude system, which served as a model for the 
implicit mindreading system (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), may well be impenetrable 
to goals and information stored in long-term memory (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 
2004). However, the question still arises: is fast, efficient mindreading truly 
informationally encapsulated, like analogue magnitude reasoning? Or is it more like 
early vision, and capable of using both top-down and bottom-up information to 
rapidly and flexibly interpret the social environment?  
3. The case of perspective-taking 
A key test-case for the claim that the implicit mindreading system is truly 
encapsulated is the component of theory of mind known as “perspective-taking,” 
which consists in the ability to represent what other agents see. In the empirical 
literature on the subject, there is a well-established distinction between two different 
“levels” of perspective-taking, which captures two different ways in which an 
                                                
17 In their own critique of the two-systems view, Christensen and Michael give a number of examples 
of well-studied cognitive systems that also succeed in achieving both flexibility and efficiency without 
the need for strong encapsulation, including the orbitofrontal cortex, the mid-level visual system, and 
language comprehension (Christensen & Michael, 2015). 
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organism might represent the visual perspective relation. “Level-1” perspective-
taking consists in the ability to represent what another agent can see. Level-1 
perspectives are construed as external, spatial relations that hold between agents and 
objects in their environments. This kind of relation depends primarily on 
environmental factors, such as an unobstructed line-of-sight, lighting, and distance. 
To be a Level-1 perspective-taker thus consists in representing whether this external 
relation is present or absent, and forming appropriate expectations about behavior on 
this basis. For instance, a Level-1 perspective-taker would not expect an agent 
wearing a blindfold to reach towards a goal object in front of her, because the 
blindfold interrupts her line-of-sight.  
“Level-2” perspective-taking, in contrast, appears to be uniquely human. It 
involves representing the way that other agents see the world. Rather than a direct 
relation between agents and their environments, the Level-2 perspective relation 
holds between agents and representational contents; however, it depends upon some 
of the same environmental factors as Level-1 perspective-taking, such as line-of-
sight. The key difference between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking is that only 
the latter is sensitive to the representational, aspectual nature of vision.  
To illustrate, imagine that you and a partner are seated opposite one another at a table, 
and lying flat upon the table is a screen with the numeral “9” on it. In the purely 
extensional, Level-1 sense, you would both see the same thing: “9”. But in the 
intensional, Level-2 sense, you would each see something different: while you would 
see the numeral as the number nine, your partner would see it as the number six. In 
other words, the more complex Level-2 relation permits us to track differences in 
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mode of presentation.  
In humans, Level-1 perspective-taking abilities emerge fairly early in 
development, and are even present in infancy (Luo & Johnson, 2009; Masangkay et 
al., 1974; Moll & Tomasello, 2006). A number of non-human animal species are also 
capable of Level-1 perspective-taking, including corvids, canines, and great apes 
(Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2004; Bugnyar, Reber, & Buckner, 2016; Josep Call & 
Tomasello, 2008). The ability to represent Level-2 perspectives seems to emerge 
somewhat later in childhood, after the fourth year of life – the same age when 
children pass the standard false belief task. (Flavell et al., 1981; Low et al., 2014; 
Surtees et al., 2012). For this reason, Level-2 perspective-taking is said to signal 
children’s acquisition of a representational theory of mind (Rakoczy, 2015). 
Beyond its comparative and developmental applications, the Level-1/Level-2 
distinction has also been invoked to describe adults’ perspective-taking abilities. 
Specifically, it has been argued that representing Level-1 and Level-2 perspectives 
involve distinct cognitive processes (Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Qureshi et al., 2010; 
Samson et al., 2010; Surtees et al., 2012; Surtees, Samson, et al., 2016). Level-1 
perspective-taking appears to be very rapid, places relatively few demands on 
executive resources, and seems to employ a simple line-of-sight heuristic. Level-2 
perspective-taking, in contrast, appears to be slow, places heavy demands on working 
memory, and employs a kind of embodied mental rotation procedure (Surtees, 
Apperly, & Samson, 2013a).  
The distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking thus seems to 
offer a clear-cut case of the dissociation between the implicit and explicit 
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mindreading: Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking each possess developmental 
and cognitive profiles that map fairly neatly onto the two mindreading systems. 
Accordingly, the two-systems account makes a number of specific predictions about 
perspective-taking that bear directly upon the issue of informational encapsulation. 
First, if the implicit system is truly informationally encapsulated, then Level-1 
perspective-taking should be insensitive to the background knowledge of the 
perspective-taker. Second, if Level-2 perspective-taking truly places heavy demands 
on working memory, then we should expect it to operate in a goal-dependent fashion, 
and to be relatively slow and effortful. 
To test the first prediction, Samson et al. (2010) created the “dot-perspective 
task.” In this task, adult participants had to rapidly judge what either they or an avatar 
could see. Subjects were presented with a scene in which an avatar stood alone in a 
room facing a wall. In Consistent Perspective trials, black dots appeared on the wall 
that the avatar could see. In Inconsistent Perspective trials, some of the dots appeared 
on the wall that the participant could see, but the avatar could not. In the Self-task, 
participants had to judge how many dots they themselves could see; in the Other-task, 
they had to judge how many dots the avatar could see. Samson and colleagues found 
that people were much slower to respond and made more errors in the Self-task for 
Inconsistent perspective trials. Participants seemed to represent the avatar’s Level-1 
perspective even when it was irrelevant to their current goal, to the point that it 




To test the prediction that the implicit system cannot represent Level-2 
perspectives, Surtees et al. (2012) presented participants with another scene 
containing an avatar; but this time, instead of dots, the experiment used numerals 
displayed on a table in front of the avatar opposite the participant – the “number-
perspective task.” On Consistent Perspective trials, a numeral like ‘8’ was displayed, 
which both the avatar and the participant saw the same way. In Inconsistent 
Perspective trials, a ‘6’ or a ‘9’ was presented on the table, which the participant and 
avatar would perceive differently; thus, this task required Level-2 perspective-taking 
abilities. As in Samson et al., participants completed both Self and Other tasks. 
Unlike in the Samson et al. experiments, the Inconsistent perspective of the avatar did 
not interfere with their response times on the Self-task. Participants appeared to only 
compute the other individual’s perspective on the Other-task, when it was goal-
relevant – once again, just as the two-systems account predicted. 
While these results do seem to bear out the above predictions, a number of 
other findings in the perspective-taking literature are not so easily accommodated by 
the two-systems framework. In the next section, I will argue that we have good 
evidence that Level-1 perspective-taking is neither fully encapsulated nor truly 
automatic. In section 5, I will argue that Level-2 perspective-taking need not be slow 
and cognitively effortful.  
4. Level-1 perspective-taking is unencapsulated: The argument from gaze-cueing 
To see why the Level-1 perspective-taking evidence does not fully support the two-
systems account, we need to consider another experimental paradigm that also aims 
to study implicit perspective-taking: gaze-cueing. Gaze-cueing tasks measure the 
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effects of shifts in the direction of a target’s eye gaze or head on covert spatial 
attention – that is, changes in attention that happen prior to any overt forms of 
attention shifting, such as movements of the eyes or head (Posner, 1980). In gaze-
cueing studies, subjects are presented with a task-irrelevant face in the center of a 
screen, with eyes that move either in one direction or another (Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998). Subjects then witness an object suddenly 
appear either on the same side as the direction that the face’s eyes have “looked” (a 
congruent trial) or on the opposite side (an incongruent trial). The gaze-cueing effect 
occurs when subjects are faster to detect the object on the congruent side than the 
incongruent one. These effects are extremely rapid – on the order of 10-15ms - and 
are also specific to social stimuli (Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004; Ristic & 
Kingstone, 2005).18 Thus, gaze-cueing seems like exactly the kind of effect that one 
might expect from the implicit mindreading system: it is extremely fast, unconscious, 
and tracks Level-1 perspectives. 
If the implicit system were truly encapsulated, knowledge stored in long-term 
memory would not affect it. However, we know from a wide range of studies that 
gaze-cueing is in fact sensitive to background knowledge. For instance, Eva Wiese 
                                                
18 Since cueing effects can also be triggered by other kinds of directional stimuli, such as arrows 
(Ristic, Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002), some have suggested that this process might be the product of a 
domain-general covert orienting mechanism (Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2014). 
However, these two types of cueing effects appear to have distinct cognitive, developmental, and 
neural bases. Specifically, gaze shifts appear to issue in a distinctly spatial cueing effect for the specific 
location where the eyes look, whereas arrows produce object-based cueing effects for any items that 
appear on the congruent side, regardless of their specific location (Marotta, Lupiáñez, Martella, & 
Casagrande, 2012). Further, while gaze-cueing effects appear even in extremely young infants 
(Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson, 2009; Hood et al., 1998), cueing effects from other kinds of 
stimuli do not emerge until much later in development (Jakobsen, Frick, & Simpson, 2013). Finally, 
gaze-cueing, but not other kinds of cueing, produces activity in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), a 




and colleagues showed participants a robot-face cueing stimulus (Wiese, Wykowska, 
Zwickel, & Müller, 2012). In one experiment, they found that participants were much 
less likely to be cued by the gaze-shifts of the robot than those of a human face. 
However, in another experiment, participants were explicitly told that an 
experimenter was intentionally controlling the robot’s gaze-shifts. In this condition, 
participants were just as likely to be cued by the robot-face as the human face. Thus, 
the presence of explicit, folk-psychological background knowledge about the stimulus 
affected whether or not partners were cued by an otherwise non-agentive stimulus. 
Similarly, when a cueing stimulus is ambiguous, background knowledge 
about whether or not it is an intentional agent can modulate whether it produces a 
cueing effect. Ristic & Kingstone (2005) showed subjects an ambiguous stimulus, 
and told them that two eye-like shapes were either eyes or wheels on a car; they found 
cueing effects for the eyes condition, but not for the car condition. Even more 
strikingly, Terrizzi and Beier recently showed participants an unfamiliar entity and 
modulated whether or not, prior to the cueing trials, subjects saw another agent 
appear to interact with it in a contingent, seemingly social manner. They observed 
“gaze” cueing effects for the unfamiliar entity (even though it did not, in fact, possess 
eyes, but merely a presumed front and back) in the social interaction condition, but 
not in the non-social condition (Terrizzi & Beier, 2016).  
Background knowledge about whether or not a human face can see also 
modulates the cueing effect. Teufel and colleagues showed participants images of a 
face wearing goggles; beforehand, subjects had the opportunity to handle a seemingly 
identical pair of goggles (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010). However, one 
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group handled goggles with opaque lenses (such that the wearer would not be able to 
see through them), while another group handled goggles with transparent lenses. 
They found that only participants who handled the transparent goggles were cued by 
the head-movements of the stimulus. Thus, if participants knew that the face could 
not see, the cueing effect was attenuated. 
Importantly, these studies always showed subjects in both experimental and 
control conditions perceptually identical stimuli; all they varied was the background 
knowledge that subjects had about what they were looking at. In other words, these 
studies provided a perfect test for informational encapsulation, and showed that gaze-
cueing is not encapsulated after all. Thus, contrary to the two-systems account, 
background knowledge affects Level-1 perspective-taking. 
One study from the two-systems group offers a potential avenue for them to 
respond to this point. Using the same stimuli as in the Samson et al. study described 
above, Qureshi et al. (2010) tested whether or not Level-1 perspective-taking would 
be affected by concurrent executive demands; according to the two-systems account, 
it should not. To do this, they used a dual-task interference design in which subjects 
had to complete the dot-perspective task while simultaneously tapping along with a 
recorded beat. They found that the cognitive load task did interfere with task 
performance, but this interference was similar for both the Self- and Other-tasks. 
While this finding might initially be interpreted as undermining the claim that Level-1 
perspective-taking is truly an efficient process, the authors argued that the similar 
interference effects for both Self- and Other-trials showed that the tapping task did 
not interfere with the calculation of Level-1 perspectives as such, but rather with the 
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attentional selection of perspectives in general. According to this picture, the Level-1 
perspective-taking process would involve two components: a perspective-selection 
process that places demands on domain-general attention, and a domain-specific, 
encapsulated mechanism for perspective-calculation. 
Accordingly, proponents of the two-systems account could argue that all the 
gaze-cueing studies show is that the Level-1 perspective-selection process is 
unencapsulated from background knowledge, but that the perspective-calculation 
process is not. Thus, in cases when the gaze of a target face is known not to be 
indicative of genuine seeing, that perspective might not be selected by attention, and 
thus no perspective-calculation would occur. But it could still be maintained that 
Level-1 perspective-calculation is encapsulated, once a given perspective has been 
selected.  
This distinction between selection and calculation enables the two-systems 
theorist to maintain that that there could be an encapsulated mechanism for Level-1 
perspective-calculation. But at best, such a mechanism could only be one component 
of the system that performs the function of Level-1 perspective-taking. This is 
because perspective-selection also seems to be a necessary part of the perspective-
taking process: in the absence of perspective-selection, no perspective-taking could 
take place. Thus, we could not ascribe the function of Level-1 perspective-taking 
solely to the perspective-calculation mechanism. If there is a “system” that is 
responsible for Level-1 perspective-taking, then it must also include whatever 
mechanism or mechanisms that accomplish perspective-selection – and these, it 
appears, are unencapsulated. Thus, while the “system” responsible for Level-1 
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perspective-taking might involve component parts that are informationally 
encapsulated, this does not change the fact that Level-1 perspective-taking as such is 
sensitive to background knowledge.  
Moreover, acknowledging a role for domain-general attention in the 
perspective-taking process also undermines the claim that Level-1 perspective-taking 
is truly automatic – that is, if by “automatic” we mean a process that is mandatory, 
stimulus-driven, and goal-independent (Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  This is because, 
more often than not, domain-general attention is goal-directed (Carruthers, 2015b). In 
paradigmatic instances of “top-down” attentional orienting driven by the dorsal 
orienting network, these goals are conscious. But attention can also be controlled by 
the ventral orienting network, which is sensitive to unconscious goals and motivations 
(Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008).19 Thus, by acknowledging a role for attention in 
perspective-selection, two-systems theorists are opening up a space where goals 
might play a significant role in the Level-1 perspective-taking system.  
Consistent with this possibility, other studies have shown that knowledge of 
the social group memberships of a target face, including its age, race, social status, 
and perceived threat all affect gaze-cueing (Chen & Zhao, 2015; Dalmaso, Pavan, 
Castelli, & Galfano, 2012; Pavan, Dalmaso, Galfano, & Castelli, 2011; Slessor, Laird, 
Phillips, Bull, & Filippou, 2010). In addition to interactions between the gaze-cueing 
mechanisms and long-term memory, these findings show that gaze-cueing is also 
                                                
19 Granted, attention can sometimes be “captured” in an automatic, goal-independent manner by 
environmental stimuli (E. I. Knudsen, 2011), and it’s conceivable that Level-1 perspective-taking 
could likewise be the product of purely bottom-up processing. However, many of the gaze-cueing 
experiments cited above were able to perfectly control for such low-level effects by using perceptually 
identical stimuli in both experimental and control conditions. The factors that modulated Level-1 
perspective taking in these experiments could not have been purely stimulus-driven. 
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sensitive to motivational factors: when a face is motivationally salient – for instance, 
because it belongs to a threatening out-group member – we preferentially allocate 
attentional resources in order to follow its gaze. However, when a face is not 
motivationally salient – say, because it belongs to a low-status in-group member – we 
do not preferentially attend to its gaze direction. In other words, Level-1 perspective-
taking appears to be highly sensitive to our social goals. 
Thus, the evidence from gaze-cueing seems to shows that Level-1 
perspective-taking is neither wholly encapsulated, nor truly automatic. Of course, 
Level-1 perspective-taking is also not under explicit, top-down, conscious control. 
Rather, its information-processing profile seems to belong somewhere in between 
these two.  It is better described as a “spontaneous” process: it is fast, efficient, and 
unconscious, but also sensitive to background knowledge and goals (Carruthers, 
2015a). Notably, this kind of process does not quite fit with the descriptions of either 
the implicit or explicit systems. Instead, it seems to share attributes of both. 
If this picture is right, and Level-1 perspective-taking is really spontaneous, 
rather than automatic, then why do subjects in the dot-perspective task represent the 
avatar’s Level-1 perspective? This did, after all, conflict with their overt goal, and it 
is not obvious what else might have motivated participants to attend to its perspective. 
One possibility is that even though Level-1 perspective-taking is not genuinely 
automatic, we may possess a standing disposition to represent other agents’ 
perspectives when doing so is cognitively efficient.20 Given that what other agents 
                                                
20 Along similar lines, Fiebich & Coltheart (2015) suggest that which socio-cognitive procedure we use 
is determined by whether or not it will be cognitively effortful in a given context (Fiebich & Coltheart, 
2015). (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this reference to my attention). 
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can see tends to be behaviorally relevant, and that calculating Level-1 perspectives is 
not particularly demanding, such a disposition would be fairly adaptive in most 
situations. In practice, this might make Level-1 perspective-taking seem automatic in 
most situations, when in fact it is really motivation-dependent. 
5. Level-2 perspective-taking can be fast and efficient 
The argument from gaze-cueing suggests that Level-1 perspective-taking does not 
quite fit with the description of the implicit mindreading system as automatic and 
encapsulated. However, it leaves untouched the basic claim that Level-2 perspective-
taking should be a slow, effortful, working-memory-based process. Thus, two-
systems theorists may be willing to concede that Level-1 perspective-taking is more 
flexible than they initially supposed, but still argue that Level-2 perspective-taking, 
which involves “full-blown” propositional attitude attribution, must possess 
something like the cognitive profile of the explicit mindreading system.  
Notably, Level-2 perspective-taking tasks almost always involve some kind of 
mental rotation (Flavell et al., 1981; Low et al., 2014; Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 
2013b), as this seems to be one of the most straightforward empirical methods for 
creating a dissociation between Level-1 and Level-2 perspectives. Problematically, 
mental rotation is known to place heavy demands on working memory even when 
mental-state attribution is not involved (Hyun & Luck, 2007). Peter Carruthers has 
recently argued that this role for mental rotation constitutes a serious confound for 
many Level-2 perspective-taking tasks, and that these tasks do not so much 
demonstrate a difference in the concepts of SEEING deployed in Level-1 and Level-2 
scenarios or a difference in underlying mindreading systems as a difference in non-
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mentalistic task demands (Carruthers, 2015a, 2015c). As an alternative explanation, 
Carruthers suggests the lack of altercentric interference in the number-perspective 
task was due to motivational factors: because they were not sufficiently motivated to 
represent the avatar’s perspective, subjects in this task simply did not go to the 
trouble of mentally rotating the numeral on the table.21 
One interesting possibility that emerges from Carruthers’ motivation-based 
interpretation is that changing the motivational structure of the number-perspective 
task could potentially lead participants to maintain a representation of the other 
agent’s Level-2 perspective. Elekes and colleagues investigated this possibility by 
creating a modified version of the number-perspective task, which subjects either 
completed by themselves (the Individual condition) or with another participant (the 
Joint condition) (Elekes et al., 2016). This initial modification of the number-
perspective task is especially noteworthy: while a nondescript avatar might be salient 
enough to warrant Level-1 perspective-taking, it is not obvious that participants 
would care enough to go to the trouble of maintaining a representation of its Level-2 
perspectives. Exchanging the avatar for a live human being both increases the 
potential salience of the target (real people are generally more interesting than 
nondescript avatars), and improves the ecological validity of the paradigm. As we’ll 
see shortly, this manipulation proves to be effective. 
                                                
21 Carruthers does accept that the evidence from the dot-perspective task shows that Level-1 
perspective-taking is automatic, although he denies that these results are best explained in terms of a 
non-representational concept of seeing. On his “one-system” account, the attribution of mental state 
concepts is automatic when executive resources are not required, and “spontaneous” when they are. 
However, the argument from gaze-cueing from the previous section shows that even Level-1 
perspective-taking is a spontaneous activity, rather than truly automatic. 
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Subjects in this experiment completed a number-verification task, which 
involved rapidly judging whether the number they saw on a screen lying flat in front 
of them was the same as the number they heard in an audio recording. In the Joint 
condition, experimenters manipulated whether participants believed that the person 
seated across from them was completing the same number-verification task (the 
perspective-dependent task), or an n-back task in which subjects had to judge whether 
or not the color of the number on the screen was the same as the number that came 
before it (the non-perspective-dependent task). Thus, in both tasks in the Joint 
condition, subjects knew that their partner was also attending to the numeral on the 
screen, but only subjects completing the perspective-dependent task believed that 
their partner was attending to the same aspects of the numeral (namely, its value). But 
importantly, all subjects ever had to do was complete their own task; their partner’s 
performance was irrelevant.  
The experimenters found that subjects in the Joint condition were slower than 
in the Individual condition, but only when both completed the perspective-dependent 
task and the numerals of the screen were such that their values differed on the basis of 
perspective (i.e. 2, 5, 6 and 9); for numerals whose values appeared to be the same 
regardless of which side of the table the participant was at (i.e. 0 and 8), there was no 
difference between the individual and joint conditions. In effect, subjects were only 
slower when 1) they had a live partner, 2) they believed that their partner had a 
similar goal, and 3) the partner’s response would diverge from their own on the basis 
of their Level-2 perspective. These results suggest that knowing that a partner 
possesses a similar goal to one’s own creates an unconscious motivation to maintain a 
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representation of their perspective, even when this is not relevant to one’s overt goal. 
When this representation differs from one’s own first-personal one, this creates 
altercentric interference.  
Using a very similar design, Surtees and colleagues obtained a slightly 
different set of effects (Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2016). Like Elekes et al. (2016), 
they used a number-verification task that used live partners seated on opposite sides 
of a display that lay flat on the table between them; in one of the experiments, Surtees 
et al. also included a version of that task where one partner made judgments about a 
surface feature of the numeral on the screen, rather than its value. And just like in the 
Elekes et al. design, subjects only ever had to judge the value of the number from 
their own perspective – the perspective of the other participant was always task-
irrelevant. However, in the Surtees et al. (2016) design, subjects took turns instead of 
completing the task at the same time; turn-taking either occurred within the same 
block of trials (with the two participants alternating rapidly), or in separate blocks 
(with one participant going first and the other going second).  
Like Elekes and colleagues, Surtees et al. found that the presence of a live 
participant affected subjects’ Level-2 perspective-taking, with an altercentric 
interference effect when their perspectives were inconsistent, and also a facilitation 
effect when their perspectives were the same. But unlike Elekes et al., they found that 
altercentric interference arose even when the partner was attending to surface features 
of the numeral, rather than its value. They also found that altercentric inference did 
not occur in subjects who went first when completing the task in separate blocks; 
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however, when the second partner took her turn, the altercentric interference effect re-
emerged.  
Collectively, the results of Elekes et al. (2016) and Surtees et al. (2016) yield 
a number of conclusions regarding Level-2 perspective-taking, as well as some open 
questions. First, using a live participant instead of an avatar seems to increase the 
likelihood that subjects will spontaneously adopt another agent’s Level-2 perspective, 
even when it is not relevant to their overt goals; however, the mere presence of a live 
participant is not sufficient for this to occur. In the simultaneous task design of Elekes 
and colleagues, participants only took their partner’s perspective into account when 
explicitly informed that they were performing the same task. In the turn-taking design 
of Surtees et al., subjects only adopted their partner’s perspective when they had 
previously observed their partner completing the task that they themselves were about 
to undertake. In both cases, some form of prior knowledge was necessary for 
spontaneous Level-2 perspective-taking to occur.  
The fact that subjects in the Surtees et al. task spontaneously adopted the 
perspective of their partner even when the partner was not attending to a perspective-
dependent feature of the numeral on the screen is inconsistent with the findings of 
Elekes et al. However, this difference may be due to the difference between the 
alternating turn-taking task design used in the former study, and the simultaneous task 
design used in the latter. It is possible that the turn-taking activity created the sense of 
a shared goal, when in fact there was none. 
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this set of findings is that 
Level-2 perspective-taking can, at times, be fast and efficient, provided that subjects 
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are provided with the right background knowledge and are sufficiently motivated. 
This contradicts the claim that Level-2 perspective-taking is a slow and effortful 
process. In more ecologically valid tasks that use a live participant rather than an 
avatar, Level-2 perspective-taking turns out to be spontaneous (just like Level-1 
perspective-taking).  
These findings create something of a puzzle for both the two-systems theorists 
and its critics, such as Carruthers: if Level-2 perspective-taking tasks place inherent 
demands on working memory (either because working memory is a constitutive part 
of explicit mindreading more generally, or because of the mental rotation confound), 
how come subjects were able to efficiently generate Level-2 perspective 
representations in these circumstances? The answer may be related to the fact that 
spontaneous perspective-taking only occurred when subjects possessed the 
appropriate prior knowledge (in addition to the right motivations). Once subjects 
learned that their partners’ perspective systematically differed from their own (e.g. “If 
I see 6, he sees 9”), they would have been able to store that knowledge as a 
mentalistic schema in long-term memory, where it would have been available for 
rapid retrieval.22 Thus, even if subjects had to initially engage in effortful mental 
rotation to judge their partner’s perspective, they would subsequently be able to infer 
their perspective without any effortful spatial reasoning at all. By using memory-
                                                
22 Christensen and Michael (2015) discuss the use of schemas in mindreading at length in their 




based strategies, subjects would have been able to circumvent the need for any 
effortful use of working memory.23  
It is worth noting that Apperly (2010) does discuss one possible way that 
explicit, demanding forms of mindreading could be rendered fast and efficient: 
downwards modularization. The basic idea behind downwards modularization is that 
expertise can render otherwise demanding tasks fast and efficient. For example, 
where an average chess player might discover a path to checkmate through slow, 
effortful reasoning, an expert player might, thanks to her extensive experience, arrive 
at a similar conclusion in a seemingly effortless manner. One way that this sort of 
efficiency-through-expertise can be achieved is when a body of knowledge – initially 
acquired through explicit, effortful processes – is used so often that it leads to the 
formulation of cognitive schemas. These schemas enable us to rapidly pair inputs to 
the appropriate behavioral outputs without having to go through any effortful, explicit 
reasoning. But, according to proponents of downwards modularization, this efficiency 
is achieved at the cost of flexibility. Just like innate “original” modules, these 
acquired modules are ultimately encapsulated from goals and background knowledge. 
Apperly suggests that downwards modularization might often occur with our explicit 
mindreading abilities: an expert poker player may, for example, become so well-
                                                
23 Interestingly, Michelon and Zacks discovered that subjects also tended to use memory-based 
strategies in a Level-1 perspective-taking task: instead of calculating the line-of-sight of an agent 
directly, participants simply memorized the set of objects that the agent could see, and this led to 
increased performance (Michelon & Zacks, 2006). The experimenters, who were interested in studying 
how line-of-sight is calculated, developed a method to control for this strategy. But it highlights the 
fact that memory-based perspective-taking strategies provide an ever-present, efficient alternative to 




practiced that she is able to automatically detect a bluff without needing to engage in 
any explicit reasoning at all.24  
However, the effects on Level-2 perspective-taking described above are not 
plausibly the result of downward modularization. First, subjects never had the explicit 
goal of monitoring the other agent’s perspective at all; Level-2 perspective-taking 
was actually detrimental to their performance on the explicit task. Expertise, in this 
context, would consist in ignoring the partner, not representing the way she saw the 
number. Second, it is implausible that subjects came into the experiment with an 
acquired module for Level-2 perspective-taking. If this were the case, then 
altercentric interference should have been present across all the Joint conditions (or, 
in the case of the Surtees et al. findings, the conditions where partners were merely 
present, but not yet engaged in the number-verification task), not just the ones where 
subjects shared a similar goal. The fact that these altercentric interference effects 
were so context-sensitive suggests that the Level-2 perspective-taking abilities 
brought by subjects to the lab were flexible and goal-dependent, not stimulus-driven. 
Thus, the fast and efficient Level-2 perspective-taking that we find in these studies 
seems to occur in spite of the fact that it is unencapsulated, which runs contrary to the 
downwards modularization proposal.  
6. Implications for the two-systems account 
The arguments of the last two sections create serious problems for the two-systems 
account of perspective-taking. Contrary to that framework, it appears as though both 
                                                




Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking can be fast and efficient, but also sensitive to 
goals and background knowledge. Thus, both forms of perspective-taking appear to 
occupy the “spontaneous” middle ground between the fast-yet-inflexible and flexible-
yet-slow information-processing profiles of the implicit and explicit mindreading 
systems. In both cases, this combination of flexibility and efficiency seems to be 
achieved through the interaction between executive systems, long-term memory, and 
motivational factors. This is not to say that the underlying processes in the two kinds 
of perspective-taking are really identical: both seem to make use of different 
cognitive strategies, and are suited to different types of problems. But neither are the 
two clearly dissociable, as the two-systems framework would suggest. 
One obvious conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that there need not be 
any trade-off between speed and representational flexibility when it comes to our 
perspective-taking abilities. On its own, this conclusion may not be fatal to the two-
systems account: perhaps the distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-
taking does not map onto the implicit and explicit mindreading systems after all, but 
this framework may still capture important distinctions when it comes to other forms 
of mental-state attribution. However, the case of perspective-taking should also lead 
us to view the basic idea of a flexibility-efficiency trade-off in the domain of 
mindreading with suspicion. Not only does this notion of a trade-off not apply in the 
case of perception – the domain it was originally intended to explain – but now it has 
also fallen short in explaining the cognitive underpinnings of one of our core 
mindreading abilities. Why expect that it should suddenly apply elsewhere? 
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As a matter of fact, there is evidence that in addition to Level-1 perspective-
taking, other forms of “implicit” mindreading also appear to be unencapsulated from 
background knowledge. For instance, the attribution of motor intentions25 through 
motor simulation or “mirror neurons” is often suggested to be automatic and 
encapsulated from background knowledge. Most commonly, this process is said to 
involve the automatic mapping of the visual kinematics of an observed action onto 
the motor system. Our motor system then simulates the performance of that same 
action, which permits an inference to a guiding motor intention (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004) by using our motor planning system in reverse (Jeannerod, Arbib, 
Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995). According to this view, the only inputs to the mirror 
neuron system are the low-level visual properties of actions.  
However, other research on the mirror neuron system is inconsistent with this 
picture. Monkeys’ mirror neurons do not activate for mimicked actions, as when they 
observe an experimenter pretending to grasp a non-existent object (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998); conversely, monkeys’ mirror neurons do activate when they witness 
an occluded grasping action that has no low-level visual properties – but only if they 
know in advance that there is food behind the occluder (Umiltà et al., 2001). In 
humans, it’s been found that background knowledge about whether or not an 
observed action is intentional, or whether it has been carried out by an intentional 
agent, affects the degree to which they are motor-primed to perform that same action 
(an effect of mirror neuron activity) (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Liepelt & Cramon, 
                                                
25 Motor intentions are intentions to engage in a particular motor action, such as grasping or throwing. 
These are distinct from distal or future intentions (what I plan to do at some point in the future) and 
present intentions (what I plan to do now, framed at a level of abstraction that is independent of any 
particular motor plan) (Pacherie, 2008; Spaulding, 2015). 
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2008). In other words, the attribution of motor intentions, just like the attribution of 
Level-1 perspectives, does not seem to be fully automatic or informationally 
encapsulated. Rather, it is sensitive to background knowledge and abstract features of 
context. Several authors have taken these findings as evidence that the mirror neuron 
system actually reflects the effects of a top-down, information-rich form of action 
prediction, rather than a low-level mapping process (Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & 
Frith, 2007).  
Further problems for the two-systems account of mindreading arise from 
studies of “implicit” false-belief26 tracking (Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 
2012). In these tasks, subjects in an eye-tracker passively observe videos of an agent 
hiding an object and then leaving a room. While the agent is absent, the location of 
the object is changed. When she returns, subjects look in anticipation towards the 
previous location of the hidden object (the one last seen by the agent), suggesting that 
they were tracking her false beliefs. When subjects were debriefed after the task, they 
showed no sign that they were consciously tracking the agent’s belief, suggesting that 
any belief-tracking that occurred was unconscious and implicit. However, when 
subjects in the same task are given even a light working-memory task, the implicit 
belief-tracking effect vanishes (Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012). One way of 
interpreting this finding is to conclude that implicit belief-tracking involves working 
memory; however, given that the contents of working memory are usually conscious, 
and subjects reported no conscious belief-tracking, this seems unlikely. What’s more 
                                                
26 Proponents of the two-systems account would deny that these experiments provide evidence for 
“belief-tracking,” since they hold that the implicit system does not represent “full-blown” propositional 
attitudes. Rather, they would describe these results as evidence of the tracking of “registrations,” a 




plausible is that when subjects were engaged in the working memory task, they 
shifted too much attention away from the agent’s perspective for encoding of belief-
states to occur or be fixed in long-term memory. Thus, implicit belief-tracking does 
not seem to be genuinely automatic; rather, as Level-1 perspective-taking, it’s likely 
that we possess a standing disposition to represent the beliefs of others, but only when 
doing so is either cognitively efficient or somehow goal-relevant.  
These findings suggest that other forms of implicit mindreading may also be 
spontaneous and context-sensitive, rather than automatic and encapsulated. If so, then 
the entire two-systems framework may be in jeopardy. The principal theoretical 
motivation for the two-systems account was that fast, efficient, “implicit” processes 
are likely to be encapsulated, which in turn yields signature limits on their 
representational capabilities. Instead, we find that implicit mindreading processes are 
generally quite flexible, and well-integrated with long-term memory, executive 
systems, and goals. If this is right, then it’s not obvious whether there really are any 
grounds for holding the implicit mindreading system exists.  
If the implicit mindreading system is not present in adults, this also casts 
doubt on the developmental claims of the two-systems view. Part of the two-systems 
approach to development has been to propose that younger children’s early theory-of-
mind abilities (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) are products of the implicit 
mindreading system, and thus subject to signature limits on their representational 
abilities (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013); in particular, children below the age of four 
should not be able to pass Level-2 perspective-taking tasks, since these require “full 
blown” propositional attitude attribution. Proponents of the two-systems account 
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tested this prediction in two separate studies, and obtained seemingly positive results: 
infants’ looking times did not reflect any Level-2 perspective-taking, and thus seemed 
subject to signature limits (Low et al., 2014; Low & Watts, 2013). But as with other 
Level-2 perspective-taking tasks, these paradigms involved mental rotation, and thus 
potentially confound Level-2 perspective-taking with effortful uses of working 
memory (Carruthers, 2015c).  
When this mental-rotation objection is supplemented by the revelation that the 
“signature limits” interpretation is based on an erroneous, encapsulated conception of 
the implicit mindreading system, it becomes all the more clear that these results 
provide no support for a two-systems account of infant theory-of-mind abilities. If 
infant mindreading abilities are really subject to any signature limits on their 
representational capabilities, it is unlikely that these are due to a distinct, encapsulated 
mindreading system that persists into adulthood. These limitations are more likely the 
product of immature executive resources, motivational factors, or a lack of relevant 
experience. Collectively, these factors may create a kind of ersatz encapsulation early 
in development, but this would dissipate as children’s developing executive resources 
and increasing social experience provides them with a more flexible, integrated set of 
mindreading abilities.  
7. Conclusion: Efficient, context-sensitive mindreaders 
Beyond its implications for the two-systems account, this critique highlights some 
important features of our mature mindreading abilities. One is that several implicit 
forms of mindreading do not seem to be genuinely automatic; rather, we deploy these 
capacities selectively, in a context-sensitive, goal-dependent fashion (although we 
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may also be generally motivated to engage in mentalizing when doing so is 
cognitively efficient). However, our context-sensitive, goal-dependent mindreading 
abilities can still be quite fast and efficient. This combination of speed and context-
sensitivity seems to be due to the integration of domain-specific mindreading 
mechanisms with domain-general attentional processes and background knowledge. 
We also find that even complex, so-called “explicit” forms of mental-state attribution, 
such as Level-2 perspective-taking, can also be both fast and efficient, provided that 
we possess the right background knowledge and that we are appropriately motivated.  
Another significant conclusion to draw from this discussion is that whether we 
spontaneously engage in very simple forms of mindreading, or very complex forms of 
mindreading, or no mindreading at all, seems to be a function of our motivations. 
Along with our background knowledge, our social attitudes seem to determine the 
amount of processing resources that go into representing the minds of others. 
Sometimes, we are highly motivated to represent the mental states of others 
accurately, and we make use of background knowledge in order to do so quickly and 
efficiently; at other times, we are less motivated, and as a result our mental state 
representations are much sparser, as we rely on general-purpose heuristics, such as 
computing line-of-sight. And, as we saw in many of the gaze-cueing studies, 
sometimes our background beliefs about the intentional status of an agent or its social 
group membership give us reason to ignore its perspective altogether. The depth of 
processing involved in a given mindreading task thus depends on our social goals.  
Moreover, as we saw in the discussion of Elekes et al. (2016) and Surtees et al. 
(2016), the availability of relevant background knowledge enables the mindreading 
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system with a way to circumvent slower, more effortful forms of reasoning. Notably, 
in these studies, the relevant background knowledge was not antecedently available to 
the participants when they first engaged in the task. But when subjects were 
sufficiently motivated to do so, they were able to generate situation-specific, 
mentalistic schemas that enabled them to rapidly update their representation of their 
partner’s mental states. In other words, one of the things that we seem to do during 
social interactions is create shortcuts that make the task of mindreading faster and 
more efficient – provided, that is, that we are motivated to do so.  
Now, contrast this picture of mindreading with the one put forward by 
mindreading skeptics and endorsed by two-systems theorists (Apperly 2011; 
Bermudez 2003; Zawidzki 2013). On their view, genuine mental-state attribution 
consists in a holistic, unbounded form reasoning that parallels the structure of first-
person decision-making. According to this picture, mindreaders must, when inferring 
the mental cause of an action, consider an indefinite range of potential belief-desire 
combinations. The computational demands of this kind of mental-state inference are 
surely immense. Clearly, as a theory of how we are able to seamlessly engage in 
complex forms of coordination or quickly infer intended speaker meanings, this 
model of mindreading is inadequate; rather, it seems to represent the mental-state 
attribution strategy of an ideal thinker, unhindered by the demands of computational 
complexity. 
Not being ideal thinkers ourselves, we rarely – if ever – engage in this kind of 
mindreading. But, contrary to the mindreading skeptic, this does not mean that we 
rarely engage in mindreading at all. Nor does it mean that we rely on a module for 
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quasi-mentalistic mindreading, as the two-systems theorists have proposed. Rather, 
we deploy a range of flexible mentalizing strategies to navigate the social 
environment, which we tailor to match our situational needs. Some of these strategies 
may indeed involve effortful, working-memory based forms of cognition. But we do 
not engage in these effortful reasoning strategies any more than is necessary. Instead, 
we supplement this kind of reasoning with a number of more efficient strategies. 
Sometimes, these involve simple, spatial heuristics, as with Level-1 perspective-
taking. But we also use more effortful forms of reasoning to create mindreading 
shortcuts, in the form of mentalistic schemas that may be rapidly retrieved from 
memory in order to maintain up-to-date models of other people’s mental states. And 
even these more efficient forms of mindreading are deployed in a selective, context-
sensitive manner. In short, we economize our mindreading strategies so that they may 
best fit our needs. We only ever mindread as much as we have to.  
Thus, skeptical doubts about the mindreading paradigm can be assuaged once 
we appreciate the context-sensitive, goal-dependent nature of mental-state attribution. 
It is a mistake to believe that everyday mindreading consists in a holistic, unbounded 
form of “central” reasoning. It is also a mistake to argue that if we rarely engage in 
this idealized form of mindreading, then we must not mindread very much at all. The 
two-systems view attempted to carve out a middle ground between these two 
extremes, but it erred in its concession to the skeptic that “full-blown” mindreading 
must cognitively effortful. With the case of spontaneous perspective-taking, I’ve 
shown that our mindreading abilities are much more flexible, efficient and context-
sensitive than either the two-systems theorists and the skeptics had thought possible.  
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Chapter 4: Character and theory of mind: An integrative 
approach27 
1. Introduction 
As highly social beings, we need to be able to rapidly predict and interpret the 
behavior of those around us in order to thrive. We do this, the usual explanation goes, 
by reasoning about the unobserved representational states that cause behavior – a 
process variously referred to as theory of mind, mindreading, and folk psychology. 
Standard models of mindreading, such as the theory-theory, the simulation theory, 
and various hybrid models, tend to focus especially on how we predict and interpret 
behaviors in terms of beliefs and desires. This focus is epitomized by the field’s 
longstanding fascination with the false-belief task, which is used to measure 
children’s understanding of the representational nature of belief (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Rakoczy, 2015; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
As a result, questions about the developmental, cognitive, and evolutionary 
underpinnings of belief-reasoning tend to dominate social cognition research. 
Due to this narrow focus on beliefs and desires, other conceptual tools that we 
use to interpret behavior are often ignored. One such tool is character-trait attribution: 
the explanation and prediction of behavior in terms of enduring internal properties of 
individuals that lead to stable behavioral tendencies. This omission from the theory-
of-mind literature is quite curious: one of the most robust findings in social 
                                                
27 This chapter was originally published as Westra (2017). It has been reprinted here with permission 
from Springer, copyright license #4100230216361. 
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psychology research is that we often interpret behavior on the basis of stable 
personality traits (D. L. Ames, Fiske, & Todorov, 2011; Gilbert et al., 1995). 
Character also figures prominently in moral philosophy (Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 
1967; Miller, 2013), and has begun to garner attention in empirical moral psychology 
research as well (Sripada, 2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Yet in spite 
of its presence in neighboring disciplines and a large body of data on the subject, 
character-trait attribution does not figure in classic and contemporary theories of 
mindreading. 
My goal in this paper is to provide a framework for integrating our 
understanding of character-trait attribution with other aspects of theory of mind. I will 
propose that we use representations of a person’s stable character traits to infer which 
hypotheses about that person’s more transient mental states – namely, their beliefs, 
goals, and intentions – are more probable; we then use these mental-state hypotheses 
to directly predict their behavior. Trait attribution thus forms the upper level of an 
action-prediction hierarchy, wherein the hypotheses at higher levels inform the 
hypotheses at lower levels. Feedback from observable behavior then leads us to make 
revisions to our mentalistic hypotheses, which might occur at either the belief-desire 
levels or at the level of character traits. This basic inferential structure is best 
understood in terms of a hierarchical Bayesian model of cognition. 
In section 2, I will briefly review part of the empirical literature on the 
attribution of character traits, and the role that these representations play in predicting 
and interpreting behavior. In section 3, I will discuss recent “pluralist” accounts of 
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folk psychological reasoning (Andrews, 2008, 2012; Fiebich & Coltheart, 2015), 
which do acknowledge the role of character-trait attribution in folk psychology, but 
fail to explain its relationship to other forms of mindreading. In sections 4 and 5, I 
will outline an account in which character-trait attribution stands in a systematic, 
hierarchically structured relation to belief and desire attribution. In section 6, I 
suggest several ways to empirically test this account, as well as ways to apply it to 
other, related domains. 
First, however, a word about how we think of character traits. Like beliefs and 
desires, character traits are believed to be causally related to behavior, and it is not 
uncommon to explain behavior by referring to a character trait (e.g. “She turned in the 
lost wallet because she is an honest person”) (Malle, 2004). Some traits, such as 
selfishness and greed, possess a strong volitional element, and thus seem closely 
related to desires. Others, such as intelligence, cleverness, and gullibility, seem 
distinctively epistemic, and thus more related to beliefs. However, traits also differ 
from beliefs and desires in several important ways. First, beliefs and desires figure in 
practical reasoning, and lead directly to action. Character traits, on the other hand, do 
not seem to figure in practical reasoning, and it is less clear how they translate into 
particular actions. Second, beliefs and desires can easily change. When we acquire 
new relevant information we regularly change our beliefs; when we successfully act 
out our plans, our desires and goals are fulfilled. Character traits, conversely, are 
much more persistent. They do not update or go away as the result of individual 
actions, but rather last through significant portions of an agent’s lifetime. Third, 
beliefs and desires can be about particular states of affairs. Character traits, on the 
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other hand, relate to the world in a very general way, and tend to be relevant across a 
wide range of situations. In short, character traits are temporally stable mental 
properties that relate to action in an opaque, general manner across a wide range of 
situations.28 
Citing evidence from social psychology, some philosophers have questioned 
whether people actually possess character traits as we ordinarily think of them (Doris, 
2002; Harman, 1999). These arguments begin with findings showing that subtle 
manipulations in situational factors lead to dramatic effects on behavior. For instance, 
Isen and Levin showed that finding a dime in a phone booth makes people much 
more likely to help a stranger pick up dropped papers – a finding that seems to show 
that “generosity” is, contrary to common belief, a fickle, variable trait (Isen & Levin, 
1972). Based on these and other experimental results, “situationists” have argued that 
it is situations, and not stable character traits, that really cause our behavior. These 
arguments have sparked a great deal of controversy, and a number of philosophers 
have mounted defenses of the reality of character traits(Miller, 2013; Sabini & Silver, 
2005; Sreenivasan, 2002).  
The situationism debate is about the metaphysical reality of character traits, 
and whether stable character traits ought to figure in mature scientific explanations of 
                                                
28 John Doris offers a similar, though not identical, analysis of character traits. According to his view, 
“global” traits have two primary features:  
1. Consistency. Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior 
across a diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their 
conduciveness to the manifestations of the trait in question. 
2. Stability. Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior 
over iterated trials of similar trait-relevant eliciting conditions. (Doris, 2002, p. 22) 
Doris also mentions a third feature of character traits, evaluative integration, which is not relevant for 
our current purposes. 
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behavior; situationists think that insofar as character traits exist, they are situation-
dependent, and that stable character traits have no real explanatory value for 
psychology. This is not a paper about the metaphysical reality of character traits, 
however. Rather, it is about people’s representations of character traits, and the role 
that these representations play in folk-psychological inference. Notoriously, folk 
reasoning about the world is often inaccurate, and frequently invokes entities that do 
not stand up to scientific scrutiny. For instance, when reasoning about the motion of 
objects, even educated adults seem to rely on a quasi-medieval impetus principle, and 
predict that (for example) a ball spinning around the end of a string will continue to 
follow a curved path when it is released (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980). 
Impetus principles no longer play any role in our mature physics, but they still play a 
role in folk physics. Likewise, stable character traits might have no place in our 
mature psychology, but they clearly still play a role in our everyday social reasoning. 
Thus, the situationists might be right that our behavior is never caused by stable 
character traits, but they could still allow that representations of stable character traits 
play an important role in our folk psychology. A dedicated situationist could thus 
happily accept the foregoing account as an error theory explaining why we think 
people have stable character traits, even though there are none. The two views are, in 
principle, mutually compatible.  
However, while the present account is not committed to the existence of stable 
character traits as such, it does imply that our representations of character traits have 
some predictive value; otherwise, their prominent role in our cognitive economy 
would be mysterious. The most obvious explanation for this predictive role would be 
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that stable personality traits do in fact exist, despite the evidence cited by the 
situationist. Another explanation would be that trait representations serve as a kind of 
inferential heuristic: even if they fail to track anything real in the world, they may 
earn their predictive keep by conferring some sort of information-processing benefit 
on other socio-cognitive processes (such as belief-desire reasoning). Along these 
lines, I suggest that one function of trait attributions is to provide us with initial prior 
probability distributions over mentalistic hypotheses, which then undergo further 
updating in response to experience.  Another explanation would be that trait 
representations roughly track something in the world – just not character traits. Like 
the impetus principle, which roughly tracks the real physical principle of inertia (but 
systematically errs in certain cases), it may be that our trait representations roughly 
correspond to some predictively relevant property of the social environment, which 
we systematically misrepresent as stable character-traits. In this vein, I suggest in 
section 6 that our trait attributions may sometimes track relational social properties 
such as status and intergroup threat. 
In order for my account to be right, at least one of these explanations must be 
correct. It could be that all of them are right: perhaps our trait attributions sometimes 
track real personality traits, while also tracking relational social properties, while 
simultaneously conferring an information-processing benefit on our overall action-
predictions. However, I need not take a strong stand on this issue at this time. All that 
matters for my current purposes is the role that trait information plays in the structure 
of mentalistic action-prediction. 
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2. Impression formation and mindreading 
In social psychology and socio-cognitive neuroscience, reasoning about character 
traits is most often referred to as ‘impression formation’ and ‘person perception’ (D. 
L. Ames et al., 2011; Trope & Gaunt, 2007). While we attribute a wide range of 
specific traits to others, it appears that the kinds of traits we appeal to tend to be 
organized along two particular social dimensions: warmth and competence (Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). The warmth dimension captures attributions of traits such as 
friendliness, sincerity, trustworthiness, and seems to track whether we expect an 
individual to be positively or negatively disposed towards us. The competence 
dimension, in contrast, captures attributions of traits such as intelligence, impulsivity, 
and social dominance, and seems to track our estimation of an individual’s ability to 
successfully achieve their goals. When trait attributions are analyzed in terms of these 
two dimensions, they are highly predictive of our reactive attitudes towards both 
individuals and groups (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), even across a wide range of 
cultures (Cuddy et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, these two trait dimensions do not just emerge in people’s 
judgments of individuals: they also emerge in stereotypes about social groups. For 
instance, common anti-Semitic stereotypes tend to invoke low warmth traits, such as 
deceptiveness and miserliness, but also high competence traits, such as intelligence. 
Misogynistic stereotypes, in contrast, invoke high warmth traits, such as helpfulness, 
but also low-competence traits, such as frivolity and superficiality. Stereotypes about 
very low status groups, such as the homeless, tend to contain low competence traits, 
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such as stupidity and laziness, and low warmth traits, such as dishonesty. Both social 
in-groups (e.g. students if one is a student) and societal prototype groups (in Western 
cultures, the White middle class) tend to be rated as both high competence and high 
warmth (Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske, 2015). This suggests that we 
may use a person’s social group membership as a source of evidence about her 
character traits (see also Fiebich and Coltheart (2015)).  
Many of the methods used to study trait attributions involve explicit, 
linguistically based measures (e.g. Ross 1977); however, character-trait attributions 
can also be extremely rapid and unconscious. In particular, we seem to use low-level 
perceptual cues such as facial appearance to make character-trait attributions within 
100 milliseconds of encountering someone (Moshe Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; 
Todorov, 2013). Incredibly, these rapid, perceptually based trait attributions also vary 
along the dimensions of warmth and competence (or, as they are referred to in this 
literature, trustworthiness and dominance). In particular, neutral-expression faces 
with wider jaws, heavier brows, and smaller eyes tend to be judged as more 
dominant, while “baby faces” tend to be judged as less dominant; similarly, neutral-
expression faces with downturned brows and lips tend to be judged as less 
trustworthy, while faces with high brows and upturned lips tend to be judged as more 
trustworthy (Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). Thus, from the first second 
that we encounter someone, we begin to form a representation of his or her character 
traits along the warmth and competence dimensions. 
 121 
 
Of course, we do not infer personality traits from appearance alone: we also 
use a person’s behavior and second-hand information to inform our representations of 
their character. The most well-known finding in this vein is that we tend to over-
attribute the causes of behavior to underlying traits or dispositions rather than 
situational factors – a phenomenon known as the ‘correspondence bias’ or the 
‘fundamental attribution error’ (Gawronski, 2004; Gilbert et al., 1995; E. Jones & 
Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). For instance, when participants passively observe one 
confederate quizzing another, they tend to rate the questioner as more intelligent than 
the test-taker, even though the questioner has clearly been provided with the answers, 
while the test-taker has not (Ross 1977). This bias can be mitigated by prompting 
participants to explicitly attend to situational factors (e.g. that the questioner has been 
provided with all the answers, whereas the test-taker has not); however, participants 
will default to the correspondence bias when placed under cognitive load, even if the 
very same situational information is made explicitly available (Gilbert et al., 1995; 
Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). This suggests that the correspondence bias is the 
product of a relatively efficient cognitive process, while correcting it requires 
cognitive control.29 
                                                
29 There are also cross-cultural differences in the extent to which individuals fall prey to the 
correspondence bias. While the correspondence bias is present to some extent across cultures (Choi, 
Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Krull et al., 1999; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2003), it appears that 
members of "individualist" societies are particularly susceptible to it; meanwhile, members of 
"collectivist" societies seem to pay more attention to situational factors and the presence of social 
constraints (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002). This is consistent with the broad 
finding that members of collectivist cultures display a habitual tendency to attend to situational factors 
and contexts (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). These habitual patterns of attention seem 




Much of the research on the correspondence bias has occurred separately from 
research on mindreading, focusing instead on the distinction between situation-based 
and disposition-based explanations of behavior. But some social psychologists have 
begun to explore the connection between representations of traits and other mental 
states, such as intentions. For instance, Krull and colleagues found that participants 
were less likely to exhibit a correspondence bias when an actor performed a helpful 
action if the actor showed signs of unwillingness (Krull, Seger, & Silvera, 2008). 
Likewise, a number of authors have found that the correspondence bias was 
attenuated when participants were given reason to think that a given action may have 
been performed for an ulterior motive (D. R. Ames, Flynn, & Weber, 2004; Fein, 
1996; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004). Hooper and colleagues also 
found that participants who were primed to engage in explicit perspective-taking 
displayed a diminished correspondence bias compared to a control group (N. Hooper, 
Ergogan, Keen, Lawton, & McHugh, 2015). Thus, thinking about mental states seems 
to mediate inferences from behavior to character (Reeder, 2009). 
This relationship between trait attribution and other forms of mental-state 
attribution is reflected in the neural correlates of both processes, which overlap 
substantially and appear to be functionally related. Many neuroimaging studies have 
confirmed the existence of a distinctive network of brain regions that are consistently 
recruited when we reason about the thoughts and behavior of others: the temporal-
parietal junction (TPJ), the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the precuneus (PC), and the temporal poles (TP) (Van 
Overwalle, 2009). All of these regions are implicated in impression formation and 
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updating, both under intentional and spontaneous conditions (Cloutier, Gabrieli, 
O’Young, & Ambady, 2011; Ferrari, Vecchi, Todorov, & Cattaneo, 2016; L. T. 
Harris, Todorov, & Fiske, 2005; Hassabis et al., 2013; Kestemont, Vandekerckhove, 
Ma, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2013; Ma et al., 2011). The dorsal region of the 
mPFC (dmPFC) in particular seems to be centrally implicated in the representation of 
stable personality traits (Ferrari et al., 2016; Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Hoeck, & 
Van Overwalle, 2012). When subjects are explicitly prompted to reason about traits, 
this region is highly active; in contrast, when subjects are prompted to reason about 
“situational” factors, this region is less active, while regions associated with goal and 
belief attribution, such as the TPJ and the pSTS, are more so (Kestemont et al., 2013). 
However, when subjects learn that a person holds a belief or performs an intentional 
action that is inconsistent with a previously formed impression, both the TPJ and the 
dmPFC show increased activity (Cloutier et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2011). Thus, the 
neuroimaging data, like the behavioral data, suggest that mental state information 
interacts with the trait attribution process.   
There is also some indication that representations of character traits can bias 
our mental-state attributions. This evidence comes from a debate about how to 
interpret the side-effect effect, which is when participants seem to over-attribute 
intentionality and blame to agents whose actions have negative (but not positive) 
side-effects (Knobe, 2003). Chandra Sripada has suggested that this effect may be 
driven by an initial negative judgment of the agent’s character, or “Deep Self” 
(Sripada, 2009). According to this view, participants incorrectly judge that the agent 
intentionally caused a particular outcome because this intentionality attribution seems 
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to follow from their previous impression of the agent’s character; in other words, they 
interpret the agent’s actions (and their consequences) as flowing from their deeper 
personality traits. To test this theory, Sripada asked participants who had completed a 
side-effect effect task to give an explicit evaluation of the agent’s character and core 
values; sure enough, these predicted their intentionality judgments (Sripada & 
Konrath, 2011; Sripada, 2012).  
To summarize: upon first encountering an individual, we rapidly construct a 
representation of their character that is especially sensitive to particular trait-
dimensions, namely warmth and competence. We use various sources of information 
to update this representation, and are biased towards interpreting behavior as 
reflecting stable character traits. However, these inferences are mediated by 
inferences about mental states: when information about the motivations and beliefs of 
others is available, we update or refrain from updating our character models 
accordingly. Moreover, background knowledge about character also seems to affect 
our intentionality attributions, suggesting that we expect not just behavior, but also 
intentions to accord with character. Inferences about character and inferences about 
mental states, in short, appear to inform one another.  
3. Character-trait attribution and theories of folk psychology 
Traditional accounts of mindreading, such as the simulation theory and the theory-
theory, have not typically addressed how we attribute character traits. The notion of 
character seems particularly hard to integrate into a simulation-based account. 
According to the simulation theory, if an interpreter has enough information about 
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another agent’s beliefs and desires, she can make a successful behavioral prediction 
by simulating in an offline manner how she would behave if she had those same 
beliefs and desires (Goldman, 2006; Heal, 1996). But it is not at all clear how this 
strategy could extend to trait attribution. Character traits are not the sorts of things 
that could figure in practical reasoning.30 Any effect of character on practical 
reasoning is bound to be oblique: it may affect the kinds of beliefs and desires we 
form in the first place, the extent to which we deliberate before acting, or the relative 
importance that we assign to particular desires. Thus, it is not clear where – if 
anywhere – character traits could fit into a pure simulationist account. 
The only plausible option for the simulation theorist would be to endorse a 
hybrid account. Instead of holding that character enters into the simulation process 
itself, a hybrid simulation/theory-theorist could hold that character information is 
used to infer the inputs to the simulation procedure. This solves the simulationist’s 
character problem, but only at the cost of conceding that simulation theory is poorly 
equipped for reasoning about traits. It also raises a new question: how would a 
theory-theorist explain the effects of character on practical reasoning? 
Fortunately, the theory-theory seems better equipped to deal with trait 
attribution. Traditional theory-theory accounts focus on generalizations about how 
beliefs and desires combine to produce behavior, treating both as underlying causal 
variables (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Wellman, 2014). Quite conceivably, character 
                                                
30 Beliefs about one’s own character traits could figure in practical reasoning (e.g. “I know that I am an 
impetuous person, so I should be careful not to act without thinking”). But this observation is of little 
help to the simulation theorist: surely, this kind of self-reflection is uncommon in the first-person case, 
and it would be bizarre if we nevertheless believed that other people frequently engage in it. Moreover, 
beliefs about one’s character seem like they would have a very different effect on behavior than 




traits could be treated as another kind of underlying variable, albeit one that has a 
much less direct effect on behavior than beliefs and desires. But any such account 
would need to do more than just posit an additional variable: it would also have to tell 
us just how traits relate to mental states, and how they help us to predict behavior. 
The account that I propose in this paper, which could be construed as a version of the 
theory-theory, will attempt to do just this. 
There is, however, one group of mindreading theorists that has already 
explicitly addressed the role of character-trait attribution in action prediction and 
interpretation: the folk-psychology pluralists (Andrews, 2008, 2012; Fiebich & 
Coltheart, 2015). The basic goal of the pluralists is to offer an alternative to 
simulation theory and theory-theory accounts that invokes a broader set of procedures 
and representations. Andrews (2008, 2012) suggests that in addition to belief-desire 
reasoning, we also use social norms, stereotypes, situation-based schemas, and trait 
attribution to predict and explain behavior. Likewise, Fiebich and Coltheart (2015) 
propose that we use trait-based inferences to predict and interpret behavior, in 
addition to theory-based and simulation-based procedures. They also situate these 
various socio-cognitive strategies within a two-systems framework31 (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). Thus, when predicting and interpreting another 
agent’s behavior, we may use either System 1 or System 2 versions of simulation, 
theory, or trait attribution.  
                                                
31 System 1 strategies are “fast, relatively effortless routines that occur without our awareness,” while 
System 2 strategies are “slow routines which require the expenditure of mental effort and are subject to 
consciousness and deliberative control” (Fiebich & Coltheart, 2015, p. 238). 
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While they differ in several respects, these pluralist accounts treat reasoning 
about behavior in terms of character traits as a socio-cognitive alternative to belief-
desire predictions and explanations. Even if an agent did not possess the concepts of 
BELIEF and DESIRE, according to the pluralists, they might still successfully predict 
behavior by using their knowledge of a target's traits. This is possible, the pluralists 
argue, because trait-based interpretations rely on associations between behaviors and 
situations. For instance, a trait like generosity might form the central node32 in a 
network of behavior-situation pairings: leaving large tips and restaurants, carrying 
heavy boxes and friends moving house, and so on. These associative networks would 
enable agents to attribute traits whenever an individual demonstrated one of the 
relevant behavior-situation pairings, and then use this information to predict that 
individual's behavior in other situations in which generosity might be possible.  
While the pluralists should be given due credit for emphasizing a role for 
traits in our folk psychology, this particular approach to trait attribution has two 
important limitations. The first is that the predictive utility of trait-based reasoning 
will depend heavily on how ‘situations’ get represented. If trait-behavior associations 
                                                
32 Fiebich & Coltheart distinguish between non-linguistic trait attributions and linguistic trait 
attributions. Non-linguistic trait attributions occur when an agent does not possess a linguistic concept 
of a trait (i.e. the word 'generosity'). These only consist in associations between particular behaviors, 
situations, and agents, and would only allow for predicting similar behaviors in similar situations. 
Linguistic trait attributions, in contrast, involve the possession of a linguistic concept of a trait, and 
would facilitate a whole network of predictions.  
I am skeptical of this distinction for two reasons. First, non-linguistic trait attribution, on this 
account, does not seem to involve trait-based reasoning at all: traits are supposed to be enduring, 
internal properties of individuals, but these non-linguistic trait attributions seem to consist only in 
superficial behavioral associations. Second, this distinction implicitly assumes that the only way to 
possess a concept of a trait is through language. But there is ample reason to think that even pre-
linguistic or non-linguistic entities can possess concepts (e.g. Call and Tomasello 2008; Carey 2009). 
While linguistic concepts undoubtedly enrich and expand our trait attribution abilities, there is no 
reason to think that non-linguistic trait attribution is as impoverished as Fiebich and Coltheart (2015) 
make it out to be. 
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are tied only to situations that we have previously experienced, then it will be inert 
whenever we encounter a novel situation. Andrews (2008) recognizes this fact, but 
suggests that it is not a big problem, because we spend most of our time in relatively 
familiar situations. But this reply raises an important question: how do we parse 
situations for the purpose of trait-based predictions? If we parse situations at a fairly 
coarse level, then Andrews might be right; however, this would make the 
corresponding predictions far less reliable, since they would be insensitive to 
important situational differences. For instance, if one forms the association between 
leaving large tips and restaurants, then we would predict that a generous person 
would leave a large tip even when she has received poor service, or when a friend is 
treating her. Conversely, if situations are parsed very finely, then we will treat 
otherwise familiar situations as novel, given a very slight change. Thus, we might 
expect a generous person to leave large tips in sushi restaurants with good lighting, 
but not in sushi restaurants with bad lighting. In this case, most trait attributions 
would be predictively inert. Unless we parse situations just right, in other words, the 
pluralist strategy will either lead to inaccurate overgeneralizations, or inflexible 
under-generalizations. 
Some pluralists may simply wish to concede the limited reliability of trait 
attributions. Andrews (2008) suggests that when we make inaccurate predictions, we 
may simply respond by forgetting them, or by giving a post-hoc explanation of our 
failures, and then carry on with our business. This is not a problem, the pluralist 
argues, because we have lots of different strategies for folk-psychological prediction: 
when trait attribution fails us, we may simply try a different one. This response is 
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unsatisfying: even if trait-based reasoning is often inaccurate, it seems that one should 
be able to learn from these inaccuracies in order to inform future predictions, rather 
than simply discard them. Indeed, the evidence reviewed in the previous section 
indicates that we actually pay close attention when our trait-based expectations are 
violated. But if traits were truly an unreliable way to predict behavior, then why 
would we continue to track character information? If the pluralist story about trait 
attribution is correct, then this seems like a bizarre use of limited cognitive resources. 
The second, related limitation of the pluralist account of character traits is that 
it cannot explain the empirical relation between trait attribution and mental-state 
attribution. As we saw in the previous section, these two forms of reasoning seem to 
be causally interrelated, both at the behavioral and neural levels. But on the pluralist 
account of trait reasoning, mental state information is never involved. This is by 
design: the pluralist's goal is to show that behavioral prediction and interpretation can 
happen in the absence of mental-state attribution. Indeed, Andrews (2008) argues that 
there is really a double dissociation between belief-attribution and trait-based 
reasoning. First, while children are able to reason explicitly about beliefs from an 
early age, they do not explicitly mention traits in their explanations and predictions of 
behavior until much later (Kalish, 2002). Thus, it is possible to reason about mental 
states even if one cannot reason about character traits. Second, interventions for 
children with autism (who lack the ability to reason about beliefs) often rely upon 
training children to associate traits and behaviors, such as the term ‘happy’ with 
smiling and laughing (Gray, 2007). Thus, one can also reason about traits without 
being able to reason about mental states. 
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There are a few problems with this argument. First, there is now positive 
evidence that three to four year-old children respond in an adult-like manner to facial 
features associated with warmth and competence, despite the fact that they do not 
refer to such traits in their explanations of behavior (Cogsdill, Todorov, Spelke, & 
Banaji, 2014). Second, the autism intervention Andrews describes does not seem to 
be about trait-reasoning at all, but rather reasoning about emotions. But even if it 
were an instance of trait-reasoning, this would then be an exception that proves the 
rule: in the absence of the capacity to reason about beliefs, it seems that children with 
autism are only able to use trait information through explicit, laborious training, 
whereas it comes naturally to neurotypical individuals.  
However, even if we were to accept Andrews’ double dissociation argument 
in its entirety, all it would show is that character reasoning and belief-desire reasoning 
are not identical, and that neither is necessary for the other. But these are only the 
strongest possible relations that could hold between these two processes. Even if, in 
principle, there were double dissociations between character reasoning and belief-
desire reasoning, it might still be true that the two processes are causally and 
functionally intertwined. 
I suggest that the solution to the pluralist’s first problem may lie in developing 
an answer to the second. What the pluralist proposal lacks is a principled basis for 
parsing situations for the purpose of behavioral prediction. But if we consider an 
agent’s beliefs and desires, the solution to this problem is obvious: the ‘situation’ will 
consist in those features of the local context that the agent believes are relevant to her 
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goals. Moreover, this approach would facilitate predictions even in highly unfamiliar 
situations. This is because mental-state reasoning is a highly flexible, generative 
framework for predicting and interpreting behavior. By employing causal models that 
treat mental states as variables that can take on a broad range of values, mentalistic 
reasoning is capable of generating behavioral predictions about an indefinitely large 
number of novel situations, even if they have yet to be encountered (Christensen & 
Michael, 2015). Thus, the predictive link between traits and behaviors postulated by 
pluralists only makes sense when it is mediated by belief-desire reasoning, because 
belief-desire reasoning provides us with a principled basis for parsing situations. 
However, this leaves us with the same lingering question that we started with: how 
are trait representations related to representations of beliefs and desires?   
4. The action-prediction hierarchy 
In this section, I introduce hierarchical predictive coding accounts of cognition, and 
how they have been applied to theory-of-mind research. This will lay the groundwork 
for my positive account of how representations of character relate to belief-desire 
reasoning. I begin with a brief digression about the nature of mirror neurons. The 
purpose of this digression will be to illustrate how predictive-coding approaches are 
poised to explain the cognitive underpinnings of action prediction. In particular, these 
accounts posit that we represent intentional states in a hierarchical fashion, and that 
mirror-neuron activity reflects the way we exploit this hierarchy when predicting 
intentional actions. Ultimately, I will argue that our representations of character are a 
part of this action-prediction hierarchy.  
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4.1. Mirror neurons and action hierarchies 
Mental states vary with respect to their temporal stability. For instance, some desire-
like states, such as motor intentions – the intention to make a particular bodily 
movement, such as reaching or grasping – are highly transient. We also chain 
together many individual motor intentions in order in order to fulfill particular action-
goals, as when we walk across a room to pick up a tool; these goals last longer than 
the individual motor intentions that comprise them, but are still extinguished 
relatively quickly. Many of these action-goals can be chained together to achieve 
more complex, temporally extended goals, such as building a house or fixing a car. 
These broader goals can in turn serve as sub-goals for still larger projects, and so on. 
Desire-like states, in other words, seem to form temporal hierarchies: more stable 
goals are comprised of more transient sub-goals, which are comprised of even more 
transient sub-sub-goals, eventually bottoming out in very low-level motor plans. 
This property of desire-like states has not gone unnoticed by mindreading 
theorists. In particular, it has caught the attention of several authors who were 
unsatisfied with the standard, “direct-mapping” interpretation of mirror-neuron 
activity endorsed by simulation theorists (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). According to 
this standard interpretation, when we observe the low-level visual properties of 
another agent’s movements, we automatically form an offline representation of those 
actions in the pre-motor cortex, where we normally represent our own action plans. 
Based on this representation, the story goes, we are then able to deduce the higher-
order intentions that would have caused this action plan, and thereby infer the agent’s 
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goals, effectively using our own motor planning system in reverse (Jeannerod et al., 
1995; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
There is a big problem with this account: the inference from low-level visual 
properties of behavior to goals is vastly under-determined. This is because a single 
behavior is, in principle, compatible with a wide range of underlying motivations. 
One could, for instance, raise one’s hand with an open palm because one is about to 
salute, to give a high five, to wave in greeting, to tell someone to stop, or to deliver a 
slap. The same behavioral effect, in other words, could have indefinitely many 
different mental causes (a predicament known as an ‘inverse problem’) (Csibra, 2008; 
Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Kilner et al., 2007). This means that for any given behavior 
that the mirror neuron system represents, we must sort through an indeterminately 
large space of possible goals that might have caused it. Thus, the direct-mapping 
account quickly leads to computational intractability.  
This observation has led several authors to argue that mirror-neuron activity 
does not reflect a bottom-up mapping from motor-intentions to goals, but rather a top-
down prediction about an agent’s likely behaviors based on a prior hypothesis about 
its goals – what Csibra (2008) calls the ‘predictive action monitoring hypothesis’. 
This solves the aforementioned under-determination problem, because all it involves 
is checking whether an observed behavior would be made likely given a hypothesized 
goal, rather than solving for a unique goal from an ambiguous behavior. And since 
goals are a more abstract kind of representation than motor intentions, they tend to be 
consistent with a fairly wide range of more concrete physical behaviors. For instance, 
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the goal of eating an apple makes a number of behaviors more likely: reaching over to 
grab the apple and bringing it to one’s mouth, or reaching over to grab an apple and 
then grabbing a knife to peel it, or using the knife to cut it into wedges, etc. Our 
action-prediction system solves this problem by selecting the behaviors that are most 
probable given the goal in question. The computational dilemma faced by the direct-
mapping account is thus avoided by taking a top-down, predictive approach that 
exploits the hierarchical structure of intentional action. 
The predictive action-monitoring hypothesis also seems to be more consistent 
with the existing mirror-neuron data: Gallese and Goldman found that monkeys’ 
mirror neurons show no activity for mimicked actions, as when an experimenter 
pretends to grasp a non-existent object (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Umiltà and 
colleagues also found that monkeys’ mirror neurons do respond to actions where low-
level visual input is unavailable, as when they watch an experimenter reach behind an 
occluder to grasp a hidden piece of food (Umiltà et al., 2001). In humans, motor-
priming (an effect of mirror neuron activity) seems to be sensitive to background 
knowledge about the intentional status of an bodily movement: if participants believe 
that a movement is forced, rather than goal-directed, no motor priming occurs 
(Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Liepelt & Cramon, 2008). Thus it seems that mirror neurons 
are responsive to expectations about goal-directed action, rather than the low-level 
visual properties of action.  
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4.2. Hierarchical Predictive Coding and theory of mind 
The predictive action-monitoring hypothesis reflects a growing trend in cognitive 
science and neuroscience towards predictive models of cognition (Clark, 2015; 
Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013). The brain, in a very general sense, 
needs to be in the business of making predictions about the world: without being able 
to predict what’s coming next, planning one’s future actions is impossible. These 
predictions need to happen at multiple timescales simultaneously, whether we are 
predicting the objects in the space before us as we move through it, predicting where 
to find food in our local environments, or predicting events in the distant future. 
Predicting the behavior of other agents, in this sense, is just one part of the larger 
cognitive challenge of planning one’s actions. As creatures that engage in complex 
forms of social coordination, this kind of prediction is especially important for human 
beings. The predictive action-monitoring hypothesis thus accounts for a key aspect 
how human beings are able to form plans at multiple timescales in a highly social 
environment.  
Hierarchical predictive coding theories (HPC) have proven a fruitful way to 
translate this broad insight about the importance of prediction in cognition to specific 
hypotheses about neural processing. According to HPC theorists, our expectations 
about the environment begin on the shortest possible timescale, with predictions 
about the causes of our present sensory experiences. On this view, neural systems do 
not just respond to incoming environmental information in a bottom-up manner, but 
also make forward-looking predictions about what that information will be, which 
they pass down the cortical hierarchy to the relevant input systems. Incoming 
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information is then checked against the prediction signal; if the two do not match, an 
error signal is propagated back up the hierarchy, and checked against the higher order 
prediction. If these error signals are large, then the information they carry is 
incorporated into a revised internal model of the causal structure of the world, which 
then generates new predictions about incoming information. This process then repeats 
itself iteratively until prediction error signals are minimized. Formally, this account is 
said to be equivalent to a Bayesian updating procedure, wherein the posterior 
probability of a given hypothesis is a function of the prior probability of that 
hypothesis and the probability of a given observation (Moshe Bar, 2007; Clark, 2015; 
Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Hohwy, 2013; Spratling, 2008).33  
Building on initial applications of the HPC framework to mirror neurons 
(Kilner et al., 2007), a number of authors have now proposed HPC accounts of 
mindreading (de Bruin & Strijbos, 2015; Hohwy & Palmer, 2014; Koster-Hale & 
Saxe, 2013). The most detailed of these proposals to date is that of Koster-Hale and 
Saxe (2013). Reviewing a wide range of neuroscientific evidence, they argue that 
much of the neural activity during mindreading tasks displays the signature of a 
predictive-coding architecture – namely, greater responsivity to unexpected stimuli 
than expected stimuli (i.e. prediction error signals). For example, they describe how 
the STS, which is associated with the processing of biological motion and goal-
directed action, displays enhanced responses to unexpected behaviors, either because 
                                                
33 There is considerable variation amongst the different versions of predictive coding. Some theorists 
have taken the extreme position that prediction error signals are the only information carried via 
bottom-up input systems (Clark, 2015; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Hohwy, 2013), while others allow that 
traditional bottom-up information-processing compliments top-down prediction (Moshe Bar, 2007; 
Spratling, 2016). On my account, trait information (e.g. via facial features) is sometimes initially 
processed in a bottom-up fashion; as such, I disavow the idea that bottom-up input systems only carry 
prediction errors.  
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they are inefficient (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; Deen & Saxe, 2012) 
or inconsistent with previously displayed desires (Jastorff, Clavagnier, Gergely, & 
Orban, 2011). Likewise, the TPJ, which is known to respond to information about 
beliefs (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), displays a stronger response to belief ascriptions 
that are surprising than those that are expected, given one’s background beliefs about 
an individual (Cloutier et al., 2011; Saxe & Wexler, 2005).  
Koster-Hale and Saxe also argue that the data on trait-sensitive activity in the 
dmPFC is also consistent with a prediction-error minimization account. For instance, 
after Ma and colleagues provided participants with verbal information about the 
behavior of an individual (from which various character traits could be inferred), they 
presented them with test sentences that were either consistent or inconsistent with 
these descriptions (e.g. “Tolvan gave her brother a hug” versus “Tolvan gave her 
brother a slap”). They saw increased responsivity in the dmPFC for trait-inconsistent 
behaviors (Ma et al., 2011; see also Behrens, Hunt, & Rushworth, 2009; Kestemont et 
al., 2013; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). Thus, the dmPFC seems to be 
sensitive to prediction errors related to personality traits. 
Currently, the HPC approach to theory of mind is still in its infancy. As 
Koster-Hale and Saxe note, more empirical work needs to be done to develop the 
positive predictions of this kind of account in detail. However, HPC gives 
mindreading theorists a well-supported, general empirical framework for explaining 
the nature of action-prediction that has already been fruitfully applied to a number of 
different cognitive domains. It also coheres with a broader consensus among 
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cognitive scientists about the centrality of predictive processes in cognitive systems. 
Although it is not without its controversies34, the HPC approach in general is 
currently a progressive scientific research program (Lakatos, 1970), and a promising 
way to pursue questions about the nature of social cognition. In the next section, I use 
this approach to develop an empirically supported conjecture about the relationship 
between character-trait attribution and other forms of mindreading. 
5. Character and the action-prediction hierarchy 
Within a hierarchical Bayesian framework, a possible relationship between character 
traits and other mental states starts to emerge. As we saw initially with the case of 
mirror neurons, predictions about more transient states of affairs, such as motor 
intentions, tend to be informed by hypotheses about more temporally stable goal 
states. Hypotheses about goals, in turn, are informed by representations of more 
enduring desires. At each subordinate level in the predictive hierarchy, expectations 
about more transient states are shaped by superordinate hypotheses about more 
enduring states. As I discussed in the introduction, a key feature of character traits 
that distinguishes them from beliefs and desires is their greater temporal stability. As 
such, traits seem to fit naturally into the upper levels of the hierarchy for action-
prediction. Background beliefs about character traits could thus inform and constrain 
                                                
34 For example, the explanatory status of the Bayesian aspect of these models is a vexed question. 
Some theorists are explicit that the Bayesian formalism is intended to capture only the computational 
level of description, abstracted away from implementational, mechanistic details (Chater, Tenenbaum, 
& Yuille, 2006), while others seem to be making claims about the actual algorithms that support 
predictive processes (Friston & Kiebel, 2009). While some have charged that ultimately, Bayesian 
models amount to “just-so” stories with little explanatory value (M. Jones & Love, 2011), there are 
reasonable answers to such challenges (Zednik & Jäkel, 2016), and plausible ways to interpret the 
various aspects of Bayesian models that render them empirically tractable (Icard, 2016).  
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predictions about more transient mental states, which then inform predictions about 
observable behavior.  
To illustrate: suppose that you are observing Tom, whom you believe to be 
dishonest. A woman walks past, and accidentally drops her wallet in front of him. 
Tom looks toward the wallet, and then looks back at the woman. Because you know 
him to be dishonest, you assign a high probability to the hypothesis that Tom desires 
to steal the wallet. Given this desire-attribution, you might then expect that Tom will 
perform a series of actions: look around to see if anyone is watching, bend over 
discretely by the wallet as if tying his shoe, pick up the wallet and put it in his pocket. 
The prior trait attribution – dishonesty – thus serves as an overhypothesis, raising the 
prior probability of mental-state hypotheses that are consistent with the trait in 
question – namely, self-interested desires (Kemp et al., 2007).35 Thus, when we 
observe Tom’s actions in a particular scenario, the first desire-hypotheses that we are 
liable to make will be based on this prior probability distribution. If we predict that 
Tom will form some particular self-interested desire, this will then raise the 
probability of certain hypotheses about Tom’s actions. Trait-attribution thus has a 
cascading effect on the kinds of mental-states that we attribute, and ultimately on 
action-prediction.  
                                                
35 This is one way in which character traits may serve as an inferential heuristic: without this 
overhypothesis, mindreaders would begin their action-predictions with a flat probability distribution 
over all the mental state hypotheses consistent with their current behavioral observations, which would 
give rise to an inverse problem. Instead, trait attributions bias the prior probability distribution towards 
a subset of mental-state hypotheses, which the predictor can proceed to test. Even if this distribution is 
in fact erroneous, it still serves as a means of bootstrapping our initial mental-state predictions, which 
then allow us to update our priors accordingly.  
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How we predict that Tom will act on this initial desire-attribution will also be 
affected by other psychological and situational factors besides Tom’s character. For 
instance, if there are people watching him, we may predict that when Tom looks 
around, he will refrain from further action. Likewise, if he sees the woman suddenly 
turn back, we might predict that he will form a new plan: to act as though he were 
intent on returning the wallet all along, and hand it back to her. Thus, the effects of 
trait-attributions on specific action-predictions are likely to be moderated by actively 
updating perspective-taking and belief-attribution procedures that respond to  
immediate situational factors (Kovács, 2015; Michelon & Zacks, 2006). Importantly, 
this shows that knowing both 1) that Tom is dishonest, and 2) that someone has 
dropped a wallet in front of him does not lead to any particular behavioral prediction. 
Rather, action predictions are produced via an initial trait attribution followed by a 
series of mental-state inferences at lower levels in the hierarchy.   
Conversely, if we antecedently believed that Tom were an honest person, then 
we might attribute to him the desire to return the wallet to its original owner. 
Ironically, this might generate a similar series of predicted behaviors as in our 
original prediction: looking around, reaching down to pick up the wallet, and then 
giving it back to the woman when she returns, or else pocketing it in order to bring it 
to the police later. Given two opposite trait attributions in the same situation, there 
might be no difference whatsoever in the actual behaviors initially predicted; all that 
would differ would be the kinds of intervening mental states that we ascribe to Tom. 
Within the pluralists’ association-based model, we could never capture this 
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difference. But on a hierarchical predictive model where traits inform mental-state 
attributions, which in turn inform predictions about behavior, we can. 
One might object that these toy examples only really show that character traits 
help us to predict desires, but that they don’t seem to help us predict beliefs. But there 
are several ways in which trait attributions might make belief-hypotheses more 
probable. Traits relating to epistemic agency, such as gullibility or suspiciousness, 
will affect the priors we assign to hypotheses about beliefs formed on the basis of 
testimony, for example. Other traits may lead to predictions about how ambiguous 
situations will be interpreted: we may infer that a paranoid individual will interpret 
two people whispering one way, an easygoing person another. And even when traits 
only lead to desire attributions, these might generate expectations about how a person 
will allocate their attention, which would in turn result in new perceptual beliefs, as 
when Tom saw the wallet, and then looked around to see if he was being watched. 
This hierarchical, predictive approach to trait attribution also helps us make 
sense of some of the empirical data on trait attribution described in section 2. For 
instance, if trait attribution is higher up in the action-prediction hierarchy, and has a 
cascading effect on lower-order mentalistic and behavioral predictions, then we 
should expect that upon encountering someone new, trait attribution should be 
prioritized. The more quickly we start to construct a model of a person’s character, 
the faster we will be able to use that information to predict and interpret their 
behavior. This means that within milliseconds of encountering someone, we need to 
start to gather whatever information is available to build up a representation of their 
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stable character traits. Facial structure is well-suited for this purpose, because it can 
be processed extremely rapidly as coarse-grained, low spatial frequency information 
(Moshe Bar et al., 2006). This kind of input can be used for an initial conceptual 
categorization of a stimulus, which can then be used to generate predictions about 
subsequent input (Moshe Bar, 2007; Chaumon et al., 2014). In other words, we can 
use facial information to form our first impressions of a person’s character, which can 
then inform our subsequent expectations about intentional behavior.  
Of course, initial trait attributions based on faces are neither accurate nor 
particularly informative for predictive purposes. But in a HPC framework, this is not 
a problem: learning from mistakes is what Bayesian systems do best. If an initial 
model results in a prediction error, this information can be used to update the model 
accordingly. For instance, if one encounters a person with a facial structure associated 
with trustworthiness, one might initially expect her to be generally well intentioned. 
However, if one witnessed such a person do something obviously cruel (e.g. abusing 
an animal), one would of course update one’s model of that person’s character 
(Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). As we 
accumulate new information about a person’s behavior, we may iteratively revise our 
initial model of their character, leading to increased accuracy (Cunningham, Zelazo, 
Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007). This helps to resolve one of the major puzzles of the 
pluralist account: even if trait attributions are initially unreliable, they might still 
serve as a basis for social learning and prediction, leading to increasingly accurate 
models of a person's character. 
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This complementary prioritization and updating of trait information can also 
shed light on the cognitive processing underlying the fundamental attribution error. 
Most impression-formation tasks that lead to the fundamental attribution error 
introduce participants to new people. If constructing a character model is prioritized 
by the mindreading system, then we should expect interpreters to use whatever 
behavioral information is available to construct that model as fast as possible. But 
when our attention is drawn to mitigating situational factors, our initial personality 
models are updated, and the behavioral evidence is discounted (Gilbert et al., 1988).36 
Likewise, when we are provided with additional mental state information (Krull et al., 
2008; Reeder et al., 2004), or primed to think about mental states (N. Hooper et al., 
2015), we use that information to update our character models accordingly. 
However, in an HPC framework, not all prediction errors lead to updating. 
The world, after all, is messy and complex. Even a highly accurate causal model is 
liable to make mistakes. Many of these mistakes will be due to noise in the input, 
rather than a problem with the model. Updating the model to accommodate every 
piece of information it encounters would result in overfitting, and thus diminish its 
overall predictive accuracy (Hohwy, 2013). Moreover, updating the model is likely to 
be cognitively costly, since it would require additional memory searches and 
generative procedures. Updating, in other words, can be a bad thing. Sometimes, 
prediction errors ought to be discounted as noise. 
                                                
36 Members of “collectivist” cultures, who habitually attend to contextual factors, no doubt benefit 
from such attentional effects in their comparative resistance to the correspondence bias. 
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Modeling character traits is no different. One might have a fairly accurate 
representation of a person’s character, and still occasionally be surprised by their 
behavior. For instance, one might be quite surprised to learn that Adolf Hitler was a 
vegetarian. Such information could be used to update one’s model of his moral 
character, but this seems unlikely. Rather, one would simply ignore this information, 
and continue to rely on one’s prior model. But this raises an interesting question: 
when do we update our character models in the face of new, conflicting behavioral 
information, and when do we treat it as noise? 
A recent study by Daniel Ames and Susan Fiske hints at an answer (D. L. 
Ames & Fiske, 2013). Given that updating character models is likely to require the 
use of additional, limited cognitive resources, they hypothesized that people should 
selectively allocate those resources towards targets that are most behaviorally relevant 
to them. To test this hypothesis, they first introduced subjects to two confederates, 
who were described as “expert consultants” with whom the participants would later 
collaborate with in a joint project after first performing a solo task. Participants in the 
outcome-dependent condition were told that based on their performance in this joint 
task, they would be considered for a $50 prize. Participants in the outcome-
independent condition, in contrast, were told that their eligibility for the prize would 
be based on their performance in the solo task only. Subjects then underwent fMRI 
scanning and were shown statements about the two confederates that were either 
consistent or inconsistent with what they had previously been told about them.  
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Ames and Fiske found inverse patterns of activity in the dmPFC for the two 
conditions: participants in the outcome-dependent condition displayed more 
responsivity to inconsistent information, whereas participants in the outcome-
independent condition showed more responsivity to the consistent information. The 
authors suggest that the outcome-dependency manipulation led participants to use 
different updating strategies: when achieving their goal (the reward) depended upon 
interacting with the confederate, they used the inconsistent information to update their 
character model, so as to better predict and adjust to their partner’s behavior. In the 
outcome-independent condition, in contrast, participants tended to dismiss the 
inconsistent information as noise, and thus conserve cognitive resources.  
From a HPC perspective, we can interpret this outcome-dependent updating as 
reflecting higher-order predictions about the action-relevance of a prediction error. 
When surprising information is particularly important for action planning (e.g. when 
we expect to interact with a person in the future), we are more likely to incorporate 
that information into our predictive models, instead of dismissing it as noise. On the 
other hand, when a bit of surprising information is not action-relevant (e.g. when we 
do not expect to interact with a person in the future), we are less likely to devote 
resources to updating our predictive models, and more likely to dismiss the prediction 
error as noise. In other words, when a prediction error is more relevant to our goals, 
we "raise the volume" on that signal; when it is less relevant, we "turn the volume 
down." In neuro-cognitive terms, this modulation of expected precision translates into 
shifts in attention. This may explain why participants under cognitive load are more 
likely to fall prey to the fundamental attribution error: when their attention is directed 
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towards another task, they fail to attend to update their character models in response 
to error signals coming from situational information. 
In sum: temporally stable character traits are represented at the upper level of 
an action-prediction hierarchy, and are used to generate prior probability distributions 
for hypotheses about more transient mental states, including beliefs and desires. 
These hypotheses are then used to inform hypotheses about even more transient 
states, which are in turn used to predict or interpret behavior. The downstream effects 
of trait-attributions on action-prediction are liable to be modulated by active belief-
attribution procedures operating at lower-levels in the hierarchy. Prediction-error 
signals are conveyed back up the hierarchy, and are either used to revise the model at 
the appropriate level, or dismissed as noise. The action-relevance of an input can 
modulate whether prediction errors are treated as noise or used to revise the model by 
changing the expected precision in of an input signal.  
6. Future directions 
Adopting an integrative hierarchical approach to reasoning about character traits 
enables us to make a number of novel predictions. Broadly speaking, we should 
expect that manipulating background information about a person's character should 
lead to differences in the kinds of mental states that we attribute to them, especially 
when interpreting ambiguous actions. More specifically, manipulating trait 
attributions along the warmth dimension should lead to either more negative or more 
positive desire and intention attributions. For instance, individuals presented as low-
warmth should be interpreted as having harmful or self-serving desires, while 
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individuals presented as high warmth should be interpreted as having helpful or 
altruistic ones (as we saw in section 2, this kind of effect is likely to be responsible 
for the side-effect effect (Sripada & Konrath, 2011; Sripada, 2012)). Manipulations 
along the competence dimension should lead to differences in the amount of 
knowledge that we attribute to them: more competent individuals should be more 
likely to be viewed as having the appropriate beliefs and making the appropriate 
inferences, while less competent individuals should be more likely to be viewed as 
ignorant. Warmth and competence information could be conveyed through facial 
information, through the observation of diagnostic behaviors, interactive experiences, 
or through testimony.  
Beyond these initial predictions, this account of character-trait attribution 
offers us a new way to connect the study of mindreading with our understanding of 
stereotyping, prejudice and implicit bias (Spaulding, 2016). As was noted earlier, the 
contents of common stereotypes are characterized by variation along the same two 
dimensions as ordinary trait attributions, suggesting that we use cues of group 
membership to infer that an individual will possess a particular set of character traits 
(e.g. an elderly person will be viewed as kind, but also as incompetent). Cues to 
group membership, such as skin color or accent, thus seem to play a similar role as 
facial features in conveying trait information; however, stereotypes seem to contain 
clusters of trait information, rather than just single traits. If trait attribution affects 
mental-state attribution as I’ve described, and stereotypes allow us to attribute 
clusters of character traits to individuals, then it would follow that stereotypes should 
also affect mental-state attribution.  
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As it happens, there is already some evidence that this is the case. Sagar and 
Schofield showed sixth-grade children vignettes depicting ambiguously aggressive 
dyadic interactions between students, such as one student bumping into another in a 
hallway, asking for food in the cafeteria, poking another student, and taking a pencil 
without asking. The authors also systematically manipulated the race of the actor in 
each dyad, such that some participants saw a white actors bumping, asking for food, 
poking, etc., while others saw black actors doing so. They found that the behaviors of 
black actors were interpreted as more mean and threatening than the identical 
behaviors from white actors (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). Thus, when the intention 
underlying an action is ambiguous (e.g. intentionally threatening and aggressive 
versus neutral), observers fell back on stereotypes about black aggressiveness to 
interpret it. These results suggest that ascertaining the role of character-trait 
attribution in mindreading may also help us to better understand the cognitive basis 
for implicit racism. 
The connection with stereotyping also raises the possibility that, in addition to 
their role in action-prediction, trait attributions may also serve a social function.37 
One of the explanations that has been offered for why we represent traits along the 
warmth/competence dimensions is that warmth helps us to keep track of potential 
threats, while competence helps us to keep track of agents’ social status (Fiske et al., 
2007). Notably, threat and status are not intrinsic properties of individuals, but rather 
relational, social properties that tend to vary with context: who counts as threatening 
or high status often depends upon one’s own group identity and social rank. Thus, 
                                                
37 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this. 
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while we tend to represent traits as intrinsic, stable properties of individuals, it may be 
that what we are really tracking are social relationships.38 These factors will still be 
highly relevant to action-prediction, however: whether an individual is higher or 
lower-status than us, or a member of the in-group or out-group, will have a significant 
effect on how they decide to act towards us. This may explain the predictive utility of 
trait-attributions: even if the situationists are right, and stable character traits do not 
really exist, we can still use trait representations as a proxy to help us factor social 
identity into our action-predictions. 
7. Conclusion 
Integrating character-trait attribution into a hierarchical Bayesian account of theory of 
mind promises to enrich our understanding, not just of these two sets of phenomena, 
but also a network of related phenomena of substantial social and philosophical 
importance. Traditional accounts of mindreading have paid little heed to character-
trait attribution, focusing instead on the attribution of beliefs and desires. Folk 
psychology pluralists have rightly pointed this oversight, and taken important steps 
towards drawing attention to the significance of trait reasoning in folk-psychological 
inference. However, the pluralist account treated trait reasoning as a completely 
independent form of behavioral prediction, which does not fit well with the empirical 
data. In contrast, I have argued that the attribution of character traits is systematically 
related to the attribution of other forms of mentality, and that a hierarchical Bayesian 
                                                
38 This may be an instance of what Cimpian and Salomon call the ‘inherence heuristic’ – a “fast, 
intuitive heuristic leads people to explain many observed patterns in terms of the inherent features of 
the things that instantiate these patterns” (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014, p. 461) – and a precursor to 
psychological essentialism about certain social categories (Gelman, 2004; Haslam, Bastian, & 
Kashima, 2006; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). 
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architecture is a promising way to explain that relation. This account yields a number 
of novel empirical predictions about mindreading, and also has the potential to further 
unify the study of mindreading with neighboring empirical domains, such as 






Appendix: Pragmatic development explains the theory-of-mind 
scale39 
 
1. The nativist–constructivist debate 
Humans are hyper-social. This much is widely agreed. It is also generally agreed that 
human social cognition—involving a capacity to attribute mental states to other 
people and to anticipate their likely actions—is essential to human uniqueness 
(Tomasello, 2009), even if it isn’t the ultimate source of that uniqueness  (Piantadosi 
& Kidd, 2016). Accordingly, a great deal of effort has been expended over more than 
30 years in an attempt to understand the development of human mindreading 
capacities (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For most of this period there was a widespread 
consensus that such capacities are constructed gradually over the course of the 
preschool years, relying on linguistic and cultural input together with general-learning 
and theorizing abilities (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & 
Woolley, 1990). While there were always some in the field who claimed that basic 
mindreading abilities are innate, and that the appearance of development reflects 
failures of performance (Scholl & Leslie, 1999), this was decidedly a minority 
position. 
 In the past 10 years, however, the field has changed dramatically. There are 
now dozens of studies of infants aged 6 to 18 months using a variety of non-verbal 
methods (including expectancy-violation looking, anticipatory looking, active 
                                                
39 This Appendix was written collaboratively with Peter Carruthers. It was originally published as 
Westra and Carruthers (2017), and has been reprinted here with permission from Elsevier, copyright 
license # 4067641072972. 
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helping, and more) suggesting that infants understand the goals and beliefs of other 
agents, and can anticipate actions accordingly. (For example, see: D. Buttelmann et 
al., 2009b, 2014; F. Buttelmann et al., 2015; He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2012; Kovács 
et al., 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005b; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014.) It is now 
widely agreed that these findings reflect an underlying social-cognitive competence 
of some sort (although see Heyes (2014a) for a dissenting view). What is disputed is 
how these early abilities relate to those that underlie performance in more traditional 
verbal tasks. Nativists have seized on the new findings to claim that core mindreading 
abilities are present throughout infancy, and that early failures on verbal tasks reflect 
performance difficulties of some sort (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Carruthers, 2013). 
Constructivists, in contrast, have mostly converged on some form of two-systems 
view, according to which there is an early-developing, implicit, limited-flexibility 
system that is later supplemented by a slowly-acquired, flexible and explicit, theory 
of mind (Apperly, 2011; Wellman, 2014). 
 There are broadly two lines of support for this new constructivist position. 
One consists of evidence that both implicit and explicit systems exist alongside one 
another in adults, and that the implicit system operative in infancy has signature limits 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Apperly, 2011; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Schneider, 
Bayliss, et al., 2012; Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2014). This evidence has been 
systematically criticized elsewhere (Carruthers, 2015a, 2015c; Christensen & 
Michael, 2015; Thompson, 2014; Westra, 2016b). The other line of support derives 
from evidence of an orderly and systematic progression in toddlers’ verbally-
manifested mindreading abilities, which is suggestive of genuine conceptual 
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development. This is most clearly demonstrated by Wellman and colleagues who 
have created and validated across cultures the mindreading scale. This will be our 
main focus here. Our goal is to show that the data provided by the mindreading scale 
fail to support constructivism. This is because there are plausible alternative 
explanations —mostly pragmatic in nature—that have not yet been controlled for and 
excluded. 
2. The mindreading scale 
Wellman and Liu undertook two studies (Wellman & Liu, 2004). The first was a 
meta-analysis of investigations of mindreading development in which children’s 
understandings of different types of mental state were pitted against one another using 
otherwise-matched tasks. (All of the studies reviewed involved verbal presentations 
and required the children to give verbal answers.) Their analysis showed that the first 
milestone children pass is understanding that different people can have different 
desires, and that these differences will lead them to act differently. These tasks are 
reliably easier than ones in which children are required to understand that different 
people can have different beliefs. The latter tasks are in turn easier than ones in which 
children are required to understand that someone can be ignorant of a fact by virtue of 
lacking perceptual access to it. Finally, understanding ignorance is reliably easier than 
understanding that people can have, and act on, beliefs that are false. 
 Inspired by these meta-analytic findings, Wellman & Liu (2004) constructed a 
sequence of matched tasks, extended to include a test of children’s ability to 
 154 
 
understand that someone can act in a way incongruent with her true feelings.40 They 
included a diverse-desires task (DD), a diverse-beliefs task (DB), a knowledge / 
perceptual-access task (KA), a false-belief task (FB), and a hidden-emotions task 
(HE). They tested 75 children aged 3–5 on all of these tasks, finding evidence of a 
robust developmental progression that matched the meta-analytic findings, with an 
understanding that people can hide their true emotions being hardest of all. In fact, a 
large majority of the children performed in a manner consistent with the following 
order of ease of passing: DD > DB > KA > FB > HE. Since Wellman & Liu’s initial 
study, over 80% of some 500 children tested in the USA, Canada, Australia, and 
Germany have displayed abilities consistent with this pattern (Kristen, Thoermer, 
Hofer, Aschersleben, & Sodian, 2006; Wellman, 2012). Moreover, congenitally deaf 
children born of hearing parents (who are introduced to full-blown sign-languages 
much later in childhood than normal) follow the same developmental progression, 
only significantly delayed (Peterson et al., 2005; Peterson & Wellman, 2009). 
 Wellman and colleagues have also found that this developmental sequence is 
cross-culturally robust, with one intriguing exception: preschool children from 
“collectivist” cultures (specifically, China and Iran) tend to find the knowledge-
access (KA) task easier than the diverse beliefs (DB) one, thus exhibiting the 
sequence DD > KA > DB > FB > HE (Duh et al., 2016; Shahaeian, Peterson, 
Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006). This is thought 
to reflect a cultural emphasis on differences of opinion in “individualist” countries 
such as the USA, and a correspondingly greater emphasis on education, knowledge, 
                                                
40 Some of the tasks included in Wellman & Liu’s (2004) initial battery of tests were dropped from 
follow-up studies, and will not be discussed here. 
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and the importance of learning from those in authority in “collectivist” ones.  
 In addition, Rhodes & Wellman (2013) combined use of the mindreading-
scale tasks with microgenetic measures (a form of longitudinal study in which 
behavior is sampled very frequently, which effectively amounts to a form of training). 
Children in the study were pre-tested on the mindreading scale, and those in the 
experimental condition then underwent a number of regular microgenetic training 
sessions over the course of six weeks. In each of these sessions children had to 
complete two new false-belief prediction tasks. They were then shown the correct 
outcome of the scenario, and were asked to explain the character’s action. Consistent 
with previous intervention studies (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Lohmann & 
Tomasello, 2003), training on false-belief tasks tended to have a positive effect on 
performance at post-test. More interestingly, it was also found that children’s scores 
on the mindreading scale at pre-test predicted the effectiveness of the training. 
Children who could already pass the knowledge-access task at pre-test were more 
likely to pass the false-belief task at post-test than children who could only pass the 
diverse-beliefs task at pre-test. Using similar methods, Wellman and Peterson 
obtained comparable training effects for older late-signing deaf children (Wellman & 
Peterson, 2013). 
 Wellman (2012, 2014) argues that this overall body of data supports a 
constructivist account of mindreading development, and is correspondingly 
problematic for nativist theories. Children are said to be constructing a causal 
framework for understanding the operations of the mind, drawing on their own 
experiences and their observations of others. Some aspects of the developing theory 
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(particularly the idea that the mind contains states that represent aspects of reality, 
needed for an understanding of false belief) are said to be intrinsically harder to 
construct than others. But construction of the theory also depends on cultural input. 
Those who are on the cusp of constructing a full-blown representational theory of 
mind are most likely to transform intensive conceptually-relevant forms of social 
experience into full false-belief competence, but such experience still benefits 
children at an earlier stage in the mindreading-scale progression. In contrast, if 
mindreading capacities are innate, then it is said to be very unclear why performance 
should exhibit these regularities, or why cultural differences and individual training-
experiences should make any difference. 
 Wellman draws a false contrast here, however. For nativism is consistent with 
cultural learning. What is innate, it can be said, is a domain-specific learning 
mechanism. (Compare what nativists say about the innateness of the language-
faculty, which is obviously designed for learning.) Specifically, a nativist can claim 
that infants are innately endowed with certain core concepts (perhaps DESIRE, BELIEF, 
PRETENSE, HAPPY, SAD, SEE, and TELL) and certain basic principles of attribution 
(such as “seeing leads to believing”). Thereafter novel concepts can be acquired, and 
new principles of attribution learned, relying both on individual experiences and 
cultural input. So from this perspective it isn’t surprising that culture might make a 
difference, nor that training might help performance. Moreover, it may be that the 
kind of learning that actually contributes to passing the tests making up the 
mindreading scale doesn’t require enrichment of the target mental-state concepts at 
all. Rather, as we will see, it may be a matter of learning to recognize cues that signal 
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the current topic of conversation or the most likely intent behind a question. 
 In addition, it is far from obvious that Wellman’s own constructivist 
framework is internally coherent. Specifically, it is unclear that the delay between an 
ability to pass diverse-belief tasks and a capacity to pass false-belief tasks makes 
theoretical sense, from a constructivist perspective. This is because both tasks require 
a grasp of the representational nature of mind. In order to understand that two people 
can have different beliefs about the same subject matter, one needs to understand that 
the subject matter in question can be represented differently. But this is the same 
understanding as has often been thought to underlie grasp of the possibility of false 
belief, together with the ability to pass (verbal) false-belief tests. Moreover, since the 
two beliefs in a diverse-belief scenario conflict with one another, at least one of them 
must be false.  
 Of course it is true that in some versions of diverse-belief test the child only 
guesses at the location of the item, rather than seeing it for herself. But at the very 
least we can say that the diverse-belief test requires the child to reason about what 
someone will do who has a belief that conflicts with what the child has just said she 
thinks is the case. Why should this be any easier conceptually than reasoning about 
what someone will do who has a belief that conflicts with what the child has just been 
told is the case (which is what happens in the mindreading-scale version of the false-
belief test)? Of course, if guesses give rise to beliefs of lesser strength than testimony 
from an adult, it may be that the pre-potent response (the “lure of the real”) in a false-
belief task is correspondingly stronger. But this would then suggest that the 
differential in performance reflects differences in executive function, rather than 
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differing understandings of the mind. So there is still a problem, here, for Wellman’s 
preferred conceptual-development interpretation of the mindreading scale. 
 From the fact that Wellman’s constructivist framework is problematic it 
doesn’t follow that a nativist account is correct, of course. Indeed, the problem for 
nativists arising from the mindreading-scale data is that the very experiments with 
infants that are thought to support nativism suggest that infants already possess the 
concepts and attribution-principles tested by most of the items on the scale 
(Baillargeon et al., 2010; D. Buttelmann et al., 2009, 2014; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). 
Moreover, although the infancy-data seemed initially to suggest that the development 
of infant competence might mirror two major stages of the mindreading scale 
(specifically, that desires are understood earlier than beliefs), recent data puts infant 
capacities to track and reason about false beliefs as early as 7 or 8 months, or even 6 
months of age (Kampis, Parise, Csibra, & Kovács, 2015; Kovács et al., 2010; 
Southgate & Vernetti, 2014). So there is little scope, here, for arguing that 
mindreading-scale performance merely lags behind true mindreading development, 
requiring monotonic growth in executive-function capacities or linguistic abilities, for 
example. The challenge for nativism, then, is to explain why the mindreading scale 
should be so robust if all the conceptual resources necessary to succeed in the tests 
are available some two years earlier than children actually begin passing its easiest 
items. 
 Not all tasks in the mindreading scale contribute to this challenge for 
nativism, however. Specifically, the final “hidden emotion” (HE) item is rather 
different in character from the rest. This is so for two reasons. The first is that the 
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story presented to children is more complex than gets used with the other measures in 
the scale, and more memory-check questions get asked prior to the target question. So 
the task is likely to be significantly harder for reasons extraneous to mindreading. 
Second, the HE task tests an appreciation of how mental states, on the one hand, and 
behavior that would normally manifest such states, on the other, can be in conflict, 
whereas the belief and desire tasks are about how the states of different people can 
conflict. It may be that it takes a while to acquire the knowledge that people aren’t 
always feeling what they appear to be feeling. And crucially for our purposes, there is 
no evidence that infants have any sort of appreciation of this point. So there is no 
initial puzzle here for nativists to answer.  
Accordingly, in what follows we will consider just the first four items of the 
mindreading scale (diverse-desire, diverse-belief, knowledge-access, and false-
belief). We will first focus on explaining the sequence DD > DB > FB, before turning 
to a separate discussion of KA. Our goals are (a) to provide well-motivated 
alternative explanations of the reliability of the sequence DD > DB > FB, together 
with (b) the influence of culture on the order in which children pass DB and KA, as 
well as (c) the boost that false-belief training can give children who perform at 
intermediate levels in the sequence. Our goal is not to demonstrate that our alternative 
explanations are correct, however. That would require a whole raft of new 
experiments. Rather, it is to show that they are independently plausible, thereby 
undercutting any support for constructivism from the mindreading-scale data in the 
absence of such experiments. 
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3. Existing accounts of verbal-task performance failures 
Since nativists are committed to claiming that the conceptual–theoretical competence 
for passing all the main components of the mindreading scale are present from 
infancy onwards, they must explain the mindreading-scale findings in terms of 
differential demands on performance. What resources are available for constructing 
such an explanation? We will first consider what nativists might say about the failures 
of children younger than four to pass verbal false-belief tasks, despite passing non-
verbal versions of the same tasks from as early as the latter half of the first year of 
life. 
 One possibility often mentioned in the literature concerns executive-function 
abilities. It has been said, for example, that capacities to pass verbal false-belief tasks 
depend on late-maturing fronto-parietal pathways, connecting executive function in 
the frontal lobes with major components of the mindreading network (Baillargeon et 
al., 2010). In support of such a view, executive function is known to correlate with 
age of passing verbal false-belief tasks (Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Kloo & Perner, 2003). Moreover, reduced demands on executive function are thought 
to explain why removal of the target object from the scene in a change-of-location 
false-belief task makes the task somewhat easier (Wellman et al., 2001; Southgate et 
al., 2010).  
While executive function abilities are no doubt part of the story, they can by 
no means provide the whole explanation. There are a number of reasons for this. One 
is that the correlation between executive function and false belief is small after 
controlling for age and verbal ability (only .22; see Devine & Hughes, 2014). Another 
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is that the active-helping false-belief tasks passed by 18-month-old infants surely 
require executive decision making (Buttelmann et al., 2009, 2014, 2015). Moreover, 
although Chinese children are known to be more advanced than US children in their 
executive-function abilities, they perform no better in false-belief tasks (Sabbagh, Xu, 
Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006; Wellman et al., 2001). And in addition, it is hard to see 
how an appeal to executive function can explain the increasing difficulty of the tasks 
that make up the mindreading scale, which are generally well-matched in terms of 
their executive demands. Nevertheless, executive function will surely assist with 
learning and managing the pragmatic aspect of verbal mindreading tasks, which we 
emphasize below. 
 Another factor known to correlate with age of passing false-belief tasks is 
general language ability. A number of constructivist accounts have proposed that the 
acquisition of language plays an important, perhaps necessary, role in the 
development of mindreading. However, there is substantial disagreement about which 
aspects of language play this role. Some authors have suggested that it is 
complementation syntax (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002), others have emphasized mental 
state vocabulary (Montgomery, 2005), and yet others stress the social experience that 
comes from linguistic interactions (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003; Dunn & Brophy, 
2005; Harris et al., 2005). But in their meta-analysis Milligan et al. (2007) were 
unable to identify a special role for any single aspect of language independent of 
general language ability. And in all, after controlling for age, they determined that 
linguistic factors correlated only moderately with mindreading ability (.31), and 
accounted for only 10% of the variance in the latter. Moreover, general language 
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ability is often controlled for in testing the validity of the mindreading scale 
(Wellman & Peterson, 2013). It is therefore unclear how a simple appeal to language 
ability could explain the sequential progressions in mindreading performance 
described earlier. What is surely correct, however, is that what makes verbal false-
belief tasks hard has something to do with the fact that they are verbal (or at least 
communicative) in nature. The proposal we make below will build on this idea. 
 Yet another suggestion that has been made in the literature is that verbal false-
belief tasks are, in effect, triple-mindreading tasks (Carruthers, 2013). This is because 
both language comprehension and communicative production are inevitably 
pragmatic in nature, and because it is widely acknowledged that mindreading is 
implicated in pragmatic aspects of speech. The child in a verbal false-belief task has 
to figure out what the experimenter is trying to communicate while computing, 
remembering, and accessing at the relevant time the mental states of the target agent. 
The child then has to figure out and select a verbal (or other communicative) response 
to have the intended effect on the mind of the questioner. A verbal false-belief task 
will thus involve a complex interplay between executive decision making, the 
language faculty, and mindreading. It seems plausible that the relevant connections 
(and the efficiency of the mindreading system itself) might not have matured 
sufficiently in younger children for them to pass. Although promising, however, this 
suggestion is not specific enough to explain the comparative difficulty of the tasks 
that make up the mindreading scale. 
Pragmatic accounts of young children’s failures in verbal false-belief tasks are 
not new. Siegal & Beattie (1991), for example, hypothesized that children might be 
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misinterpreting the test question to mean, “Where should she look for her ball?” They 
found that by altering the question slightly to, “Where will she look first for her ball” 
they were able to shift the average age of passing a few months earlier. (The latter 
question doesn’t remove the ambiguity altogether, of course. It can still be heard as 
asking, “Where should she look first for her ball [in order to get it right away]?”) 
Surian & Leslie (1999) later replicated this finding, while also showing that the “look 
first” manipulation has no effect on children with autism (suggesting that the 
difficulties these children experience with false-belief tasks are not merely 
pragmatic). More recently, Helming et al. have proposed a more elaborate form of 
pragmatic account, which we briefly discuss here before developing our own view in 
Section 4 (Helming et al., 2014; Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2016). 
Helming et al. argue that young children have problems with the false-belief 
task because it requires them to adopt two different perspectives simultaneously. In 
order to pass, a child must adopt a third-person—“spectatorial”—perspective on the 
protagonist’s instrumental action, while simultaneously adopting a second-person—
communicative, and hence cooperative—perspective with the experimenter and when 
answering the latter’s question. Engaging with the experimenter in a communicative 
interaction is said to disrupt the child’s third-personal tracking of the protagonist’s 
beliefs. The child’s subsequent response is then the product of two pragmatic biases: 
one referential, one cooperative.  
The referential bias is triggered when the experimenter asks a question about 
the target object. It can be triggered by the test question itself (e.g. “Where will she 
look for her ball?”), or by a prior control question about the actual location of the 
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target object (e.g. “Where is the ball now?”) (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2015). Such 
questions have two primary effects: first, mentioning the object primes the child to 
think about its true location. Second, involvement in a second-person interaction with 
the experimenter causes the child to focus on their shared epistemic perspective 
(specifically, their shared knowledge of the object’s true location). This disrupts the 
child’s ability to track the protagonist’s false belief from a third-person perspective. 
Together, these two factors cause the child to focus on the true location of the object, 
and ignore the agent’s false belief.  
The cooperative bias is said to arise from the fact that children are motivated 
to help the mistaken agent. This leads them to adopt a second-person perspective 
toward the protagonist in the narrative, rather than a third-person spectatorial one. 
The bias is a manifestation of the fact that children at this age are chronically helpful, 
and will go out of their way to help an unknown adult even when it takes effort to do 
so and they are engrossed in an activity of their own (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007, 
2009, 2013; Warneken, 2015). Indeed, even somewhat younger children will point 
out information to help an ignorant adult who is searching for something, or to 
prevent an adult from making a mistake (B. Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012; 
Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). Thus, when younger children see that 
the protagonist in the false-belief task is mistaken about the location of her ball, they 
are motivated to help her find it. This, in combination with the referential bias 
towards the true location of the ball, leads the child to misinterpret the experimenter’s 
predictive question, “Where will she look for her ball?” as a normative one (“Where 
should she look for her ball?”) 
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We agree with much in these suggestions, so far as they go.41 But while these 
two biases may help to explain why younger children initially fail the false-belief 
task, they do not explain how older children eventually come to pass it. Here, 
Helming and colleagues appeal to children’s developing executive abilities (which 
presumably help children inhibit the two biases).42 But for the reasons that we have 
just mentioned, executive development cannot be the whole story. Moreover, 
Helming and colleagues’ account is silent about the ordered difficulty of the tasks that 
make up the mindreading scale. In Section 4 we will construct a more elaborate 
pragmatic account of false-belief failures that incorporates this one, building on the 
work of Westra (2016a). 
4. A pragmatic account of false-belief performance 
We should stress at the outset that all communication is inevitably partly pragmatic in 
nature. A communicator produces a performance of some sort (a speech act, a 
gesture) and the audience has to figure out the intent behind that performance 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 2002). Moreover, recent models of speech comprehension 
suggest that it takes place competitively and in parallel, with syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics being processed interactively, generally with multiple hypotheses in play 
                                                
41 In their account, Helming et al. (2014, 2016) stress that these two biases are generated by the 
demands of simultaneously adopting second- and third-person perspectives on the actions of the 
experimenter and the agent. But we are doubtful whether this framework is really doing any work. 
The referential bias seems to be generated primarily by the fact that the hidden object has been 
mentioned, while the cooperative bias is the product of children’s disposition to engage in helping 
behavior. It isn’t obvious what pointing out the contrast between second- and third-person 
perspectives adds to explanation. Therefore, although we agree with the substance of Helming et al.’s 
account, we do not follow them in adopting this terminology. 
42 While they largely endorse an executive-functioning account in their paper, Helming and colleagues 
do note that the existence of the two biases does not logically entail acceptance of an executive-
functioning account. This, they acknowledge, might make their pragmatic analysis of the task 
compatible with some form of constructivism. By the same token, it also makes their view 
compatible with our developmental proposal. 
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at each level (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007). In production, too, it seems that speakers 
make a selection from among a number of candidate utterances suggested by the 
context (Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2010). We should expect, then, that 
a child participating in a verbal false-belief task will be no different. A number of 
candidate interpretations of the experimenter’s question are likely to be entertained 
and evaluated for likelihood (albeit swiftly and unconsciously), with a selection from 
among candidate answers being made accordingly. 
 How a child interprets the experimenter’s questions in a false-belief 
experiment will depend, in part, on her construal of the nature of the communicative 
exchange: that is to say, its topic and purpose. As Helming et al. (2014, 2016) rightly 
point out, one aspect of the false-belief scenario that will seem highly salient to 
children of this age is the fact that the agent is in need of help (because she has a false 
belief). If nativism is assumed, then the child will be aware that the protagonist needs 
help, and may thus anticipate being invited to offer such help. This will, in turn, 
increase the salience of a normative interpretation of the test question, taking it to 
mean, “Where should she look for her ball?” Even more simply, the child might infer 
that the experimenter is inviting her to help Sally find her ball, and interpret the test 
question as, “Can you show Sally where to look for her ball?” We will refer to this as 
the “helpfulness-interpretation” of a false-belief (or other mindreading-related) 
question.  
 Another salient construal of the communicative exchange with the 
experimenter is that it serves a pedagogic purpose of some sort. Hence the false-belief 
question is a request for the child to show what she has learned from the exchange; 
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she is being asked to exhibit that she has acquired some target item of knowledge 
(whatever that is). We will refer to this as the “knowledge-exhibiting-interpretation” 
of the question. In fact, children are quite likely to assume that the interaction with 
the experimenter may have a pedagogic intent. This is because the normal cues to 
pedagogy (shared attention, eye-contact between adult and child at the outset of the 
exchange) will almost always be present in a normal false-belief experiment. Note 
that in other contexts such cues have been found to serve as reliable signals to young 
children that knowledge transmission of some sort is about to take place (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009; Gergely, 2013).  
 Now notice that intended interpretation of the false-belief question is, indeed, 
a knowledge-exhibiting one: the experimenter wants the child to exhibit her 
knowledge of the psychological states of the protagonist in the story and/or their 
likely effects on behavior. And this will be the interpretation most directly suggested 
by the syntax and literal semantics of the question (“Where does she think it is?” / 
“Where will she go?”) But this interpretation requires the child to take the topic of 
conversation to involve the protagonist’s cognitive states of knowledge or belief. This 
may strike the child as unlikely, for reasons we will explain shortly. Moreover, there 
is normally nothing in the setup of a false-belief experiment to suggest to the child 
that she is supposed to be learning something about the cognitive states of the 
protagonist (although manipulations that make cognitive states more salient do have 
the effect of reducing the age at which children first pass the false-belief task; see 
Wellman et al., 2001). 
In contrast, what will seem most immediately salient about the false-belief 
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scenario is that it involves displacement and concealment of an object (in a change-
of-location false-belief task), or that a container has contents other than one might 
expect (in an unexpected-contents version of the task). If pedagogic intent is assumed, 
then these will seem like probable targets for learning: the experimenter wants the 
child to learn about the true location of the object or the contents of the container. The 
child is then likely at least to entertain the hypothesis that the question is inviting her 
to exhibit her knowledge of the worldly events that have just unfolded—that is, the 
actual location of the object, or the actual contents of the container. As a result, in 
false-belief experiments there will generally be two knowledge-exhibiting 
interpretations in play, in addition to the helpfulness-interpretation discussed earlier. 
The child’s task is to figure out which of the three is the most likely.43 
 When a child in a false-belief experiment is asked where the protagonist will 
look for her ball, then, we suggest that there will generally be three interpretations of 
the question that are activated, competing to control the answer. One is that the child 
is being invited to be helpful toward the protagonist. Another is that she is being 
asked to exhibit her knowledge of the events that have unfolded in the story. And the 
third is that she is supposed to exhibit her knowledge of the way in which the 
protagonist’s beliefs will issue in action. Notice that although this third interpretation 
is the one intended by the experimenter, each of the others will push in the direction 
of the same (incorrect) answer: both will incline the child to reply by stating the 
                                                
43 Consistent with this suggestion, Howard et al. (2008) found that the most consistent predictor of 
false-belief performance in their corpus data was the frequency of child-directed questions. Likewise, 
Hughes et al. (2014) found in a study employing false-belief tasks with slightly older children from 
England, Italy, and Japan that the only systematic predictor of differential success across groups was 
the age at which children in their respective countries begin formal schooling. (This is a year earlier 
in England than in Italy and Japan, and the English children performed significantly better.) For of 
course school-teachers frequently ask children knowledge-exhibiting questions. 
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actual, current, location of the ball. One might expect, then, that in a three-way 
competition among possible interpretations, the odd one out would face an uphill 
battle to control behavior. Put differently: the child has two reasons to name the actual 
location of the ball, and only one reason to name the location believed-in by the story 
protagonist. 
 This account enables us to offer a deeper explanation of the referential bias 
postulated by Helming et al. (2014, 2016), which was discussed in Section 3. The 
reason why control-questions or false-belief questions that mention the actual location 
of the target object are more likely to lead to erroneous answers is that they raise the 
probability of the two competing interpretations of the intent behind the question. 
When the experimenter refers to the target object she thereby draws attention to its 
actual location. This will make that location seem relevant to the communicative 
exchange, hence increasing the likelihood that she is inviting the child to be helpful 
by pointing out that location to the protagonist; and by the same token, it will also 
make it seem more likely that the child is being invited to exhibit her knowledge of 
the actual location, rather than her knowledge of the protagonist’s beliefs. We diverge 
from Helming et al., however, in that we do not view the referential bias as disrupting 
or interfering with the third-person mindreading process. On our account, the child 
continuously represents the agent's false belief throughout the task. However, 
children don’t use this information when interpreting the experimenter’s question, 
because they are drawn instead to more salient, alternative interpretations. 
 We noted earlier that there is a systematic reason why it may strike the child 
as unlikely that the topic of conversation in a false-belief task is the protagonist’s 
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mental states and resulting actions, or that the protagonist’s beliefs are 
conversationally relevant. This is that, in the child’s experience, cognitive states are 
rarely talked about (Westra, 2016a). One reason for this is that our ordinary 
explanations and descriptions of behavior generally leave beliefs implicit. Instead, we 
simply refer to an agent’s desires, leaving it to our interlocutors to infer the relevant 
belief-factors (Papafragou et al., 2007; see also Steglich-Peterson & Michael, 2015). 
Indeed, Papafragou et al. (2007) found that participants would only spontaneously 
mention beliefs when describing behavior in cases of deception or false belief, or 
when provided with particular syntactic cues. While mature speakers will recognize 
that these exchanges contain implicit references to beliefs, a novice speaker 
unfamiliar with the pragmatics of belief discourse will likely come to regard 
references to beliefs as relatively rare events. Moreover, such a pattern of omission is 
reflected in child-directed speech, where “think” gets used only half as frequently as 
“want” (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006; MacWhinney, 2014).  
 In addition, we often use verbs like “think” in a manner that isn’t really about 
beliefs at all (Simons, 2007; Lewis et al. 2012). Rather, “think” is frequently used as a 
way of indirectly asserting its complement. Thus if one says, “I think it will rain this 
afternoon,” one’s primary speech act is to make a hedged assertion about the weather, 
not to attribute a belief about the weather to oneself. Third-person uses of these terms 
often perform a similar role. If one responds to someone’s query about the upcoming 
weather by saying, “John thinks it will rain this afternoon”, mention of John’s beliefs 
is introduced in an evidential role, and the result is still something resembling an 




Studies of corpus-data collected from children’s conversations with adults 
show that such indirect-assertion uses of “think” make up a large proportion of 
children’s conversational experience with such terms, both in child-directed adult 
speech and in children’s own speech production (Shatz et al., 1983; Bloom et al., 
1989; Diessel & Tomasello, 2001). Sentences of the form, “S thinks that P” are more 
likely to serve as a way of indirectly asserting, “P” than to attribute a belief to the 
subject. This has led some linguists to argue that children interpret “think” as indirect 
by default, and only draw on the attributive sense when the indirect interpretation is 
clearly implausible (Lewis et al. 2012; Hacquard 2014; Dudley et al., 2015).  
Thus, while many of our actual thoughts about the beliefs others are left 
implicit, many of our explicit uses of belief-verbs tend not to be about beliefs at all. 
All this will lead a novice speaker to assume that conversations about beliefs are quite 
infrequent. So even when an utterance might be plausibly interpreted as being about 
beliefs (e.g. “What will she think is in the box?”), these interpretations will be 
assigned a low prior probability. Consequently, such interpretations are unlikely to be 
selected when more probable alternatives exist. 
It might be objected that not all forms of false-belief task use the term “think”, 
either in describing the false-belief scenario or in the test question. Rather, the child 
might merely be told where the protagonist has placed her desired object and that it 
has been moved in her absence, before being asked, “Where will she look for it when 
she returns?” This objection misses the point of the proposal, however. The idea is 
that infrequent talk about cognitive states combined with indirect-assertion uses of 
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terms like “think” and “know” lowers the prior probability of the hypothesis that 
cognitive states are relevant to the topic of conversation. This remains true even in 
conversations where those terms are not themselves used. 
5. Pragmatic reasoning in FB  
With the components of our pragmatic account now outlined, consider the version of 
false-belief task used in the mindreading scale, drawn from Wellman & Liu (2004): 
Children see a toy figure of a boy, together with a sheet of paper with a 
backpack and a closet drawn on it. The experimenter says, “Here’s Scott. 
Scott wants to find his mittens. His mittens might be in his backpack or they 
might be in the closet. Really, Scott’s mittens are in his backpack. But Scott 
thinks his mittens are in the closet.” – “So, where will Scott look for his 
mittens? In his backpack or in the closet?” (the target question) – “Where are 
Scott's mittens really? In his backpack or in the closet?” (the reality question). 
To be correct the child must answer the target question “closet” and the reality 
question “backpack.” 
We suggest that children will likely entertain three main hypotheses about the intent 
behind the target question. One is the helpfulness-interpretation: she wants me to help 
Scott find his mittens. A second is a knowledge-exhibiting interpretation whose topic 
is the world (rather than Scott’s psychology): she wants me to show that I know where 
the mittens really are. And the third is the intended psychological-knowledge-
exhibiting interpretation: she wants me to show that I know that Scott will look for his 
mittens where he thinks they are. On the one hand, the syntax of the question favors 
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the third hypothesis. But the child is alert for opportunities to be helpful, and will be 
aware that Scott won’t find his mittens unless he looks in the right place. And in 
addition, as we pointed out above, people’s cognitive states are rarely directly 
relevant to the topic of conversation in the child’s previous experience. These factors 
may render the intended interpretation the least plausible of the three. And even if 
they don’t, since the other two alternatives motivate the same reality-oriented answer, 
when combined they may lead the child to answer accordingly. 
While our account can explain why children fail change-of-location false-
belief tasks, it might seem that it is less well placed to explain failures in unexpected-
contents versions of the task. For in such cases there is no overt goal. The child is 
merely asked what someone else (or her previous self) will think is in the Smarties 
tube (having just discovered for herself that the tube contains pencils and not 
candies).44 And in the self-directed version of the task, especially, it may seem 
unlikely to the child that she is being invited to offer help to her own past self when 
she is asked, “What did you think was in there?” A world-directed knowledge-
exhibiting interpretation will be especially salient in unexpected-contents forms of 
false-belief task, however. For consider what has taken place from the child’s 
perspective. She begins by presuming likely pedagogic intent following initial eye-
contact with the experimenter and/or the use of child-directed speech. She is then 
shown something surprising about a Smarties-tube (that it contains pencils). She 
might reasonably infer that this is what she is supposed to have learned, and thus 
exhibit her knowledge of the actual contents of the container when asked. 
                                                
44 Nevertheless, a goal may often be tacitly presumed. The child might reasonably assume that 
everyone likes smarties, and hence be motivated to prevent the target agent from being disappointed 
to discover that the box contains pencils. 
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Moreover, recall that “think” is generally used in statements to indirectly 
assert the complement clause. In second-person questions, likewise, the topic is the 
complement clause: if you ask me, “Do you think it will rain this afternoon?”, the 
most likely situation is one in which you are asking me about the weather, not my 
beliefs. This may combine with the saliency of the surprising fact the child has just 
learned to make it seem likely that she is being asked to exhibit her knowledge of the 
contents of the container, rather than her own prior beliefs. 
Notice that our proposed account of young children’s failures in verbal false-
belief tasks comports quite nicely with many of the known predictors of false-belief 
performance. It makes sense, for example, that both executive function and general 
verbal ability should correlate with false-belief performance. For in order to pass, a 
child needs not only to decipher the experimenter’s query correctly, but also to inhibit 
answers suggested by alternative interpretations. Likewise, one might expect that 
verbal ability would depend partly on greater conversational experience, leading to an 
appreciation that the syntax of the question (“Where will she look?” or “What does 
she think?”) increases the likelihood that the questioner’s pragmatic intent has to do 
with the cognitive states of the story protagonist. 
It also makes good sense that false-belief performance should correlate with 
the extent to which mental-state terms are used in the child’s home and with the 
frequency of child-directed questions (Howard, Mayeux, & Naigles, 2008), and that it 
should likewise correlate with the number of the child’s siblings (McAlister & 
Peterson, 2013; Perner et al., 1994)—at least, on the assumption that multiplying 
perspectives in the home is likely to lead to more talk about mental states. The same 
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point holds for the finding that deaf children of hearing parents, who are delayed in 
their exposure to language, should also be delayed in verbal false-belief performance 
(Peterson & Wellman, 2009), and that it should be increased exposure to mental-state 
terms in particular that predicts subsequent success (Pyers & Senghas, 2009).  
In addition, our pragmatic proposal can explain why some variations in task-
parameters can reliably shift the age of passing false-belief tasks forward by a few 
months (Wellman et al. 2001). One factor is whether the target object remains present 
when the child is asked the test question, or has been removed from the scene. This is 
generally explained in terms of reduced demands on executive function. And this may 
well be partly correct. But it can also be explained in pragmatic terms. For if the true 
location of the target object is unknown to the child, then that will lower the 
probability that the experimenter is inviting the child to be helpful to the agent in the 
story, as well as lowering the probability that she is being asked to display knowledge 
of the actual location; and it will correspondingly increase the probability that the 
experimenter is inviting the child to display her knowledge of the protagonist’s 
psychology. 
If the context is a deceptive one, too, then it is correspondingly less likely that 
the adult is inviting the child to be helpful. Of course this isn’t ruled out. Sometimes 
tricks are intended just to elicit surprise (“Look where your ball is now!”) rather than 
consternation (“My ball has gone!”). But given an intent to deceive the target agent 
about the location or nature of an object, it is significantly less likely that the adult 
will at the same time invite the child to undeceive (be helpful to) the agent. A similar 
point holds if the child herself participates in the experimental transformation. If the 
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child was encouraged to put the pencils in the Smarties container, then that should 
lower the likelihood that the adult is now asking the child to be helpful in informing 
the target agent of this fact. For why would she encourage the child to make the 
change and then invite the child to helpfully inform the agent of the result? Indeed, 
this factor may merge with the previous one. That the child is asked to make the 
move suggests some sort of deceit, or game of hide-and-seek. And then telling about 
it would spoil the game.  
Finally, it also makes sense, of course, that making the protagonist’s cognitive 
states more salient during the setup of a false-belief task should make it easier for 
children to pass, as we noted earlier (Wellman et al., 2001). For this will help them to 
see that such states are directly relevant to the topic of conversation, hence raising the 
likelihood of the psychological-knowledge-exhibiting interpretation. 
Our approach also provides an alternative explanation for some recent results 
that have been thought to support an executive-function account of children’s 
difficulties with standard false-belief tasks. Thus Scott et al. show in an expectancy-
violation looking-paradigm that 2.5-year-olds can pass when they passively watch an 
adult participating in a verbal false-belief task (Scott, He, Baillargeon, & Cummins, 
2012). They look longer when the adult gives the incorrect (reality-based) answer. 
But since the infant is just an observer in these circumstances, there will be no 
pedagogic cues; and one might expect that the helpfulness-interpretation would be 
less salient because the infant herself is not involved in the task, and has no 
opportunity to help. Likewise, He et al. (2012) show using anticipatory looking that 
2.5-year-olds pass a false-belief task when the question, “I wonder where she will 
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look for her scissors?” is self-addressed by the experimenter while gazing at the 
ceiling, while they fail when the same words are directed at them. For there is a 
pedagogic cue (eye-contact) in the latter case but not the former; and only in the 
former it is plain that the child is not being invited to help. 
One might wonder whether the finding that 3-year-olds can pass a verbal 
false-belief task when prompted with the question, “What happens next?” (Rubio-
Fernández & Geurts, 2013) presents a problem for our account. For why shouldn’t 
children be motivated to help the Duplo character in the narrative, just as they are in a 
regular change-of-location false-belief task? This would lead them to guide the Duplo 
character to the actual location of the bananas she wants, rather than the believed 
location (which is what they actually do). But in fact the experimental procedure 
makes clear to participants that they are being invited to continue the story. They are 
invited to pick up the Duplo character and act-out the conclusion. This should induce 
the child to access her model of the character’s psychology, adopting it as her own in 
pretend-mode, and then acting-out what one should do when occupying that 
perspective. (One should go to the empty location to retrieve the bananas, of course, 
because that is where one thinks they are.) In effect, the procedure lowers the 
probability of a helpfulness-interpretation of the question, substituting in its place an 
invitation to pretend to be the character in the narrative (Westra, 2016a). 
We propose, then, that our pragmatic account can offer a well-motivated 
alternative explanation of the difficulties young children have with verbal false-belief 
tasks. We suggest, in fact, that the explanation is no less plausible than that offered by 
constructivists about mindreading, who think that children’s failures manifest a 
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conceptual deficit. In what follows we will apply our framework (together with other 
factors) to show that one can similarly explain the order of difficulty of the main 
components of the mindreading scale. 
6. Why DB is easier than FB 
With our account of the false-belief task in place, we are now in a position to explain 
children’s performance on the other items on the mindreading scale. We begin with 
why diverse-belief tasks should be easier for young children than false-belief tasks. 
Here is a description of a diverse-belief task, drawn from Wellman & Liu (2004), to 
be compared with the description of the false-belief task given in Section 5. 
Children see a toy figure of a girl, together with a sheet of paper with bushes 
and a garage drawn on it. The experimenter says, “Here’s Linda. Linda wants 
to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in 
the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?” 
This is the own-belief question. If the child chooses the bushes: “Well, that’s a 
good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She thinks her cat is in the 
garage.” (Or, if the child chooses the garage, she is told Linda thinks her cat is 
in the bushes.) Then the child is asked the target question: “So where will 
Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?” To be correct the child 
must answer the target question opposite from her answer to the own-belief 
question. 
In contrast with the false-belief task (where the child is told where the target object 
really is), in the diverse-belief task the child is initially asked what she thinks. From 
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the child’s perspective this would normally be interpreted as a question about the 
world, rather than about her beliefs as such. It therefore seems likely (given the 
pragmatic framework articulated in Section 4) that the child will interpret the 
experimenter’s subsequent assertion, “Linda thinks the cat is in the garage” as also an 
implicit statement about where the cat really is. In effect, she takes the experimenter 
to be offering evidence of where the cat is actually located. As a result, she is likely to 
prioritize the experimenter’s belief over her own guess, and thus forms the belief that 
the cat is in the garage.  
Now, consider the hypotheses that the child entertains when interpreting the 
experimenter’s query in this task. The intended interpretation will be, she wants me to 
show that I know that Linda will look for her cat where she thinks it is. The worldly-
knowledge-exhibiting interpretation will be, she wants me to show that I know where 
the cat is. The helpfulness interpretation will be, she wants me to help Linda find her 
cat. We think it likely that in this task, as in the false-belief task, younger children 
will favor one of the alternative hypotheses over the intended one. But in contrast to 
the false-belief task, this misunderstanding makes no difference to children’s 
performance. Since the child has inferred, based on the experimenter’s indirect 
speech act, that the cat is in the garage, all three interpretations will issue in the same 
answer, namely, the garage. Thus in contrast to the false-belief task, where the 
differing interpretations yield different responses, here all three interpretations yield 
the same (correct) response.  
If this account is accurate, then the only way for a child to fail a diverse-belief 
task (besides mere confusion, which is more likely in younger children, of course) is 
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if she ignores or fails to pick up on the indirect assertion of the experimenter, and 
goes on believing her own guess. Believing that the cat is in the bushes, the helpful 
thing to tell Linda is that this is where the cat is, which would then get scored as 
incorrect.45 (The worldly-knowledge-exhibiting interpretation, in contrast, will seem 
implausible in this case. For it was not the experimenter who taught her the location 
of the cat.) 
7. Why DD is easier than DB 
Having explained from a nativist perspective why the diverse-belief task may be 
pragmatically easier than the false-belief task, we now turn to explain why the 
diverse-desire task should be easier still. Here is a canonical description of the task, 
drawn from Wellman & Liu (2004). 
Children see a toy figure of an adult, together with a sheet of paper with a 
carrot and a cookie drawn on it. The experimenter says, “Here is Mr. Jones. 
It’s snack time, so Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat. Here are two different 
snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you 
like a carrot or a cookie best?” This is the own-desire question. If the child 
chooses the carrot: “Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes 
cookies. He doesn’t like carrots. What he likes best are cookies.” (Or, if the 
child chooses the cookie, she is told that Mr. Jones likes carrots.) Then the 
child is asked the target question: “So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Jones can only 
                                                
45 Why would children ever believe a mere guess? One possibility is that children (and especially 
young children) are chronically poor at source monitoring (Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Having guessed an 
answer (or indeed, having merely been asked to imagine a particular state of affairs), children are apt 
thereafter to speak and behave as if they really believe it. 
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choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Jones choose? A carrot or a 
cookie?” To be scored as correct, the child must answer the target question 
opposite from her answer to the own-desire question. 
This task is pragmatically easy for children for two related reasons. The first is that 
we know from corpus-data that young children have plenty of experience with 
conversations in which talk of people’s desires takes place, and are the topic of 
conversation, as well as with conversations in which there is encouragement for 
children to tell others what they want (MacWhinney, 2014; see also Tamoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006).  
Further, while “think” is most often used in an indirect manner, the same is 
unlikely to be true of “want.” Even though “want” can be used as an indirect way of 
communicating an imperative (e.g. “Do you want to be quiet?” can mean, “Be 
quiet!”), our suspicion is that such uses are comparatively rare. In fact children’s 
desires, unlike their other thoughts, are frequent topics of conversation in child-
directed speech: primary caregivers continuously monitor and manage their children’s 
needs, so it makes sense to ask them what they want on a regular basis. Children’s 
beliefs, in contrast, are less vital to the caregiving process. Thus, desire-talk in 
general, and the verb “want” in particular, is much less likely to pose pragmatic 
challenges for a novice speaker than does talk of cognitive states like belief and 
knowledge. Hence the conversation initiated with the child in a diverse-desire task is 
comparatively unambiguous. Most young children can easily figure out that they are 
being told what Mr. Jones wants, and can predict what he will choose accordingly. 
 In fact the only way a child can fail the diverse-desire task (aside from being 
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completely confused, mishearing the question, and so on) is if she thinks that 
everybody shares her desires, and refuses to accept the statement that Mr. Jones likes 
carrots. If she believes that Mr. Jones (like everyone) prefers cookies to carrots, then 
she will answer, “Cookies” when asked what Mr. Jones will choose. There is some 
evidence that children might reason egocentrically like this at an early age. Repacholi 
and Gopnik show this pattern of response at 14 months, but not 18 months (Repacholi 
& Gopnik, 1997). However, although children are fairly adept at giving and helping 
by this age (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007), the test question in this experiment was 
pragmatically demanding. In the pre-test phase, the experimenter expressed a 
preference for either broccoli or crackers. Then in the test phase, bowls of broccoli 
and crackers were placed between the child and the experimenter. The experimenter 
then asked, “Can you give me some?” and the child had to interpret the nature of the 
request. (“Some what?” she might wonder.) When 14-month-olds failed, this was 
interpreted as egocentrism. However, it could just be that they found the unusual 
nature of the request confusing—especially when, for them, the crackers are the most 
salient option (Baillargeon et al., 2015). In fact, even at much earlier ages children 
already show an understanding of goals and preferences, and are surprised when 
agents act contrary to their preferences (e.g. Woodward, 1998; Luo & Baillargeon, 
2005). We argue, then, that there is no age at which infants are truly egocentric about 
desires. 
 Indeed, we predict that it might be easier still for young children to pass a 
version of the diverse-desire test if it were to involve two protagonists, especially if 
the desired items were affectively-neutral for the child (or even better: novel). 
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Children could be introduced to Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith. They are told that Jones 
likes daxes, whereas Smith likes blickets, while being shown some of each. They 
could then be asked: “Which will Mr. Jones choose?” Here there would be no 
opportunity for the child’s response to be biased by her own preferences. 
8.  Knowledge-Access 
We turn now to the knowledge-access task, and the way in which performance on the 
task is influenced by cultural background. Here is a canonical statement of the task, 
drawn from Wellman & Liu (2004). 
Children see a nondescript plastic box with a closed drawer (which contains a 
small plastic toy dog inside). The experimenter says, “Here’s a drawer. What 
do you think is inside the drawer?” (The child can give any answer she likes, 
or indicate that she does not know). Next, the drawer is opened and the child 
is shown the contents of the drawer. The experimenter says, “Let’s see ... it’s 
really a dog inside!” The drawer is then closed: “Okay, what is in the 
drawer?” Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: “Polly has never ever seen 
inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does Polly know what is in the 
drawer?” (the target question) “Did Polly see inside this drawer?” (the 
memory question). To be correct the child must answer the target question 
“no” and the memory control question “no.” 
Why is this task easier than the false-belief task? In contrast with the latter, there is 
nothing in the task to suggest that Polly has the goal of finding the toy dog. So an 
interpretation of the test question as inviting the child to be helpful to Polly is 
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correspondingly less likely. One of the main factors that pushes children toward 
incorrect answers in a false-belief task is therefore absent. However, children might 
still assume that the most salient fact they have learned about the situation is that the 
drawer contains a toy dog. They might therefore hear the test question as an invitation 
to show what they have learned. Moreover, the intended-interpretation of the test 
question still makes cognitive states a topic of conversation, which is something that 
children at this age would regard as unusual. So there are still factors (albeit fewer 
factors) biasing young children toward an incorrect answer, thus explaining why the 
knowledge-access task is harder than the diverse-desire task. 
Is this the only reason why the knowledge-access task is harder than the 
diverse-desire task (and, for Western subjects, the diverse-belief task)? In fact there is 
good reason to think that at least part of the difficulty results from an experimental 
artifact. For the knowledge-access task (alone among tests in the mindreading scale) 
requires children to give yes/no answers.46 (Both answers need to be negative for the 
child to be scored as correct.) Yet we know that children of this age are strongly 
biased to answer all yes/no questions positively (Fritzley & Lee, 2003; Okanda & 
Itakura, 2008). The yes-bias is especially strong in younger children, but begins to 
weaken through the fourth year of life (at about the time children begin passing the 
knowledge-access task). So one reason why young children pass the diverse-desire 
task before they pass the knowledge-access task is likely to be this: the latter, but not 
the former, involves yes/no questions that require a negative answer. Moreover, a 
general capacity to inhibit the yes-bias is strongly predicted by both verbal ability and 
                                                
46 The same form of yes/no question was also used in the studies cited in Wellman & Liu (2004), on 
which the knowledge-access task was based (Fabricius & Khalil, 2003; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & 
Moses, 1990; Surian & Leslie, 1999). 
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executive (specifically inhibitory) control, even after controlling for age (Moriguchi, 
Okanda, & Itakura, 2008), both of which will be developing during this period. 
 If these explanations of the difficulty of the knowledge-access task in 
comparison to the diverse-desire and false-belief tasks are correct, then that leaves us 
with the question of cross-cultural differences in the relative ease of the diverse-belief 
and knowledge-access tasks. Why do children in countries like America and Australia 
find the former easier than the latter, whereas in countries like China and Iran the 
reverse is true? One part of the explanation turns on the role of the yes-bias in the 
knowledge-access task. For we know that children in “collectivist” cultures tend to 
perform better on measures of inhibitory control (Lan, Legare, Ponitz, Li, & 
Morrison, 2011; Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh et al., 2006), and that inhibitory control 
is strongly predictive of children’s ability to overcome the yes-bias (Moriguchi et al., 
2008). So one component of the explanation is simply that children from such 
cultures are able to overcome the yes-bias earlier than do children from 
“individualist” ones. 
In addition, we can also adopt Wellman’s own proposal, but giving it a 
pragmatic rather than a constructivist twist. He points out that in “collectivist” 
cultures there is much greater emphasis on the importance of knowledge, the 
importance of respecting those who have knowledge, and so on (Wellman et al., 
2006; Shahaien et al. 2011). As a result, we suggest, children in these cultures will be 
better positioned to recognize the conversational importance of the “seeing leads to 
knowing” principle that is at stake in the knowledge-access task. This raises the 
likelihood that the child will interpret the experimenter’s question as asking about 
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Polly’s state of knowledge rather than the location of the dog, leading her to answer 
correctly. 
Why should there be no difference between “collectivist” and “individualist” 
cultures in the age at which children pass verbal false-belief tasks, however (Wellman 
et al., 2001), given that the former have more advanced executive function abilities, 
and given that executive function predicts some of the individual variance in false-
belief, as we noted earlier? Here, too, we can appeal to Wellman’s own proposals for 
an explanation. While the increased executive-function abilities of “collectivist” 
children should give them a boost in false-belief tasks, at the same time the greater 
emphasis placed on differences of opinion and conflicts of belief distinctive of 
“individualist” cultures should provide additional help to Western children in figuring 
out the intent behind the false-belief question. So the two factors may cancel one 
another out. 
9. The benefits of training 
We have suggested explanations of the relative ordering of the main components of 
the mindreading-scale, and have sketched an account of cultural variation in the 
scale’s intermediate components. We now turn to consider the impact of training on 
false-belief performance. 
Rhodes & Wellman (2013) undertook a training study with American 
children, who normally find diverse-belief tasks significantly easier (and pass them 
3–6 months earlier) than knowledge-access tasks. They found that children who are 
already capable of passing both forms of task, while still failing false-belief tasks, are 
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more likely to benefit from training in the latter. Significantly more of these children 
transition from failing to passing false-belief tasks following training. Children who 
are only capable of passing diverse-belief tasks, in contrast (who prior to training fail 
both knowledge-access and false-belief), are less likely to benefit. Wellman (2014) 
argues that this finding supports a constructivist position. Children who are further 
along the mindreading scale are on the cusp of genuinely understanding the nature of 
false beliefs, and can benefit from training that targets that understanding, whereas 
those earlier along the scale are not, and do not. 
 From our nativist perspective, in contrast, the difference between diverse-
belief tasks and false-belief tasks is one of pragmatic difficulty, not conceptual 
understanding. (See Sections 5 and 6.) In particular, the same pragmatic 
misunderstanding that leads children to fail a false-belief task (interpreting the 
question in one or other reality-oriented way) will lead children to answer in a manner 
that is scored as passing a diverse-belief task. But it normally takes 6–12 months for 
children to transition from passing the diverse-belief task to passing the false-belief 
task. During this time they have more and more experience, both of conversations in 
which cognitive states are the main topic of conversation and of questions that are 
intended to elicit statements of what they know, and they learn to discriminate some 
of the cues that will enable them to tell when these things are so. For instance, 
children will start to see that facts about beliefs become especially noteworthy and 
relevant in false-belief scenarios, and that explicit talk about beliefs is associated with 
particular syntactic frames, such as complementation syntax (Papafragou et al. 2007). 
They will also start to realize that we often make implicit reference to beliefs. In 
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addition, children will develop more general pragmatic competence during this 
period. This will help them to develop more refined expectations about how various 
question-types (such as knowledge-exhibiting questions and invitations to be helpful) 
tend to be asked. All of these experiences will lead them to gradually update their 
priors about the conversational relevance of cognitive states, and help them to 
successfully apply their knowledge of beliefs in conversation. 
In contrast, children who have recently become capable of passing the 
knowledge-access task are only 3–6 months away from being able to pass the false-
belief task (Rhodes & Wellman, 2013). It makes sense, then, that they will already 
have accumulated much of the necessary conversational experience and sensitivity. 
As a result, they are better positioned to respond to training in false-belief tasks. They 
improve (whereas children who fail knowledge-access tasks do not), not because the 
training induces a conceptual understanding of false belief, but simply because the 
training makes talk of mental states more salient to them—thereby increasing the 
prior probability of the interpretation intended by the experimenter. In children who 
do not yet pass knowledge-access tasks, in contrast, the lure of the helpfulness and 
real-world knowledge-exhibiting interpretations is still too strong for them to show 
any improvement. 
At this point, a defender of the conceptual development account might point 
out that, on her view, the benefits of training should generalize to a wide range of 
situations. The conceptual-change account should predict that the benefits of training 
will extend to mindreading tasks employing quite different questions and materials, 
involving different experimenters, and taking place in an entirely different context. 
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Our view, in contrast, might predict that the benefits of training will be quite local 
and context-specific, and not generalize to new testing situations. What is learned in 
just a few training episodes (as opposed to months of communicative experience) is 
more likely to be that in conversations with these people taking place in this context 
cognitive states are relevant to the interpretation of these sorts of questions.47 While 
these predictions have not been directly tested, there are some results in the literature 
that might seem to support the conceptual-change account. We will discuss these 
briefly here. 
 Lecce et al. show that training both children and aging adults on false-belief 
tasks not only improves false-belief performance, but also benefits later performance 
on metamemory tasks, enabling them to exhibit greater knowledge of such facts as 
that it is easier to learn a short list than a long one, or that it is easier to learn in the 
absence of distractions (Lecce, Bianco, Demicheli, & Cavallini, 2014; Lecce, 
Bottiroli, Bianco, Rosi, & Cavallini, 2015). But the transfer, here, is quite unlikely to 
be conceptual. For how could training on false-belief tasks lead people to acquire 
explicit knowledge of these sorts, and to do so in just a couple of days? Rather, we 
suggest that the training increases the saliency of mental-state talk in general. 
Consistent with this interpretation, Lecce et al. (2015) found that false-belief training 
significantly decreases performance on physical-causality tasks. It is surely more 
likely that false-belief training decreases the saliency of physical-causal talk than that 
it causes some sort of physical-causality forgetting, or results in some kind of 
conceptual loss.  
                                                
47 This will depend on the nature of the training, of course. If the training takes place across many 
different contexts, then it may succeed in raising the probability that cognitive states are a topic of 
conversation across the board. 
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In addition, there is the recent finding that false-belief training helps children 
in a game of deceive-the-experimenter, where to win they have to tell the 
experimenter the opposite of what they know to be true (Ding, Wellman, Wang, Fu, 
& Lee, 2015). But this, too, is explicable in terms of a kind of pragmatic saliency-
priming. For repeated exposure to false-belief tasks should make other people’s 
cognitive states more salient when engaging in verbal interactions with the 
experimenters, making it easier for them to adopt the false-belief-causing response. 
And it should also make clear to children that a helpfulness response (telling the 
experimenter where the target really is, thereby enabling him to win) is not what is 
being looked for in the interaction (any more than it is in false-belief tasks). 
10. Conclusion 
Our goal in this paper has been to show that the mindreading-scale data do not 
presently support constructivism over nativism. This is because there are plausible 
and empirically well-motivated alternative explanations of those results that are 
consistent with nativism about mindreading, mostly of a pragmatic sort. Our main 
proposal has been that it takes children a while to figure out that cognitive states can 
be a topic of conversation and to develop the pragmatic skills to discern when this is 
so. They have to learn that sometimes questions are really invitations for them to 
display their psychological knowledge rather than requests to be helpful or to display 
their knowledge of the worldly facts. And we have suggested that the various 
components of the mindreading scale differ in their pragmatic demands rather than 
their conceptual difficulty. But we have, of course, done nothing to support the truth 
of nativism here. That is a task for another occasion. Our goal has merely been to 
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show that the robustness of the mindreading scale (and children’s late-emerging 
performance in verbal false-belief tasks, in particular) provides inadequate reason to 
reject a nativist account. 
 Nevertheless, our pragmatic account is surely ripe for experimental testing. 
For it makes numerous predictions for interventions that should impact children’s 
performance in these tasks which would distinguish it from constructivist approaches. 
Here we will mention just one. Manipulations that draw children’s attention to 
cognitive states as the topic of conversation should improve performance. For 
instance, one should be able to “prime” children who are on the cusp of passing false-
belief tasks into succeeding, by engaging them in conversations in which cognitive 
states of belief or knowledge are the topic. Whether those conversations concern false 
beliefs in particular, or provide feedback that could be construed as evidence for a 
representational theory of mind, should be irrelevant. The same effect could also be 
achieved through task designs that highlight the salience of cognitive states—for 
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